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Foreword  
To avoid catastrophic climate change, 197 countries adopted the Paris Climate Agreement in 2015. It 
aims to limit the increase of global average temperatures since pre-industrial levels to well below 2°C, 
while pursuing efforts to stay within 1.5°C. Bringing all countries together to achieve this Agreement 
in 2015 is one of my proudest personal achievements as UN Secretary-General. Since the historic 
agreement, 123 countries responsible for 63% of emissions have adopted or are considering net-zero 
targets. These net-zero targets have put the Paris Climate Agreement’s goals within striking distance.  
Financing a rapid transition to a net-zero, climate-resilient economy in line with the goals of the Paris 
Climate Agreement will require significantly greater investments, investments in a different set of 
assets, and investments that address the humanitarian imperative of social inclusion and poverty 
alleviation. Rapid decarbonization will have an overall net benefit but also significant distributional 
trade-offs.  
Climate change places a triple responsibility on financial decision-makers, regulators of the financial 
systems and governments. First, they must maintain the capacity of the financial system to support 
economic activity, encourage entrepreneurship, and safeguard the assets of millions of people. 
Second, they must channel a much larger share of world private savings towards sustainable 
investments and low-carbon options.  
Third, they must maximize the development co-benefits of climate policies. This is a precondition to 
scale up climate action in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic. Decisions taken by leaders today to 
revive economies will either entrench our dependence on fossil fuels or put us on track to achieve the 
Paris Climate Agreement targets and the Sustainable Development Goals. 
A clear conclusion from the IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5 °C above pre-
industrial levels is that the sooner we act, the lower the physical and transition risks of climate change 
and the higher the synergies between climate action and other societal benefits.  
However, financial actors might not fully anticipate the consequences of climate change as it initially 
affects geographies that represent a limited share of the market economy and capital flows. In one 
scenario, the financial system could ultimately disengage from threatened assets but would transfer 
to communities and taxpayers the costs of climate damage. In a second scenario, the financial system 
would not readjust on time in function of new information, endangering the stability of the entire 
financial system. In both cases, the financial system would fail to deliver on its triple responsibility to 
address climate change.  
This publication is a science-based call to financial decision-makers to incorporate climate change in 
the valuation of financial assets and to lead the transition to net-zero, climate resilient economies. 
Every policy and every investment have an impact on the future. Policy makers and financiers 
continuously forecast future conditions. The report outlines how they can use models to understand 
the financial implications of climate change and capitalize on the new opportunities of a climate 
economy. Together, we must ensure that our response to the double tragedy of climate change and 
Covid-19 finances a safer, fairer, and sustainable future for us all.  
 
 
Ban Ki-moon 
President and Chair of the Global Green Growth Institute  
8th Secretary-General of the United Nations  
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Executive Summary 
This publication aims to help financial decision-makers incorporate climate change in the valuation of 
financial assets and accelerate the transition to a net-zero, climate resilient economy, based on the 
latest scientific findings and policy developments.  
What climate science says about risks associated with climate change  
The earth’s surface global mean temperature is currently 1.0°C higher (0.8°C - 1.2°C range) than in the 
pre-industrial period (1850-1900). It has increased faster in these 170 years than at any other time in 
the past 800,000 years. This trend is unequivocally linked to human activities responsible for the 
release of greenhouse gases (GHGs) (IPCC 2018). The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide 
(CO2) has increased from 280 ppm (parts per million) in 1850-1900 to 417 ppm in 2020, predominantly 
due to fossil fuel combustion, cement manufacturing, and land use change (deforestation, removal of 
land cover and land tilling).  
Multiple lines of evidence show warming is already affecting all earth systems and many human 
systems, and that its impacts are more severe than initially anticipated. As shown in Figure 1 below, 
we fear today that a 2°C increase in mean global temperatures could wipe out 90% of coral reefs and 
endanger the security and economic livelihoods of hundreds of millions of people. 
Figure 1: Climate risks depending on global mean temperature increases. 
 
Source: IPCC. (2018). 
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The net impact of warmer climates on people, ecosystems and the economy is the result not only of 
temperature increases, but also of the capacity to prevent damage and adapt to the changing 
circumstances. The impacts of a warmer world experienced so far are distributed unevenly. For most 
countries in the Global North, the evidence of net economic impacts so far is inconclusive, but in most 
poor countries global warming is already having a negative impact on gross domestic product (GDP) 
and wellbeing.  
To avoid catastrophic climate change, 197 countries in 2015 adopted the Paris Agreement. Its aim is 
to limit the increase of global average temperatures since pre-industrial levels to well below 2°C, while 
pursuing efforts to stay within 1.5°C. Cumulative CO2 emissions and global mean temperature increase 
are directly related. To stabilise the global mean temperature, global net CO2 emissions must decline 
to zero. Table 1 compares global net CO2 emission declines depending on the targeted limit to global 
warming. 
Table 1. Global CO2 emissions decline and year of reaching net zero CO2 emissions associated with 
limiting warming to 1.5°C and 2°C. Interquartile ranges are shown in square brackets (based on 
table 2.4 in Rogelj et al., 2018).  
Long term (2100) 
temperature limit 
Global CO2 emissions 
reduction in 2030 
compared to 2010 
Year of reaching net zero 
CO2 emissions 
Year of reaching net 
zero GHG emissions 
1.5°C 45% [40-60%] 2050 [2045-2055] 2065 [2060-2085] 
2°C 25% [10-30%] 2070 [2065-2080] 2090 or thereafter 
 
The Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) as of 2018 do not yet chart a path towards net-zero 
CO2 emissions. Their full implementation is projected to result in warming within about 2.9°C - 3.4°C 
until the end of the century. The difference in projected impacts between 1.5°C and 2°C is already 
significant, but the difference in impacts between 2°C and 2.5°C is projected to be even greater. This 
increases further at higher temperatures. The estimated impacts at 3°C or 4°C of warming are 
expected to trigger very large, abrupt, or irreversible changes in the climate system with cascading 
impacts on nature and humans.  
For example, chances of a major heatwave occurring in somewhere in the world in a given year 
increases five- to sixfold in a 1.5°C warmer world compared to the past three decades and almost 
twentyfold in a 4°C warmer world. For global staple foods, the chances of a damaging hot spell 
increases around twofold for rice and fourfold for maize in a 4°C warmer world compared to 1.5°C. 
We still have choices in how we limit warming to 1.5°C. To illustrate this, the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) in its Special Report on global warming of 1.5°C (SR1.5 2018) highlighted 
four illustrative emission pathways that give us a 50% to 66% chance of limit warming to 1.5°C with 
limited or no temporary temperature overshoot (see table 2). All of them accelerate the deployment 
of fossil-free energies but they differ in the emphasis placed on reducing CO2 emissions more quickly 
in the next decades by lowering energy demand through behavioural change compared to relying on 
great quantities of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) (P1 and P2 pathways versus P3 and particularly P4 
in table 2).  
Pathways relying on CDR have greater uncertainties on technological maturity and economic, socio-
cultural, and institutional feasibility, and are likely to present greater trade-offs with food and water 
security, and biodiversity protection and restoration. Of the four illustrative pathways, P1 minimizes 
these uncertainties and trade-offs while P4 would exacerbate tensions between mitigation, 
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adaptation and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Such tensions would represent economic 
and financial risks, for instance if they lead to a sudden shift in development strategies. 
The longer the delays, the higher will be the adaptation needs. Fundamentally, adaptation cannot be 
disconnected from overall sustainable development trajectories (IPCC 2018) because the magnitude 
of risk climate change poses is also a result of existing vulnerabilities and capacities to anticipate and 
adapt. Thus, development interventions such as reducing the infrastructure investment gaps or 
improving health systems intrinsically build adaptive capacities and reduce risk. 
Table 2: Climate risks characteristics of four illustrative pathways. 
 
Source: IPCC. (2018). 
Adaptation actions might also be maladaptive or insufficient. Maladaptation denotes adaptation 
actions that disproportionately burden the most vulnerable, have high opportunity costs, reduce the 
incentive to adapt or instil path dependency. In some places and for some human and ecological 
systems, there are limits to adaptation when the pace of climate change impacts makes the 
prevention of intolerable risks impossible (Klein et al., 2014). Such limits emerge either from situations 
where the technological or institutional capacity to adapt is ‘by passed’ by the pace of damage or from 
hard constraints such as thermal limits of survival for species, or sea level rise that makes permanent 
relocation the only viable adaptation strategy in certain low-lying areas.  
Scaling up both climate mitigation and adapation is critical to reduce the physical and transition risks 
from climate change. Physical risks stem from the impact of climate change and transition risks are 
related to uncertainties about technological innovations, changes in legislation and regulation, 
implementation of a carbon tax and changes in consumer behaviour (e.g., a shift in attitudes towards 
the purchase of diesel cars, air travel or deforestation-based products).  
Reducing the physical and transition climate risks on society will require an acceleration of the 
transition of our socio-economic systems towards zero-emission development pathways to avoid 
physical and detrimental social tipping points. For adaptation and mitigation, four system transitions 
 P1 P2 P3 P4 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Storyline  Social, business and technological 
innovations; lower energy demand by 
2050; higher living standards (also in 
the global South); downsized energy 
system; rapid decarbonisation of 
energy supply; afforestation the only 
CDR option considered; no CCS. 
Focus on sustainability incl. energy 
intensity; human development; 
economic convergence; international 
cooperation; shifts towards sustainable 
and healthy consumption patterns; low-
carbon technology innovation; well-
managed land systems; limited BECCS. 
Societal and technological development 
follow historical patterns; emissions 
reductions through changing 
production of energy and commodities 
rather than through reductions in 
demand. 
Economic growth and globalisation; greenhouse-
gas-intensive lifestyles, including high demand 
for transportation fuels and livestock products; 
emissions reductions mainly through 
technological means; CCS and BECCS. 
Temperature outcome (within 
0.1°C accuracy, median estimate) 
Warming limited to 1.5°C  Warming limited to 1.5°C  Warming limited to 1.6°C  Warming exceeds 1.5°C limit by 20% (0.3°C) with 
assumption it can be reversed by 2100 
Risk of overshoot of 1.5°C Small Small Large  Very large (designed to first miss the target) 
Alignment with sustainable 
development 
Very strong Strong Medium, with potential trade-offs Weak, with marked trade-offs  
Physical climate risks to 2050 Lowest Low Medium Highest 
Physical climate risks after 2050* Low Lowest Low High 
Transition risks & Opportunities 
Energy demand 
reduction/management 
Very high  High Medium Low 
Energy supply 
Infrastructure investments 
Lowest  Medium  High Highest 
Asset stranding  Near-term retirement of fossil-fuel 
assets 
Near-term retirement of fossil-fuel 
assets 
Moderate stranding of fossil-fuel assets Stranding delayed by a decade but then with 
higher magnitude** 
Reliance on CDR Small Medium Large Extreme 
Deployment of land-based 
mitigation & bioenergy 
Medium Medium High Extreme 
Discontinuation risks Failure to achieve demand and 
behavioural changes may leave little 
time to ramp up supply-side 
measures like CCS. 
Full portfolio of supply and demand 
options hedges against failures and 
discontinuation risks 
Failure to address potential trade-offs 
from land-based mitigation, risks 
policies being reversed due to societal 
concerns.    
High risk of necessary post-2030 climate policies 
strongly competing with other societal concerns 
and hence not being implemented or 
discontinued.  
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are key: the energy system transition, the land and ecosystem transition, urban and infrastructure 
system transitions, and the industrial system transition.  
The combination of aggregated but integral modelled pathways and a detailed assessment of the 
feasibility of mitigation and adaptation options across the four systems transitions reveals that it is 
still the technical feasibility space to limit warming to 1.5°C. However, the technical maturity and cost 
efficiency of many options need to be improved, especially in hard-to-decarbonize sectors. 
Furthermore, some options that are already financially attractive are hampered by systemic barriers, 
including those in the financial system. The systems transitions will require a dramatical scale-up of 
climate-related innovation and investment and a rapid decline in investments in low carbon options. 
Climate Investments: proactive approaches for addressing gaps and realizing 
opportunities 
Financing a rapid transition to a net-zero emission, climate-resilient economy will require significantly 
more investment in low carbon and climate resilient options. They will be scaled up at the required 
level only if they alleviate and do not exacerbate the short-term economic and social tensions. They 
must also address the imperative of social inclusion and poverty alleviation (UNFCCC, 1992). 
This places a triple responsibility on financial decision-makers, financial system regulators and 
governments:  
 Maintain the capacity of the financial system to support economic activity, encourage 
entrepreneurship, and safeguard the assets of millions of savers, pensioners, local public 
institutions, and businesses; 
 Channel a much larger share of private savings towards sustainable and low carbon options; 
and 
 Create a business environment in which climate policies alleviate today's tensions in the world 
economy (unemployment, poverty, inequality, trade disputes).  
The Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS, 2019) estimates that between 2% and 5% of 
total financial assets are directly at risk. The Sustainability Accounting Standard Board (2016) indicates 
that climate-related risks could impact 72 out of 79 industries assessed representing 93% of equities 
(or $27.5 trillion) by market capitalization in the US alone. Financial players will progressively integrate 
physical risks under a ‘value at risk’ framework, and revise them according to new information, but it 
is not certain that this integration will happen fast enough to maximize the chances of a P1 or P2 
scenario. 
Financial actors might not immediately anticipate the consequences of climate change as it is initially 
affecting zones that represent a limited share of the market economy and capital flows. In a first 
scenario, the financial system would ultimately disengage on time from threatened assets but would 
transfer the costs to communities and taxpayers. In a second scenario, the financial system would not 
readjust on time in function of new information, endangering its own entire stability. In both cases, 
the financial system would fail to deliver on its triple responsibility to address climate change.  
Understanding the challenge of climate finance requires differentiating between global low-carbon 
investment needs, and the amounts needed to bridge the infrastructure investment gap (IMF, 2014). 
Global low-carbon investment needs are estimated between 3.9% and 8.7% of the world’s GDP over 
the next two decades. However, the additional investments compared to a business-as-usual scenario 
could be funded by redirecting between 1.4% and 3.9% global savings (2.4% on average, see box 4.8 
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of IPCC, 2018) that currently flow towards real estate, land, and liquid financial vehicles. This task is 
not insurmountable macroeconomically. More challenging is that it has to be achieved together with 
the reduction of the infrastructure investment gap. This gap could be of 15.9% (Global Infrastructure 
Hub 2017) or even 32% (Arezki et al., 2017) between 2035 and 2040 for a cumulative value between 
$14.9 and $30 trillion worldwide.  
The global infrastructure investment gap reflects risk-averse behaviours that cause a wedge between 
the propensity to save and the propensity to invest. It also represents a misalignment in the 
geographic distribution of savings, capital flows, and infrastructure investment needs. Developed 
countries have ageing populations, high saving capacities, established social safety nets, and the bulk 
of their infrastructures in place. Developing countries have a significant opportunity to leapfrog as 
they still must build two-thirds of their infrastructure capital. They have young populations, a wide 
range of savings rates (from 15% to over 40%) and underdeveloped social safety nets.  
This misalignment is compounded by the limited capital flows from high-saving to low-saving regions. 
From a microeconomic point of view, the infrastructure investment gap looks like an economic 
paradox since, with current low-interest rates, infrastructure investments deliver a real return 
between 4% and 8% (Bhattacharya et al., 2016). With an estimated $14 trillion of negative-yielding 
debt in OECD countries and $26 trillion of low carbon, climate-resilient investment opportunities in 
developing countries by 2030, capital in search of higher results should flow from developed to 
developing countries to address this gap. This is not happening. Three-quarter of global climate 
finance is deployed in the country in which it is sourced, revealing a strong preference for home-
country investments where risks are well understood. This explains why sub-Saharan Africa accounted 
for only 5% of climate-related financial flows in non-OECD countries, at $19 billion (CPI, 2019). 
Neither financial investors nor project developers try and take advantage of what the IMF's World 
Economic Outlook (Abiad et al., 2014) describes as 'free lunch' opportunities because these 
opportunities face several political, regulatory, macroeconomic, and technical barriers. These barriers 
and associated business costs are magnified in developing countries because of the considerable 
differences in their creditworthiness. The spread between the interest rate of a bond issued by the US 
government and the interest rate of loans to a given country comes on top of projects' risk premium. 
In 2018, it was 1.30% for a five-year project and 2.5% for a ten-year project in BBB-rated countries. At 
the beginning of 2020 it jumped to 6% and 9%, respectively, in B-rated countries. Before the Covid-19 
crisis, more than 60 countries were rated below BBB and had access to capital only at interest rates 
higher than 18% for two-year projects. The impact of this inequality is exacerbated by the fact that 
countries in this class are often those whose creditworthiness might be the most affected by climate 
change damages (Buhr et al., 2018). 
Two approaches are advocated to incentivize the changes needed in investment, production, and 
consumption patterns and induce technological progress that brings down carbon abatement costs 
on time to avoid catastrophic climate change: market fixing and market shaping. 
The market-fixing approach aims to send the right pricing and risk signals to enable financiers to better 
value assets and reallocate capital accordingly. To achieve these objectives, it calls on scaling up 
carbon pricing and promoting climate risk disclosure and taxonomies. There is a widely shared 
consensus in economics that, in a frictionless world with perfect capital markets and without 
uncertainty, carbon prices would be sufficient to secure the attractiveness of low carbon options for 
capital markets. In the real world, however, the carbon price signal is swamped by the noise of other 
signals, such as oil prices, interest rates, and currencies exchange rates in addition to business 
uncertainty.  
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The high-level commission led by Nicholas Stern and Joseph Stiglitz (Stern-Stiglitz, 2017) estimated 
that carbon prices should be set at a higher level than the $40–80/tCO2 by 2020 and $50–100/tCO2 
by 2030 to be capable to cover these noises. The scaling-up and geographical expansion of carbon 
prices to such levels are highly uncertain. The adverse economic and distributive effects of higher 
energy prices and the removal of fossil fuel subsidies are more severe for low-income countries, 
countries with a large share of energy-intensive activities, and countries exporting fossil fuels.  
The full deployment of climate risk disclosure and taxonomies faces a different set of challenges. 
Historically, the concerns about the implications of climate change for the financial community arose 
from potential fiduciary obligations of reinsurers and pension funds. The focus on liability risks 
responded to the advocacy strategies deployed by universities’ endowments and mission-based 
investors such as philanthropic and religious organisations to remove the 'social license' from the fossil 
fuel industry and to raise the cost of its access to capital. 
Marc Carney's speech (2015) on the 'tragedy of the horizons’ broadened this perspective, adding the 
'physical risks' and the 'transition risks' to the 'liability risks’. This alert from the former Governor of 
the Bank of England had an influence amongst financial actors who generally do not consider the 
future beyond a quarterly horizon. This discussion led to the creation of a Taskforce on Climate-related 
Financial Disclosures (TCFD) under the auspices of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) that brings 
together financial authorities from G20 countries to prevent new financial crises. Climate disclosure 
is meant to help asset managers to correct their short-term bias and send financial signals to investors 
by setting the cost of loans in an inverse proportion of the projects' carbon content, thereby hedging 
against abrupt corrections in financial markets caused by cumulated mispricing of assets. 
In late 2017, the Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) was launched. It now has 90 
members, amongst which central banks from many developed and developing countries. Observers 
include the IMF, the World Bank, the Bank for International Settlements, the Basel Committee for 
Banking Supervision, and the Green Climate Fund (GCF). Its first report established a taxonomy of 
green, non-green, brown, and non-brown products (NGFS, 2019) to help direct investments to 
sustainable options. In parallel, stress test methodologies have tried to assess the risk exposure of 
various asset portfolios. The concrete outcome of these processes is still uncertain, but they show an 
increasing demand for knowledge tools from high-level decision-makers in an uncertain environment. 
While market-fixing approaches address information barriers for financiers, the market shaping 
approach has gradually emerged over the past 30 years to address both demand and supply barriers 
to climate finance. It aims to tackle several risks that deter entrepreneurs and financiers from exposing 
their resources:  
(i) Political and regulatory risks arising from governmental actions, including changes in 
policies or regulations that adversely impact infrastructure investments;  
(ii) Macroeconomic and business risks arising from the possibility that the industry 
and/or the economic environment are subject to change; and  
(iii) Technical risks determined by the skills of operators and managers, and related to the 
features of the project (e.g. its complexity, construction, and technology).  
A direct consequence of these risks is the limited supply of high-quality, transparent low-carbon 
climate-resilient investment projects despite the unmet demand for new infrastructures.  
The need to address market and investment barriers to low carbon options has inspired the 
development of a wide array of public measures. According to the International Energy Agency’s 
Policies and Measures Database, over 5,500 climate policies and instruments are currently in use 
globally. Table 3 shows the main types of instruments.  
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Table 3: Environmental Policies Instruments 
 
The first four columns list environmental policy instruments that create a business context conducive 
to the demand for low carbon investments and the supply of low carbon projects, including by 
reducing their transaction costs. In contrast, financial de-risking instruments do not seek to change 
the overall business context to reduce risks but tackle projects’ risks by transferring part of them to 
public actors. They blend public and private resources, often to encourage market-creating projects 
that will establish a proof of concept (innovation to market) or commercial track record (market 
deployment) for new climate solutions. The structuring approach of financial de-risking instruments 
is often referred to as ‘blended finance’. 
A common limit of these instruments lies in the fact that the tighter the public funding constraints, 
the lower the political credibility of their maintenance over time. Combined with the difficulty of 
controlling opportunistic behaviours in subsidies, this can lead public budget officers working under 
tight constraints and competing demands to lower support to these measures or make their 
administration particularly complex. 
Furthermore, blended finance has proven effective for mature technologies in mature markets, but 
not for early-stage technologies in early-stage markets. Over 2012-18, $205.1 billion was mobilized 
from the private sector by official development finance interventions. But only 5.3% of these flows 
went to Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and other Low-Income Countries (LICs), and very little to 
adaptation and nature-based solutions (CPI, 2019). The role of guarantees was particularly important 
in these countries, as they mobilised 62% and 46% of the resources in 2015-16 and 2017-18 
respectively. Direct equity investment followed, mobilizing 14% and 24% of the resources in 2015-16 
and 2017-18 respectively (Attridge and Engen, 2019). However, blended finance has usually taken the 
form of relatively safe senior debt rather than guarantees and equity.  
While blended finance aims to use public resources in a catalytic manner to align private sector flows 
with sustainable development, the leverage ratio of blended finance for climate change is very low. On 
average, every $1 of resources invested from multilateral development banks (MDBs) and development 
finance institutions (DFIs) leveraged just $0.37 of private finance in LICs because of a poor business 
context (Attridge, and Engen, 2019). The geographic and thematic concentration of blended finance 
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and its low leverage ratio are significant obstacles to tapping into the vast private savings pool to reduce 
the infrastructure investment gap in emerging economies. 
In theory, market-fixing approaches can be embedded within broader market-shaping efforts (see 
Table 3 placing key market-fixing policies within measures directed at the demand side - top line). In 
practice, market-fixing and market-shaping approaches tend to emphasize different sub-sets of public 
instruments.  
Market fixing relies on price signals to create a demand for low-carbon low-climate-risk goods and 
services and shift financial flows towards climate-friendly investments. Market shaping intervenes at 
the level of sector policies and endeavours to create a demand and directly de-risk the supply of 
climate-friendly investments to crowd-in private finance.  
Experience to date, however, shows that these two approaches are mutually supportive and should 
be deployed in tandem. The combination of the two sets of instruments helps overcome the 
constraints inherent to each approach and increases the overall efficiency and effectiveness of public 
policies and finance to accelerate the transition to net-zero climate-resilient economies.  
Scaling Climate Finance in the context of Covid-19 
The Covid-19 pandemic has pushed the global economy into the deepest recession since the Second 
World War. The World Economic Outlook (April 2021) estimated a 3.5% contraction in global growth 
in 2020, which is far higher than the 0.1% recorded after the 2008 financial crisis. The situation has 
been particularly devastating for developing countries. During the subprime crisis they continued 
growing, with a rate of 2.8% in 2008 (World Bank, 2020a), whereas their GDP in 2020 contracted by 
2.6% and 5% respectively, China excluded (World Bank, 2021). In addition to the health consequences 
of the pandemic, these countries experienced sharp drops in commodity export prices, including oil 
prices, a collapse in tourism revenues, reduced exports to developed economies, and the blocking of 
specific nodes in the supply chain. This led to an increase of the number of people facing food 
insecurity from 135 million in 2010 to 272 million in 2020 and a significant transfer of the employed 
population into ‘inactivity’ (ILO, 2020). An additional 500 million people have fallen below the poverty 
line. This increase, the first in thirty years, was particularly acute in LDCs and Small Island Developing 
States (SIDS) (UNU WIDER, 2020). 
To rescue their economies and support a strong recovery, governments are adopting large-scale 
expansionary fiscal measures. The fifty largest economies in the world have announced $14.6 trillion 
in fiscal spending in 2020, of which $1.9 trillion is for long-term economic recovery (UNEP, 2021). 
There is a disparity between announced spending by advanced economies (22.5% of their combined 
GDP), and that of emerging markets and developing countries (10.6%) - a 17 times greater amount on 
a per capita basis (UNEP, 2021). One of the key reasons for this disparity is the difference in the cost 
of additional debt. For most high-income countries, the cost of additional debt is close to 0% per 
annum. For developing countries, with low credit ratings, interest rates are significantly higher, 
increasing the cost of any new debt thus burdening fiscal budgets. The proportion of poorest countries 
in or at high risk of debt distress has climbed to 55% in January 2021, from 50% in 2019 and 26% in 
2013 (LIC Debt Sustainability Framework).  
The Covid-19 crisis has brought the world at a crossroad in the fight against climate change. Shan et 
al. (2020) have shown that carbon-intensive packages would increase global five-year emissions (2020 
to 2024) by 16.4% (23.2 Gt) while the ‘greenest’ one could reduce them by 4.7% (6.6 Gt). Forster et 
al. (2020) show that a ‘colourless’ recovery would put the world on an emissions pathway that would 
pass the 1.5°C threshold within a decade and the 2°C limit soon after 2050, whereas the world has a 
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50% chance to stay below the 2°C warming target with a moderate green stimulus, and below 1.5°C 
with a solid green stimulus. The UN Environment Programme (2021) finds that, in the 50 largest 
economies, only 18% of recovery spending and only 2.5% of total spending will enhance sustainability. 
In 2020, G20 countries spent $208.73 billion supporting fossil fuel energy, compared with at least 
$143.02 billion supporting clean energy. 
Advanced economies are undertaking expansionary fiscal measures, but the present low green 
content of their recovery packages could entrench their dependence on fossil fuels and undermine 
the capacity to meet their net-zero emission targets by 2050. Developing countries, on their side, are 
suffering from increasingly restricted monetary and fiscal spaces, which seriously undermine their 
ability to finance mitigation and adaption measures. A weak comeback in regions that represent 
(China excluded) 55% of the world markets may in turn make the world economic recovery more 
fragile. 
The main argument not to postpone climate action in a context of competing pressures on public 
budgets is that bridging the infrastructure investment gap would be a blueprint for a fast and robust 
global recovery thanks to the strong knock-on effect on infrastructure investments, notably unlocking 
two-thirds of world infrastructure markets currently ‘frozen’ in developing economies. The public 
policy devices mobilised to redirect savings towards low-carbon options have the advantage, 
compared to untargeted recovery measures, to secure the efficiency of every unit of public money 
spent. 
The economic and financial impacts of Covid-19 have exacerbated the four challenges developing 
countries were already facing to scale up climate action. These countries will need to ensure that 
climate action and economic recovery are mutually supportive, scale up investment without 
increasing the debt burden, attract large scale private financial flows in a context of perceived higher 
investment risk, and secure access to long-term affordable finance at a time of rising capital costs. 
These challenges can be addressed through four sets of complementary actions. 
1. Integrating policies on climate action, sustainable development, and Covid-19 stimulus to 
minimize incremental investment requirements and optimize development co-benefits 
NDCs are at the heart of the Paris Agreement and countries’ commitment to transform their 
development trajectories. Countries are currently in the process of submitting updated and more 
ambitious NDCs. Integrating policies on climate action, sustainable development and Covid-19 
stimulus measures could reduce investment needs by 40% and leverage the stronger economic 
multiplier of climate action to build back better.  
The imperative to green the Covid-19 recovery amplifies the need to translate integrated NDCs into 
investment plans that: (i) align, combine and sequence multiple sources of international and domestic 
finance from the public and private sectors; (ii) enable countries to take a more integrated value-chain 
investment approach, notably by acquiring the technical capacity needed to address policy and 
regulatory gaps to improve the bankability of the NDC project pipeline; and (iii) identify financial 
mechanisms and investment patterns that will not increase sovereign debt, but catalyse private funds 
and increase access to long-term affordable finance.  
2. Alleviating developing countries’ debt burden to create fiscal space to finance their green, 
climate-resilient recovery plans  
Several multilateral actions are being taken to help developing countries cope with the economic crisis 
and creating more fiscal space. The G20 has suspended – not cancelled – official bilateral debt payments 
for 42 low-income countries, corresponding to approximately $5 billion. The discussion about the 
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issuance of new special drawing rights (SDRs) has been reopened by the IMF (IMF, 2021). An even 
bolder action is to consider at scale ‘debt-for-climate swaps’ - a partial cancellation of debt by the 
creditor government transforming the remaining part into local currency and directing it to investment 
in climate action. The use of debt reduction could be a function of a country’s overall climate 
vulnerability.  
The scaling-up of new payment facilities (debt-for-climate swaps, SDRs) is complex to design and 
requires a pipeline of high-quality bankable climate investments, which can be capitalized in the form 
of credible assets, together with transparent and credible domestic spending. A direct linkage with 
integrated and costed NDCs and dedicated technical assistance facilities would remove some of these 
barriers. These unconventional debt management instruments respond to the specifics of the post-
Covid-19 context and are additional, not alternatives to the commitment of developed countries to 
mobilize $100 billion in climate finance per year by 2020 for developing states. Reaching the $ 100 
billion commitment is critical to finance essential non-market services as well as the deployment of 
environmental policy instruments to create a conducive business context to catalyse low carbon, 
climate resilient private investment. 
3.  Leveraging sovereign and multi-country guarantee funds to reduce investment risk and 
catalyse private finance 
The experience of blended finance highlights the importance of sovereign and sub-sovereign (local 
governments) guarantees to overcome the barriers hindering climate-friendly investments in nascent 
technologies in nascent markets. They reduce upfront risks, provide a broad risk coverage, a lower cost 
for public budgets of donor countries, and a high leverage ratio of public to private capital (Blended 
Finance Taskforce, 2018).  
In a context of heightened risk perception in developing countries, multi-sovereign guarantees, where 
developed countries rated AAA-AA join forces to provide an AAA-AA backing to developing countries, 
could:  
• Expand developing countries' access to capital markets at a lower cost and longer maturities 
thanks to the reduction of creditworthiness risks, especially for small states; 
• Accelerate the recognition of climate assets suitable for institutional investors seeking 'safe 
investments havens’, thanks to the reputational effect of a selection of projects with 
multilateral backing and transparent assessment methods; 
• Strengthen climate disclosure through high grades in the environmental notation of these 
climate assets;  
• Increase the effectiveness of carbon pricing with more mitigation activities unlocked by a 
given price level, a stronger employment impact and higher funding facilities to help industries 
adapt; 
• Free up grant capacities for SDGs and adaptation by crowding in private investments for 
mitigation. For non-marketable activities, grants are the key instrument to develop policy and 
capacity and establish a conducive investment environment that deals with risks.  
 
4. Increasing developing countries’ access to the green bond market  
The potential of green bonds is estimated at €29.4 trillion over 2030 (Bolton et al., 2020). They can 
drive new public-private partnerships and increase access of developing countries to long-term 
affordable debt. The development of green bonds is far below this potential (only $1 trillion in the ten 
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years since their launch and $258 billion in 2019, CBI 2020). They represent about 5% of total bonds 
issued globally and fell by 11% in 2020 in the aftermath of the pandemic. 
Options to significantly broaden developing countries’ access to the green bond markets include 
creating credible and standardized assessments and valuation methods to select, design, value, 
monitor and report on high-quality bankable climate projects; and enhancing country capacity to 
design, float and implement green bonds. 
Some countries are already exploring the four sets of instruments discussed above. For example, Saint 
Lucia, one of the SIDS hardest hit by climate change, is translating its NDC into a detailed investment 
plan exploring financial innovations like resilience bonds and climate debt swaps to supplement public 
resources and finance these efforts without raising its debt. 
Conclusion 
Accelerating the transition to reduce emissions along a P1 or P2 pathway is required to maximize 
development co-benefits and achieve both the Paris Agreement and the SDGs. The P1 and P2 
pathways, which entail reducing energy demand and improving energy efficiency, are technical 
feasible for both adaptation and mitigation. Financing a P1 or P2 pathway will require significantly 
more investment and investment in a different set of low emission, climate resilient assets.  
However, inertia on the part of the financial system means that in the absence of policy interventions, 
the financial system will not be able to redirect carbon private capital on the needed scale. This will 
lead towards a P3 or P4 scenario with greater tension with sustainable development outcomes and 
more severe overshoots cannot be excluded. The Covid-19 pandemic exacerbates this inertia, and 
with the large fiscal stimulus measures, ‘colourless’ investments could tip the world beyond the 1.5°C 
threshold within a decade and the 2°C limit soon after 2050.  
To avoid this irreversible outcome, financial flows must first be shifted towards a P1 and P2 pathway. 
This can be achieved through a combination of market fixing and shaping efforts. Deploying both 
approaches in tandem helps overcome the constraints inherent to each approach and increase the 
overall efficiency and effectiveness of public policies and finance to scale up climate action.  
Second, four strategic interventions could enable developing countries to address the additional 
economic and financial challenges created by the pandemic for developing countries to realize their 
climate ambitions. Together these four interventions – support to integrated and costed climate policy 
and plans; alleviating developing countries’ debt burden; leveraging sovereign and multi-country 
guarantee funds; and increasing developing countries’ access to the green bond market – would 
enable developing countries to foster a green, climate resilient recovery from the Covid-19 crisis.  
These four immediate actions could also have a structural positive impact on the future climate policy 
architecture. They could a) facilitate the deployment of carbon pricing since de-risking mechanisms 
will increase the volume of low-carbon investments at a given carbon price; b) magnify the impact of 
financial transparency and disclosure though the emergence of investments and asset classes of 
higher credibility; c) reduce the fragmentation of climate and development finance; and d) enhance 
the capacity of official climate and development assistance to support nonmarketable services. 
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Introduction  
Earth’s surface warming since the pre-industrial baseline period (1850-1900) has been faster than at 
any other time in the past 800,000 years. Currently, the global mean surface temperature is 1.0°C 
higher (0.8°C - 1.2°C range) than the baseline. Temperatures are rising at an average of 0.2°C (0.1 - 
0.3°C) per decade (IPCC, 2018). Warming is unequivocally linked to human activities responsible for 
the release of greenhouse gases (GHGs) (IPCC, 2018). The atmospheric concentration of carbon 
dioxide (CO2) has increased from 280 ppm in the pre-industrial period (1850-1900) to 417 ppm in 2020, 
predominantly due to fossil fuel combustion, cement manufacturing, and land use change 
(deforestation, removal of land cover and land tilling) (NOAA, 2019).  
Multiple lines of evidence show warming is already affecting all earth systems and many human 
systems. The net impact of warmer climates on people, ecosystems and the economy is the result not 
only of temperature increases, but also of the capacity to prevent damage and adapt to the changing 
circumstances. Poorer countries, where access to information, mobility, infrastructure, and state 
support is limited, are typically most exposed.  
To avoid the catastrophic impacts of climate change, 197 parties adopted the Paris Agreement in 2015, 
which aims to limit the increase of global average temperatures since pre-industrial levels (1850-1900) 
to well below 2°C, while pursuing efforts to stay within 1.5°C. The Paris Agreement also aims to 
increase countries’ ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change (United Nations, 2015). 
This need to be done while eradicating poverty and meeting the UN Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs).  
Further rises in temperature and sea level are inevitable until GHG emissions are cut to net zero. A 
report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) - the UN body providing scientific 
information on human-induced climatic changes – established that limiting warming to 1.5°C over the 
course of the century requires steep reductions by 2030 and net zero CO2 emissions by 2050.  
Since the release of the report, 123 countries responsible for 63% of emissions have adopted or are 
considering net-zero targets. These net-zero targets have put the Paris Agreement’s goals within 
striking distance (Climate Action Tracker, 2020). Rapid decarbonization will have an overall net benefit 
but also significant distributional trade-offs. The entire business model of countless profitable 
corporations will be upended by rapid and deep decarbonization and some countries and 
communities may be disproportionately affected.  
Climate change creates a set of two inter-related challenges for the financial system. First, the impacts 
of climate change pose growing risk to the financial stability and its capacity to support economic 
activity and safeguard the assets of millions of savers, retirees, institutions, and businesses. The 
Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS 2019) estimates that between 2 and 5% of total 
financial assets are directly at risk. The Sustainability Accounting Standard Board (2016) indicates that 
climate-related risks could impact 72 out of 79 industries assessed representing 93% of equities (or 
$27.5 trillion) by market capitalization in the US alone. Because climate risk cannot be diversified 
away, investors need to understand and adequately price their exposure to it. 
Second, supporting the transition to a low-carbon, climate-resilient economy in line with the goals of 
the Paris Agreement will require significantly more investment, investment in a different set of assets, 
and investment that addresses the humanitarian imperative of social inclusion and poverty alleviation 
(de Coninck et al., 2018).  
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The financial system has a pivotal role to play in accelerating the transition to a net-zero economy, 
mitigating climate physical and transition risks, seizing the opportunities that emerge from the 
economic transformation and ensuring a just transition-precondition to a fast transition. The total 
value of the net-zero economy is estimated at $2.3 trillion (UN and UAE, 2020).  
Based on an extensive review of the scientific and economic literature, the Report highlights the key 
climate physical and transition risks associated with different low-carbon climate resilient pathways 
and the imperative for financial decision-makers to integrate climate risks and net-zero opportunities 
into every single investment decision. While knowledge of the concept of net zero is growing, 
understanding of its implications for individual businesses is poor - 64% of a survey of 1,000 senior 
decision makers across a range of industries in all parts of the UK were not confident they fully 
understood the implications for their firm (Net zero barometer report, 2021).  
The Report is divided into three chapters. Chapter I discusses the climate physical and transition risks 
associated with different climate mitigation and adaptation pathways and their financial implications. 
Chapter II discusses whether the financial system will be able to redirect private capital at the needed 
scale in the absence of policy interventions and presents past and on-going efforts to align finance 
with the sustainable development goals and the Paris Agreement. Chapter III proposes four 
interventions to achieve this objective in the context of Covid-19.  
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Chapter 1: What Climate Science says about climate change related risks 
Every policy and every investment are a wager on the future. Policy makers and financiers 
continuously forecast future conditions. Since its 2nd assessment report (1996) the IPCC assesses 
scenarios of the consequences of business-as-usual behaviours in contrast to mitigation pathways, 
with the aim of informing decision-makers. This chapter outlines the state of the art of such scenarios 
and pathways for limiting warming to 1.5°C, identifies how they can be used to understand the 
financial implications of climate change and climate policies, and outlines the feasibility conditions of 
the systems transitions needed to avoid the worst consequences of climate change. 
1.1. Carbon budgets and mitigation pathways 
1.1.1. Carbon Budgets and limits to warming 
The remaining carbon budget is the amount of CO2 that can still be emitted while limiting warming to 
around 1.5°C or 2°C (see Box 1.1). Pathways that stay within this budget can be described by emission 
milestones in specific years and can be characterised by two core variables (see Table 1.1):  
1. the decline in global annual net anthropogenic CO2 emissions in 2030 compared to 2010 
2. the year in which the goal of net zero CO2 emissions is reached.  
Non-CO2 emissions in pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C also require deep reductions, but 
with little variation between 1.5°C and 2°C (IPCC 2018; Rogelj et al., 2018). 
Table 1.1. Global CO2 emissions decline and year of reaching net zero CO2 emissions associated with limiting 
warming to 1.5°C and 2°C. Interquartile ranges are shown in square brackets, based on Table 2.4 in (Rogelj 
et al., 2018).  
Long term (2100) 
temperature limit 
Global CO2 emissions 
reduction in 2030 
compared to 2010 
Year of reaching net 
zero CO2 emissions 
Year of reaching net 
zero GHG emissions 
1.5°C 45% [40-60%] 2050 [2045-2055] 2065 [2060-2085] 
2°C 25% [10-30%] 2070 [2065-2080] 2090 or thereafter 
 
 
Box 1.1: How the Carbon Budget Determines CO2 Emissions Limits  
Cumulative CO2 emissions and global mean temperature increase are directly related. To stabilise 
the global mean temperature, global CO2 emissions must decline to zero. The amount of CO2 that 
can still be emitted while keeping warming below a specific temperature is known as the remaining 
’carbon budget’. To limit global warming to 1.5°C (i.e. exceeding it by no more than 0.1°C at any 
point during this century with some likelihood) this budget has been estimated at 420 and 580 
billion tonnes of CO2 (GtCO2) from 2018 onwards in order to have a two-in-three and one-in-two 
chance, respectively. These estimates can increase or decrease by up to 250 GtCO2 depending on 
how successfully non-CO2 GHGs, e.g. methane, are limited. Earth-system feedbacks, like the release 
of CO2 and methane from thawing permafrost, could further decrease the carbon budgets by 100 
GtCO2 over the course of this century (Rogelj et al., 2018). These numbers are subject to 
considerable uncertainty and in the past new insights have led to both upward and downward 
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revisions. In addition, the temperature response to GHG concentrations shows a probability 
distribution. 
In 2017, global CO2 emissions were 42 Gt (Le Quéré et al., 2018; Rogelj et al., 2018). If this rate 
continues, the remaining carbon budget for 1.5°C will be depleted within 10 or 14 years starting 
from 2018. More recent years, including the emission dip in 2020 because of the Covid 19-
measures, have not modified this number by much (Friedlingstein et al., 2020; Forster et al., 2021).  
 
The Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) as of 2018 do not yet chart a path towards net-zero 
CO2 emissions. Their full implementation is projected to result in warming within about 2.9-3.4°C until 
the end of the century. The annual emissions in 2030 for 1.5°C pathways would have to be 19-33 
GtCO2e (or roughly 30-50%) lower than what the NDCs are projected to deliver (de Coninck et al., 
2018; Rogelj et al., 2018). 
1.1.2. Mitigation pathways: nature of the trade-offs 
The emissions pathway until 2100 varies depending on the speed and scale of the deployment of 
mitigation action over time. Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) explore the technological, 
economic and geophysical aspects of emissions pathways (see box 1.2 for more details).  
Box 1.2: How Are Emission Pathways Constructed?  
The emission pathways that the IPCC assesses are generally created with tools known as Integrated 
Assessment Models (IAMs). These models link the climate system with the economy, including all 
known sources and sinks of GHG emissions. All IAMs include emissions associated with the energy 
sector, and many include emissions from land use. They include energy efficiency but rarely model 
the specific and societal dynamics of transportation, industry and agriculture. The models are used 
to explore the dynamics of human-Earth systems under different scenarios for reaching certain 
climate targets. IAMs are internally consistent under a multitude of constraints and assumptions, 
and the model outcomes are often, but not exclusively, the result of a social cost optimisation over 
the course of the century. 
IAMs utilize various model structures to represent society’s behaviours. Some models start from 
an energy system optimisation core with a detailed representation of how various options for 
energy supply can meet a given level of energy demand and only to a limited degree represent the 
macro-economic feedbacks of climate policies. Other models start from an economic core and 
incorporate energy system transitions. IAMs do not represent individual companies, and only a few 
represent the public and private finance sectors, always in a highly aggregated way. Although they 
do not model capital markets and monetary policies explicitly (Espagne, 2018), the IAM have given 
inputs to highlight financial aspects (Bowen et al., 2014; UNEP Inquiry, 2018). 
IAMs make assumptions about societal dynamics and drivers (population growth, economic 
growth, evolution of energy intensity), economic parameters (growth rate, discount rates) as well 
as international cooperation or the level of RandD. IAMs often link their assumptions to 
overarching socio-economic narratives. The standard in IPCC emission pathways are the five 
‘Shared Socio-economic Pathways’ (SSPs): narratives with different premises for factors such as 
economic growth, population, international cooperation, and energy demand. 
A pathway is then generated by a) retaining assumptions on the costs and efficiencies of different 
technologies and on the potentials of wind, solar or fossil fuel energy or geological CO2 storage and 
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b) imposing constraints, typically on the carbon budget and certain technologies (e.g., amount of 
energy storage required to support a given share of intermittent renewables). 
 
The IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C (SR1.5) highlighted four illustrative 
pathways, drawn from a range of IAMs (see Table 1.2). The difference between the pathways is the 
emphasis placed on eliminating gross CO2 emissions quickly in the next decades by limiting and 
reducing energy demand and energy efficiency improvements through behavioural change and 
digitalisation (P1 and P2 pathways in Table 1.2) (Grubler et al., 2018; WBGU, 2019), compared to 
reliance on great quantities of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) (P3 and particularly P4 in Table 1.2). 
The active removal of CO2 from the atmosphere plays two important yet distinct roles in shaping 
emissions trajectories. It first helps bringing global CO2 emissions down to net zero. Mitigation 
strategies determine how high gross emissions will be, and therefore how much CDR is needed to 
reach net zero (compare the respective CO2 emission contributions at the time global CO2 emissions 
reach net zero in the illustrative pathways P1-P4 in Table 1.1). Second, CDR draws down CO2 beyond 
the point of net zero to slowly revert global warming (see box 1.3). 
Box 1.3: The implications of ‘overshooting’ 
‘Overshoot’ refers to a situation in which a) a temperature limit is first exceeded with the intention 
of halting warming at a later point in time, and then relying on the possibility of reducing global 
mean temperature through active CDR and b) there is a high likelihood that a return below the 
temperature limit by the end of the century will not be achieved.i In this strategy, the temperature 
limit that is considered safe can be exceeded before being sure that either halting or reversing 
global warming by CDR is possible and that the CDR will not be in conflict with food and water 
security or biodiversity protection. Pathway P4 further illustrates the characteristics of overshoot 
pathways (see Table 1.2). 
A way forward in conceptualising the scenarios that increase the likelihood of meeting the Paris 
Agreement’s temperature goal (Rogelj et al., 2019b), is to determine the cumulative amount of CO2 
emitted until emissions are net zero at a given point in time for a given target and calculate the 
amount of net negative CO2 emissions needed to balance residual non-CO2 emissions for which at 
present no mitigation options have been identified. This logic demonstrates that the transition 
challenge is situated in the next couple of decades until net-zero CO2 emissions are achieved 
globally.  
 
Strategies lowering energy demand show more synergies with other societal goals than strategies 
focused on the supply side (Roy et al., 2018a) which more often imply trade-offs with food and water 
security or biodiversity protection. Of the four illustrative pathways, P1 is most aligned with the 
sustainable development agenda, while P4 is projected to result in more tensions between mitigation 
pathways and sustainable development objectives in the medium to long term (see Table 1.2a). Such 
tensions would represent economic and financial risks in case of a sudden shift in strategy when the 
trade-offs materialise.  
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Table 1.2a | Risk characteristics of four illustrative pathways pursuing different strategies to limit warming to 1.5°C as shown in Figure SPM.3b of the IPCC 
Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C (IPCC, 2018). Darker cell colours indicate higher risk. AFOLU = Agriculture, Forests and Other Land Use, BECCS 
= bioenergy and carbon dioxide capture and storage.  
 P1 P2 P3 P4 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Storyline  Social, business and technological 
innovations; lower energy demand by 
2050; higher living standards (also in 
the global South); downsized energy 
system; rapid decarbonisation of 
energy supply; afforestation the only 
CDR option considered; no CCS. 
Focus on sustainability incl. energy 
intensity; human development; 
economic convergence; international 
cooperation; shifts towards sustainable 
and healthy consumption patterns; low-
carbon technology innovation; well-
managed land systems; limited BECCS. 
Societal and technological development 
follow historical patterns; emissions 
reductions through changing 
production of energy and commodities 
rather than through reductions in 
demand. 
Economic growth and globalisation; greenhouse-
gas-intensive lifestyles, including high demand 
for transportation fuels and livestock products; 
emissions reductions mainly through 
technological means; CCS and BECCS. 
Temperature outcome (within 
0.1°C accuracy, median estimate) 
Warming limited to 1.5°C  Warming limited to 1.5°C  Warming limited to 1.6°C  Warming exceeds 1.5°C limit by 20% (0.3°C) with 
assumption it can be reversed by 2100 
Risk of overshoot of 1.5°C Small Small Large  Very large (designed to first miss the target) 
Alignment with sustainable 
development 
Very strong Strong Medium, with potential trade-offs Weak, with marked trade-offs  
Physical climate risks to 2050 Lowest Low Medium Highest 
Physical climate risks after 2050* Low Lowest Low High 
Transition risks and Opportunities 
Energy demand 
reduction/management 
Very high  High Medium Low 
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Energy supply 
Infrastructure investments 
Lowest  Medium  High Highest 
Asset stranding  Near-term retirement of fossil-fuel 
assets 
Near-term retirement of fossil-fuel 
assets 
Moderate stranding of fossil-fuel assets Stranding delayed by a decade but then with 
higher magnitude** 
Reliance on CDR Small Medium Large Extreme 
Deployment of land-based 
mitigation and bioenergy 
Medium Medium High Extreme 
Discontinuation risks Failure to achieve demand and 
behavioural changes may leave little 
time to ramp up supply-side 
measures like CCS. 
Full portfolio of supply and demand 
options hedges against failures and 
discontinuation risks 
Failure to address potential trade-offs 
from land-based mitigation, risks 
policies being reversed due to societal 
concerns.  
High risk of necessary post-2030 climate policies 
strongly competing with other societal concerns 
and hence not being implemented or 
discontinued.  
* P2 has the lowest post-2050 physical climate risk as it combines low peak warming with a strategy to achieve net CDR after 2050 and gradually reverse warming. ** Highest capital turnover 
due to short-term fossil-fuel expansion and medium-term retirement of carbon intensive infrastructure   
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Table 1.2b | Contributions of bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), total carbon capture and 
storage (CCS) and agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU) in four illustrative pathways pursuing 
different strategies to limit warming to 1.5°C as shown in Figure SPM.3b of the IPCC Special Report on Global 
Warming of 1.5°C (IPCC, 2018). 
 P1 P2 P3 P4 
 
 
  
 
    
Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) (negative values = removals) (Gt CO2 per year) 
2020-2030 
average 
0 0.00 - 0.03 - 0.30 
2030-2040 
average 
0 - 0.26 - 0.22 - 3.60 
2040-2050 
average 
0 - 0.95 - 0.84 - 11.35 
2050-2060 
average 
0 - 1.87 - 2.30 - 17.65 
Net emissions from agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU, negative values = removals) (Gt CO2 per year) 
2020-2030 
average 
2.03 1.77 2.60 1.48 
2030-2040 
average 
-0.54 -1.39 -0.39 3.03 
2040-2050 
average 
-1.24 -3.24 -1.89 4.78 
2050-2060 
average 
-2.26 -3.95 -2.84 3.23 
  
1.2. Risks, damages and adaptation needs under different mitigation pathways 
Global warming has already had significant impacts on human and natural systems (IPCC, 2014, 2018, 
2019b, 2019c) and all earth systems will continue to be impacted, due to inertia of earth systems 
(IPCC, 2001; 2019a). For example, even after stabilisation or reduction of GHG concentrations, sea 
level is projected to continue rising for centuries. Inertia related to human systems is more dependent 
on regional policies and actions, which in turn shape adaptation pathways and outcomes. It is 
important to understand the impacts associated with different levels of warming for various human, 
natural and managed systems and we examine first these links based on the difference between 1.5°C 
and 2°C temperature levels before emphasizing the risks in terms of overshoot of these levels. We do 
so using the five reasons of concerns due to global warming pictures in Figure 1.1.  
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Figure 1.1. The identified reasons for concern are: threats to endangered species and unique systems, damages 
from extreme weather events, effects that fall most heavily on developing countries and the poor within 
countries, global aggregate impacts, and large-scale high-impact events. The colouring in the bars, nicknamed 
‘burning embers’, is based on multiple lines of evidence showing that risks increase with global warming. They 
show that warm-water corals are heavily at risk even at 1.5°C, as well as fisheries, the Arctic and coastal regions. 
Terrestrial ecosystems, fluvial flooding, crop yields and the health and mortality impacts of heat waves show a 
contrast between 1.5 and 2°C. Source: Figure SPM.2 in (IPCC, 2018).  
1.2.1. Risks and impacts to natural ecosystems at 1.5°C and 2°C 
On land, impacts on biodiversity and ecosystems, including species loss and extinction, are projected 
to be lower at 1.5°C of global warming compared to 2°C. Limiting global warming to 1.5°C is also 
projected to lower the impacts on freshwater and coastal ecosystems and to retain more of their 
services to humans (See Table 1.3). Warmer temperatures increase risks to marine biodiversity, 
fisheries, and ecosystems, as well as to their functions and services to humans, as illustrated by recent 
changes to Arctic sea ice and warm-water coral reef ecosystems. 
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Table 1.3 | Projected impacts of climate change at 1.5°C vs. 2°C vs. 3°C in specific regions, including impacts 
for human systems. Regions that were not hotspots at lower warming levels become hotspots at higher levels 
of warming.  
Region Warming of 1.5°C or less  Warming of 1.5° to 2°C  Warming of up to 3°C 
Arctic Sea 
Ice 
− Arctic summer sea ice 
likely to be maintained  
− Habitat losses for polar 
bears, whales, seals, and 
sea birds  
− Benefits for Arctic fisheries  
− 50% or higher risk of ice-
free Arctic in summer  
− Habitat losses for polar 
bears, whales, seals, and 
sea birds possibly critical if 
summers are ice-free 
− Benefits for Arctic fisheries  
− Arctic very likely to be ice-
free in summer  
− Critical habitat losses for 
polar bears, whales, seals, 
and sea birds  
− Global atmospheric 
temperature rises from 
1.5° to 3.5°C increase 
maximum catch potential 
from 29.1 ± 1.6% to 55.0 ± 
3.9% 
Arctic Land 
Regions 
− Cold extremes warm by a 
factor of 2 to 3, reaching 
up to 4.5°C (high 
confidence)  
− Biome shifts in the tundra 
and permafrost 
deterioration likely 
− Cold extremes warm by as 
much as 8°C (high 
confidence)  
− Larger intrusions of trees 
and shrubs in the tundra 
than under 1.5°C of 
warming likely; larger but 
constrained losses in 
permafrost likely  
− Drastic regional warming 
very likely  
− Collapse in permafrost 
possible (low confidence);  
− Drastic biome shift from 
tundra to boreal forest 
possible (low confidence) 
Alpine 
Regions 
− Severe shifts in biomes 
likely  
− Robust increases in runoff 
in Fenno-Scandinavia and 
the Alpine regions 
− Even more severe shifts 
likely 
− Distinct increase in the 
changes to mean, low and 
high runoff at 2°C 
compared to 1.5°C 
− Critical losses in alpine 
habitats likely 
− Increased runoff in most 
of Norway, Sweden and 
northern Poland 
− Decreased  
runoff around the entire 
Iberian coast, the Balkan 
Coast and parts of French 
coast. 
Southeast 
Asia 
− Risks for increased 
flooding related to sea 
level rise  
− Increase in heavy 
precipitation events  
− Significant risks of crop 
yield reductions avoided 
− Higher risks of flooding 
related to sea level rise 
(medium confidence)  
− Stronger increase in heavy 
precipitation events 
(medium confidence)  
− One-third decline in per 
capita crop production 
(medium confidence) 
− Substantial increases in 
risks related to flooding 
from sea level rise  
− Substantial increase in 
heavy precipitation and 
high-flow events  
− Substantial reductions in 
crop yield 
Mediterrane
an  
− Increase in probability of 
extreme drought (medium 
confidence) 
− Reduction in runoff of 
about 9%, with likely 
range 4.5 to 15.5% 
(medium confidence)  
− Robust increase in 
probability of extreme 
drought (medium 
confidence) 
− Robust change of average 
maximum temperature 
and temperature 
extremes over more than 
− Robust and large increases 
in extreme drought 
− Substantial reductions in 
precipitation and in runoff 
(medium confidence) 
− Very high risks of water 
deficit (medium 
confidence) 
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− Risk of water deficit 
(medium confidence) 
50% of land; >60% 
increase in the number of 
tropical nights in parts of 
the region  
− Further reductions (about 
17%) in runoff with likely 
range of 8 to 28% 
(medium confidence) 
− Higher risks of water 
deficit (medium 
confidence) 
West Africa 
and Sahel 
− Increases in the number of 
hot nights and longer and 
more frequent heatwaves 
likely 
− Reduced maize and 
sorghum production likely, 
with area suitable for 
maize production reduced 
by as much as 40% 
− Further increases in 
number of hot nights and 
longer and more frequent 
heatwaves likely 
− Negative impacts on maize 
and sorghum production 
likely larger than at 1.5°C; 
medium confidence that 
vulnerabilities to food 
security in the African 
Sahel will be higher at 
2.0°C compared to 1.5°C 
− Substantial increases in 
the number of hot nights 
and heatwave duration 
and frequency (very likely) 
− Negative impacts on crop 
yield may result in major 
regional food insecurities 
(medium confidence)  
Southern 
Africa 
− Reductions in water 
availability with robust 
reduction in precipitation 
of up to 0.4 mm day−1 over 
parts of Zambia and South 
Africa under 1.5°C 
warming (medium 
confidence) 
− Increases in number of hot 
nights and longer and 
more frequent heatwaves 
(high confidence) 
− High risks of increased 
mortality from heatwaves  
− High risk of undernutrition 
in communities dependent 
on dryland agriculture and 
livestock 
− Larger areas facing 
reductions in rainfall and 
water availability under 
2°C warming (medium 
confidence) 
− Further increases in 
number of hot nights and 
longer and more frequent 
heatwaves (high 
confidence), associated 
higher risks of increased 
mortality from heatwaves 
compared to 1.5°C 
warming (high confidence) 
− Higher risk of 
undernutrition in 
communities dependent 
on dryland agriculture and 
livestock 
− Large reductions in rainfall 
and water availability 
(medium confidence) 
− Drastic increases in the 
number of hot nights, hot 
days, and heatwave 
duration and frequency, 
with substantial impact on 
agriculture, livestock, and 
human health and 
mortality (high 
confidence) 
− Very high risk of 
undernutrition in 
communities dependent 
on dryland agriculture and 
livestock 
Tropics  − Increases in the number of 
hot days and hot nights as 
well as longer and more 
frequent heatwaves (high 
confidence) 
− Risks to tropical crop 
yields in West Africa, 
Southeast Asia, Central 
and South America 
significantly lower than 
under 2°C of warming 
− Larger increase in hot days 
under 2°C compared to 
1.5°C is projected  
− Significant changes in 
rainfall; e.g. spatially- 
averaged annual mean 
precipitation across India 
increases by 2-14% under 
2°C compared to 1.5°C 
− Risks to tropical crop 
yields in West Africa, 
− Oppressive temperatures 
and accumulated 
heatwave duration very 
likely to have a direct 
impact on human health, 
mortality, and productivity 
− Further changes in 
precipitation patterns; e.g. 
significant decrease in 
rainfall across NW Indian 
sub-continent; increase in 
the frequency of extreme 
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Source: Amended from (Cheung et al., 2016; Donnelly et al., 2017; Dosio and Fischer, 2018; Hoegh-Guldberg et 
al., 2018, 2019; Maúre et al., 2018; Mishra et al., 2017; Nikulin et al., 2018) 
 
1.2.2. Risks and impacts to human systems at 1.5°C and 2°C 
The impacts of a warmer world so far have been experienced unevenly. For countries in the Global 
North, the evidence of economic impacts is inconclusive, but “for most poor countries there is >90% 
likelihood that per capita GDP is lower today than if global warming had not occurred” (Diffenbaugh 
and Burke, 2019). The same imbalance exists for health impacts (Watts et al., 2019). For example, risks 
from malaria and dengue fever are projected to increase with warming from 1.5°C to 2°C, including 
shifts in their geographic range (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2019) and Western Pacific, South-East Asia 
and Africa seeing an increase of more than 10% since 1990 of the vulnerability to heat extremes (Watts 
et al., 2019). 
Limiting global warming to 1.5°C compared to 2°C is expected to reduce the proportion of the world 
population exposed to climate-induced water stress by up to 50% with considerable variability 
between regions. For instance, many small island could experience lower water stress (Hoegh-
Guldberg et al., 2019) while under SSP2 (‘middle of the road’ scenario), dryland populations vulnerable 
to water stress, drought intensity and habitat degradation could reach 178 million people by 2050 at 
1.5°C warming, increasing to 220 million people at 2°C warming, and 277 million people at 3°C (IPCC, 
2019a). 
Global warming of 2°C would see a loss of 7-10% of global rangeland stock. Pastoral systems are 
particularly vulnerable. In the land sector, several climate drivers exacerbate risk exposure for 
agriculture and food security: shifts in climate envelopes causing shifts in crop varieties planted, 
Southeast Asia, and 
Central and South America 
possibly extensive 
precipitation in east India, 
Bangladesh.  
− Substantial reductions in 
crop yield very likely 
Small 
Islands 
− Land of 60,000 fewer 
people exposed by 2150 
on Small Island Developing 
States (SIDS) compared to 
2°C 
− Risks for coastal flooding 
reduced by 20 to 80% for 
SIDS compared to 2°C  
− Freshwater stress reduced 
by 25% as compared to 
2°C  
− Increase in the number of 
warm days for SIDS in the 
tropics  
− Persistent heat stress in 
cattle avoided  
− Loss of 70 to 90% of coral 
reefs 
− Tens of thousands of 
people displaced owing to 
inundation of SIDS 
− High risks for coastal 
flooding and increased 
frequency of extreme 
water-level events 
− Freshwater stress from 
projected aridity 
− Further increase of ~70 
warm days/year 
− Persistent heat stress in 
cattle in SIDS 
− Loss of most coral reefs 
and weaker remaining 
structures owing to ocean 
acidification (i.e., less 
coastal protection) 
− Substantial and 
widespread impacts 
through inundation of 
SIDS, coastal flooding, 
freshwater stress, 
persistent heat stress, and 
loss of most coral reefs 
(very likely) 
− Risk of multi-meter sea 
level rise due to ice sheet 
instability 
Fynbos 
biome 
− About 30% of suitable 
climate area lost (medium 
confidence) 
− Increased losses (about 
45%) of suitable climate 
area (medium confidence) 
− Up to 80% of suitable 
climate area lost (medium 
confidence) 
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seasonal changes, extreme events affecting critical growth periods (flooding/droughts), diseases and 
pests. Such physical impact will lead to 1) reduced crop yields, mainly in lower latitude regions; 2) 
reduced nutritional content of crops (carbohydrate dilution, less protein, zinc, and iron); 3) food price 
instability 4) supply chain disruption (due to extreme weather events) and 5) changes in crop 
suitability (Hurlbert et al., 2019). The forestry sector will also face risks due to higher frequency and 
intensity of wildfires. Recent examples in California, Australia and Portugal are obvious testimonies. 
With warming, impacts across energy, food, and water sectors overlap spatially and temporally, 
creating new – and exacerbating current – hazards, exposures, and vulnerabilities. These could affect 
increasing numbers of people and regions. Exposure to multiple and compound climate impacts is 
projected to increase between 1.5°C and 2°C of global warming with greater proportions of people 
both exposed and susceptible to poverty in Africa and Asia. Such ‘risk hotspots’ are illustrated in Figure 
1.2.  
Figure 1.2 Comparing population centres of low-income people (right) to hotspots of multi-sector risk (MSR) 
(left). 
 
 
The maps in the left column show the full range of the multi-sector risk (MSR) score (0–9), with scores ≤5.0 shown 
with a transparency gradient and scores >5.0 with a colour gradient. Score must be >4.0 to be considered ‘multi-
sector’. The maps in the right column overlay the 2050 vulnerable populations (low income) under Shared Socio-
Economic Pathway (SSP)2 (greyscale) with the multi-sector risk score >5.0 (colour gradient), thus indicating the 
concentrations of exposed and vulnerable populations to risks in multiple sectors. Source: Figure 3.19 in Hoegh-
Guldberg et al. 2018 (IPCC, 2018). 
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Beyond such ‘hotspots’ overshooting 1.5°C will already lock in impacts on infrastructure, livelihoods, 
income and biodiversity for SIDS and certain coastal cities such as Mumbai, Dhaka, Miami and New 
York, as well as increase disaster incidence. 
1.2.3. The implications of temperature overshoots  
Temperature overshoots will be associated with increased physical risks (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 
2019). What is less understood is how higher temperatures might result in specific impacts for 
particularly vulnerable locations, populations, or species as well as the compounding risks at higher 
warming levels (Lawrence et al., 2020). Estimated impacts at 3°C or 4°C of warming are expected to 
trigger very large, abrupt or irreversible changes in the climate system with cascading impacts on 
nature and humans. Estimates of the probability in examples of global average climatic events may 
change as follows (Arnell et al., 2019):  
1) the chance of a major heatwave increases from 5% in 1981–2010 to 28% at 1.5°C and 92% at 
4°C  
2) the chance of an agricultural drought increases from 9 to 24% at 1.5°C and 61% at 4°C  
3) the chance of a river flood occurring every 50 years increases from 2 to 2.4% at 1.5°C and 5.4% 
at 4°C (so it becomes a 20-year-flood)  
4) the chance of a damaging hot spell for maize increases from 12.3 at 1.5°C to 50% at 4°C and 
for rice from 27 to 46%.  
Impact assessments at higher temperatures are associated with considerable uncertainty and regional 
variation (Arnell et al., 2019). Estimates of changes in water availability find that the number of people 
exposed to freshwater vulnerability varies substantially from almost 1 billion people at 4°C in an SSP5 
world to almost 3 billion people at the same temperature increase in an SSP3 world (Koutroulis et al., 
2019). These estimates show how higher temperatures can trigger significant and unprecedented 
impacts. In addition, in certain ecosystems, overshoot might result in irreversible losses and damages 
(e.g. in SIDS) (Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 2018). 
1.2.4. Adaptation pathways, limits to adaptation and residual risks 
Adaptation pathways are sequences of adaptation decisions/interventions (Werners et al., 2021). 
They are characterised almost systematically by dynamic decision-making under deep uncertainty, 
and trade-offs across spatial and temporal scales (Wise et al., 2014; Fazey et al., 2016; Butler et al., 
2014; Gajjar et al., 2019; Haasnoot et al., 2013). Although local adaptive capacities depend on the 
context they operate in (e.g. local development, risk, existing vulnerability), the study of local 
adaptation pathways is needed to prioritise decision-making and prepare for potential unintended 
outcomes (i.e. maladaptive outcomes) and trade-offs (Haasnoot et al. 2013; Werners et al. 2021).  
Fundamentally, adaptation cannot be disconnected from overall sustainable development trajectories 
(Roy et al., 2018b; Gajjar et al., 2019) because the magnitude of risk climate change poses is as much 
a result of existing vulnerabilities and capacities to anticipate and adapt as it is the level of exposure 
to the physical hazard (Hallegatte et al., 2007; Simpson et al., 2021). Thus, development interventions 
such as reducing the infrastructure investment gaps or improving health systems intrinsically build 
adaptive capacities and reduce risk. 
The need to include prevention and adaptation as a major dimension of development choices emerges 
from studies on the repetition of tropical storms and typhoons. Based on the evidence of 6,700 
tropical storms since 1950, Hsiang and Jina (2014) show that the strongest 10% of them reduces per 
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capita incomes by 7.4% two decades later, effectively undoing 3.7 years of average development. 
Strobl (2019) show that the repetition of typhoons can generate 3.2% GDP loss in some regions.  
Adaptation actions might be insufficient, adaptive, or maladaptive (Magnan et al., 2016; Gajjar et al., 
2019) (see figure 1.3). The ex-ante assessment of multiple pathways can highlight synergies and trade-
offs between options (e.g. as Haasnoot et al. (2019) for coastal systems), with signposts that can be 
tracked and used to mark the need for a better coordination of actors’ decision (Lawrence and 
Haasnoot, 2017; Stephens et al., 2018). Maladaptation denotes adaptation actions that 
disproportionately burden the most vulnerable, have high opportunity costs; reduce the incentive to 
adapt; or instil path dependency (Barnett and O’Neill, 2010). Certain adaptation actions can lead to 
unintended consequences and lock-ins and sequencing of actions are critical to keep the envelope of 
feasible adaptation strategies open.  
In some places and for some human and ecological systems, there are limits to adaptation when the 
pace of climate change impacts accelerates, making the prevention of intolerable risks impossible 
even through accelerated action (Klein et al., 2014). This comes from hard limits to adaptation 
(McNamara and Buggy, 2017; Djalante et al., 2018). Soft ones are thresholds that represent an actual 
limit at the time of assessment (e.g. current availability or accessibility of technology) but can change 
over time (e.g. due to new technologies or institutional changes). For example, sea walls can be 
effective strategies under certain projects but might become insufficient over time in the face of 
surging higher storm. Hard limits to adaptation are those that will not change, such as thermal limits 
of survival for species, or sea level rise that makes permanent relocation the only viable adaptation 
strategy in certain low-lying areas. (See Table 1.4 for an overview.)  
Table 1.4 Soft and hard limits to adaptation.  
System/Region Examples  Soft limit Hard limit 
Coral Reefs 70-90% loss of tropical coral reefs by mid-century under 
1.5°C 
 X 
Biodiversity  6% of insects, 8% of plants, 4% of vertebrates lose over 50% 
of the climatically determined geographic range at 1.5°C 
(18% insects, 16% plants, 8% invertebrates at 2°C) 
 X 
Poverty  24-357 million people exposed to multi-sector climate risks 
and vulnerable to poverty at 1.5°C (86-1220 million at 2°C) 
X  
Human Health Twice as many megacities exposed to heat stress at 1.5°C 
compared to present, potentially exposing ~350 million 
additional people to deadly heat waves by 2050  
X X 
Coastal 
Livelihoods 
Large-scale changes in oceanic systems inflict damage and 
losses to livelihoods, income, cultural identity, and human 
health for coastal communities at 1.5°C with higher 
potential losses at 2°C.  
X X 
Culture, 
Lifestyle, 
Traditions and 
Heritage 
Climate-induced relocation or loss of livelihoods can erode 
shared practices, narratives and customs that provide 
meaning and structure to people's everyday life  
X  
Small Island 
Developing 
States 
Sea level rise and increased wave run up combined with 
increased aridity and decreased freshwater availability at 
1.5°C potentially leaving several atoll islands uninhabitable. 
 X 
Adapted from Djalante et al. (2018); McNamara and Jackson (2019); Boyd et al. (2017); Tschakert et al. (2019). 
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The issue is whether, as highlighted by the SR1.5, an incremental approach to adaptation, leading to 
marginal redirections of development choices will suffice or whether transformational adaptive 
changes will be needed. Transformational adaptation implies ‘significant changes in structure or 
function that go beyond adjusting existing practices’ (de Coninck et al., 2018)) and might be critical to 
deal with hard limits to adaptation and tipping points, which have “the potential for abrupt, non-linear 
and climate change-triggered shifts in the elements of the Earth system” (Garschagen and Solecki, 
2017). These adaptation tipping points are situations when the consequences of physical impacts of 
climate change breach functioning thresholds of socio-ecological systems (Kwadijk et al. 2010). 
The absence of anticipatory, transformational adaptation in the present, will make future adaptation 
to stay within hard limits more economically and socially costly (Werners et al., 2013). The social, 
political, institutional conditions for mainstreaming adaptation in current development choices 
remains a significant challenge (Garschagen and Solecki, 2017). What is clear, however, is that 
adaptation is tightly dependent on development trajectories and choices, and not undertaking 
anticipatory adaptation today will foreclose future options for adapting, leading to more costly future 
interventions. (e.g., Haasnoot et al. 2019; de Ruig et al. 2019). 
Figure 1.3 Differences between ‘normal’ (incremental) and transformational adaptation.  
 
Residual loss and damage occur when hard limits to adaptation are reached. For example, being 
unable to protect certain coastal regions from flooding or being unable to prevent health impacts of 
heat waves, despite adaptation, constitute residual risks. It is acknowledged that such losses and 
damages are differentiated across regions and populations (Boyd et al., 2017; Djalante et al., 2018; 
McNamara and Jackson, 2019; Tschakert et al., 2019) and include tangible deprivations, such as the 
loss of assets and crops, as well as non-economic ones, such as the loss of biodiversity, culture or 
health.  
1.3. Feasibility of adaptation and mitigation options  
Scaling up GHG emission reduction efforts is critical to avoid tipping points while anticipatory 
adaptation is critical to stay within hard limits of adaptation in the least costly manner socially and 
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economically. Reducing the physical and transition climate risks on society will require to accelerate 
the transition of our socio-economic systems towards zero-emission climate resilient development 
pathways.  
Physical risks stem from the impact of climate change and transition risks are related to uncertainties 
about technological innovations, changes in legislation and regulation, implementation of a carbon 
tax and changes in consumer behaviour (e.g. a shift in attitudes towards the purchase of diesel cars, 
air travel or deforestation-based products). The magnitude of implications of climate related risks on 
many activity domains will be determined by:  
• How and when the physical impacts of climate change on natural systems result in human 
damages; 
• How and when the human damages from physical impacts or mitigation measures translate 
into net economic losses; what share affect nonmarketable services and fall on population poorly 
included in the monetized economy; what percentage of the GDP will be dedicated to repairing the 
damages; 
• How the net economic losses translate into financial risks, which depends on their sectoral 
and geographical distribution, and the degree of surprises they involve. 
Here below, we summarize these implications in terms of feasibility of mitigation and adaptation 
options grouped in four categories: energy system transition, Land and (terrestrial) ecosystem 
transition, Urban and infrastructure system transition and Industrial system transition. The objective 
is to delineate the enabling conditions that will increase their feasibility space, conditions understood 
as consisting of six dimensions: environmental, economic, technological, institutional, socio-cultural 
and geophysical. 
1.3.1. Feasibility of adaptation options  
Twenty-three adaptation options are mapped in Table 1.5 onto the four system transitions, and their 
multi-dimensional feasibility was assessed, resulting in the conclusions that several adaptation 
options are feasible (Table 1.5; Singh et al., 2020).  
Table 1.5 How feasible are adaptation options?  
Feasibility assessments of 1.5°C-relevant adaptation options, with dark shading signifying the absence of 
barriers in the feasibility dimension, moderate shading indicating that, on average, the dimension does not 
have a positive or negative effect on the feasibility of the option, or the evidence is mixed, and faint shading 
indicating the presence of potentially blocking barriers. No shading means that there was not sufficient 
literature to make an assessment. NA signifies that the dimension is not applicable to that adaptation option. A 
confidence assessment is undertaken at the option level but not shown here (see Table 4.12 in the SR1.5 (de 
Coninck et al., 2018)). The context column indicates which contextual factors would change the assessment. For 
the methodology and literature, see the SR1.5 supplementary material 4.SM.4. Abbreviations used: Ec: 
Economic – Tec: Technological – Inst: Institutional – Soc: Socio-cultural – Env: Environmental/Ecological – Geo: 
Geophysical 
SYSTEM ADAPTATION OPTION EC TEC INST SOC ENV GEO CONTEXT 
Energy System 
Transitions 
Power infrastructure, including 
water 
      
Depends on existing power infrastructure, all 
generation sources and those with intensive water 
requirements 
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SYSTEM ADAPTATION OPTION EC TEC INST SOC ENV GEO CONTEXT 
Land and Ecosystem 
Transitions 
Conservation agriculture 
      
Depends on irrigated/rainfed system, ecosystem 
characteristics, crop type, other farming practices 
Efficient irrigation 
      
Depends on agricultural system, technology used, 
regional institutional and biophysical context 
Efficient livestock systems 
      
Dependent on livestock breeds, feed practices, and 
biophysical context (e.g., carrying capacity) 
Agroforestry 
      
Depends on knowledge, financial support, and 
market conditions 
Community-based adaptation 
      
Focus on rural areas and combined with ecosystems-
based adaptation, does not include urban settings 
Ecosystem restoration and 
avoided deforestation 
      
Mostly focused on existing and evaluated REDD+ 
projects 
Biodiversity management 
      
Focus on hotspots of biodiversity vulnerability and 
high connectivity 
Coastal defence and hardening 
      
Depends on locations that require it as a first 
adaptation option 
Sustainable aquaculture 
      
Depends on locations at risk and socio-cultural 
context 
Urban and Infrastructure 
System Transitions 
Sustainable land-use and urban 
planning 
      
Depends on nature of planning systems and 
enforcement mechanisms 
Sustainable water management 
      
Balancing sustainable water supply and rising 
demand, especially in low-income countries 
Green infrastructure and 
ecosystem services 
      
Depends on reconciliation of urban development 
with green infrastructure 
Building codes and standards 
      
Adoption requires legal, educational, and 
enforcement mechanisms to regulate buildings 
Industrial System 
Transitions 
Intensive industry infrastructure 
resilience and water management 
      
Depends on intensive industry, existing infrastructure 
and using or requiring high demand of water 
Overarching Adaptation 
Options 
Disaster risk management 
      
Requires institutional, technical, and financial 
capacity in frontline agencies and government 
Risk spreading and sharing: 
insurance 
      
Requires well-developed financial structures and 
public understanding 
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SYSTEM ADAPTATION OPTION EC TEC INST SOC ENV GEO CONTEXT 
Social safety nets 
      
Type and mechanism of safety net, political priorities, 
institutional transparency 
Climate services 
      
Depends on climate information availability and 
usability, local infrastructure and institutions, 
national priorities 
Indigenous knowledge 
      
Dependent on recognition of indigenous rights, laws, 
and governance systems 
Education and learning 
      
Existing education system, funding 
Population health and health 
system 
     
NA 
Requires basic health services and infrastructure 
Human migration 
      
Hazard exposure, political and socio-cultural 
acceptability (in destination), migrant skills and 
social networks 
 
These options are cost effective. In a frictionless world, they should mobilize investments to avoid 
larger costs or generate returns. In low and middle-income countries globally, based on willingness to 
pay for prevention, disruption in power supply (due to increased storm surges, typhoons, and 
cyclones) are estimated to impact firms directly (by up to $120 billion/year), with coping costs of up 
to $65 billion/year. For households, the direct impact and cost of coping could be between $2.3–190 
billion/year (Hallegatte et al., 2019). The International Finance Corporation (IFC) reviewed climate-
related sectors in 21 emerging market economies and identified almost $23 trillion of climate-resilient 
and climate-friendly investment opportunities, with the largest ones related to buildings and 
transportation. In several regions, including South Asia, climate-resilient infrastructure is a major 
opportunity with the potential to unlock over $2 trillion of investment (IFC, 2016). Chapter 2 will 
discuss how such investments could be triggered, connecting this discussion to the necessity of 
bridging the infrastructure investment gap (IMF 2014a) that block the fulfilment of SDGs.  
1.3.2. Feasibility of mitigation options 
1.3.3. Energy System Transition 
The required investment for the energy supply side to limit warming to 1.5°C constitutes a small share 
of overall investments (McCollum et al., 2018) (see also chapter 2). However, it will involve a radical 
shift compared to current trends that has no precedent at the scale and spread required, comprising 
all countries and all economic sectors (de Coninck et al., 2018). Investments will need to move rapidly 
towards efficient and low-emission options. The feasibility of some of them is evaluated in Table 1.6. 
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Table 1.6 How feasible are mitigation options?  
Feasibility assessment of 1.5°C-relevant mitigation options in energy system transitions, with dark shading 
signifying the absence of barriers in the feasibility dimension, moderate shading indicating that, on average, 
the dimension does not have a positive or negative effect on the feasibility of the option, or the evidence is 
mixed, and faint shading indicating the presence of potentially blocking barriers. No shading means that the 
literature found was not sufficient to make an assessment. A confidence assessment is undertaken at the 
option level but not shown here (see Table 4.11 in the SR1.5 (de Coninck et al., 2018)). The context column on 
the far right indicates which contextual factors would change the assessment. For the methodology and 
literature basis, see the SR1.5 supplementary material 4.SM.4. Abbreviations used: Ec: Economic – Tec: 
Technological – Inst: Institutional – Soc: Socio-cultural – Env: Environmental/Ecological – Geo: Geophysical 
MITIGATION OPTION EC TEC INST SOC ENV GEO CONTEXT 
Wind energy (on-shore 
and off-shore) 
      
Wind regime, economic status, space for wind farms, and the existence 
of a legal framework for independent power producers affect uptake; 
cost-effectiveness affected by incentive regime 
Solar PV 
      
Cost-effectiveness affected by solar irradiation and incentive regime. 
Also enhanced by legal framework for independent power producers, 
which affects uptake 
Bioenergy 
      
Depends on availability of biomass and land and the capability to 
manage sustainable land use. Distributional effects depend on the 
agrarian (or other) system used to produce feedstock 
Electricity storage 
      
Batteries universal, but grid-flexible resources vary with area’s level of 
development 
Power sector carbon 
dioxide capture and 
storage 
      
Varies with local CO2 storage capacity, presence of legal framework, 
level of development and 
quality of public engagement 
Nuclear energy 
      
Electricity market organization, legal framework, standardization and 
know-how, country’s ‘democratic fabric’, institutional and technical 
capacity, and safety culture of public and private institutions 
 
Current investment trends contrast with the requirements for limiting warming to 1.5°C as they are 
still being made in fossil fuel-intensive options and tend to increase resistance on the part of those 
actors ‘invested in’ such an energy system. Given the dramatic reduction in the use of coal, oil and gas 
in the next couple of decades, the transition risk for the assets based on these options is obvious. 
Divestment in fossil fuel-based energy for lower temperature emission pathways could grow from just 
over $275 billion over 2016-2023, to about $400 billion over 2016-2030, and nearly $550 billion over 
2016-2050 (see box 1.4; McCollum et al., 2018). Chapter 2 will discuss a specific mix of regulation, 
taxation, pricing and other policy necessary to mitigate the financial, macroeconomic and political 
adversities and risks of such a quick and drastic redirection of investments. 
Such shifts also open investment opportunities in low-emission options. Many of them (wind and 
photovoltaic electricity) are technologically mature and increasingly competitive with fossil fuels from 
a purely economic perspective. Innovation in electricity storage is moving rapidly, while less progress 
is reported for nuclear energy and CCS (REN21, 2017; de Coninck et al., 2018; IEA, 2017). But the pace 
of wide-scale implementation of fast-growing low-emission options is still hindered by regulation and 
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planning of the system, up-front costs due to a mix of transaction costs and cost uncertainty, and 
other obstacles to financial access discussed in chapter 2. In many places, these factors result in a 
carbon lock-in (Unruh, 2002). 
Investment opportunities are also important on the energy demand side, in particular in buildings. 
They would require investments estimated at between $0.38 trillion per year in a 2°C scenario and 
$0.45 trillion in a 1.5°C scenario yearly between 2016 and 2035 (Box 4.8 IPCC 2018). Such investment 
will have to be particularly significant in the short-term in P1/P2 types of scenarios in table 1.2. 
Box 1.4 | A Look at Energy System Investment Estimates  
Estimates of energy system investments for climate change mitigation pathways consistent with the 
1.5°C limit are only sparsely covered in academic literature. Estimates are available from one multi-
model study (McCollum et al., 2018), which primarily covers P3-type pathways (see Table 1.2). 
Because P1 and P2 pathways put greater emphasis on energy demand reductions, such futures would 
see reduced needs for investment in energy supply than those reported below, but demand-side 
investment levels roughly on par with those of the P3 pathways. 
Sector-Wide Energy Supply Investments 
Results from IAMs for a ‘middle-of-the-road’ reference scenario (i.e. SSP2 comparable to the P3 
scenario in Table 1.2) indicate that mean annual energy-supply investments would have to grow from 
$1.8 trillion per year in 2015 to $2.2 trillion per year (with a $1.4 to $3.4 trillion range surrounding the 
latter across six models) between 2016 and 2050 (McCollum et al., 2018). While this is a substantial 
increase from the BAU scenario it will represent a declining share of global GDP, due to stable long-
term economic growth in the IAMs. 
Reference scenario investments: Energy supply investments in the developing world would make up 
most of the world energy investments forming a sizeable investment opportunity. Even in a reference, 
no climate policy scenario, those investments would amount to $1.35 trillion per year (range from 
$0.81 to $2.3 trillion) on average over 2016-50, a level on average 35% higher than the $1 trillion 
investment in energy systems in developing countries in 2015. Developed countries are projected to 
see investments in the order of $0.8 trillion per year (range from $0.36 to $1.3 trillion). This is on 
average 10% higher than the $0.7 trillion in energy-supply investment in 2015 (McCollum et al., 2018).  
The large ranges of these estimates confirm the important uncertainties which constitute an obstacle 
for risk-averse investors. Chapter 2 will discuss how climate finance can help overcome this obstacle.  
NDC scenario investments: According to the models, pathways that extrapolate from countries’ NDCs 
until 2050 require very little change in investments compared to the reference scenario mentioned 
above. Total annual investments over 2016-2050 would increase for both developed and developing 
countries in the order of tens of billions USD per year. The NDCs do cause a notable reduction of 
investments in fossil fuel extraction and fossil power generation globally: from a share of 59% to 50% 
of total mean sector-wide energy supply investments between 2016 and 2050. There is an increase in 
the renewable investment share (by 3%, to 19%) under the NDCs, while the investment share of power 
transmission, distribution and storage stays roughly constant at around 21% over this period.  
Well below 2°C scenario investments: this scenario requires a much more pronounced redirection of 
global investment flows than in NDC pathway. The total investments would increase to about $2.5 
trillion per year (range from $1.1 to $4.4 trillion) on average over the 2016-2050 period. The modelled 
transition more than halves the share of global investment in fossil fuel extraction and power 
generation over the 2016-2050 period, from 50% of energy supply investment under the NDCs to 22% 
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(with a range of 21 to 28% across models). The investment share of renewables, and power 
transmission, distribution and storage over the 2016-2050 period increases to about 28% each . The 
share of investment in developing countries for such a transition grows from 57% in 2015 to 62% over 
2016-2050, not keeping pace with the share of global population, which rises to 75% over this period. 
Similarly, mean investments for unabated fossil electricity generation (i.e., without carbon capture 
and storage) over the 2016-2050 period are also found to be considerably lower in 2°C and 1.5°C 
futures compared to the reference case: decreases of $0.13 trillion per year (range from $0.08 trillion 
to 0.17 trillion) and $0.14 trillion per year (range from $0.09 trillion to $0.17 trillion) respectively. 
Particularly noteworthy is the small difference in unabated fossil fuel-powered electricity investments 
when going from 2°C to 1.5 °C. This highlights how limited the space is for this specific class of ‘brown’ 
investments going forward. 
Near-term investments: In the near term (up to 2023 and 2030), models suggest that amounts divested 
from fossil-based energy systems would need to be reinvested in solar photovoltaic (PV), wind, and 
nuclear power. Investments in bioelectricity and biofuels as well as CCS scale up less quickly initially, 
but increase significantly after 2030 in P3-type pathways. Meanwhile, investments into hydrogen fuel 
technologies would be limited in the near term in both 1.5°C and 2°C pathways (McCollum et al., 
2018). In 1.5°C pathways, dependence on investment in hydrogen fuel technologies is higher, due to 
the more urgent need to decarbonise end-use activities such as trucking, shipping and manufacturing.  
Investments in Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) 
Besides afforestation and reforestation, BECCS is the only CDR option covered in IAM pathways (See 
also box 1.5 on CDR). Only few pathways manage to achieve the 1.5°C limit without BECCS (e.g. the 
P1 pathway in Table 1.2). Pathways not relying on BECCS typically require strong demand-side 
emissions reductions and carbon-neutral alternatives to liquids and gases that do not rely on biomass 
(Grubler et al., 2018; van Vuuren et al., 2018). Potentials of CDR options other than BECCS and 
afforestation come with a wide uncertainty range that depends on the local context of deployment.  
In the P3-type pathways investment requirements for BECCS add up to a rough mean investment of 
ca. $50 to 150 billion over the 2016-2050 period. In the pathways using BECCS, developed countries 
start out with larger BECCS investments than developing countries, but their distribution is broadly 
similar between developing and developed countries in absolute terms (see Table 1.7).  
Table 1.7: Estimated Annual Investments in BECCS (2016-2050) in billion $ 2015/yr. 
Source: Calculations based on McCollum et al. 2018 
Energy Demand-Side Investments 
For demand-side investments, specifically the portion increasing energy efficiency, it is more difficult 
to make estimations due to a lack of reliable statistics and issues around definitions (Grübler and 
Wilson, 2013). A first-order approximation of energy efficiency investments across all end-use sectors 
 Developing countries Developed countries 
2015 
investment  
2016-2023 2016-2030 2016-2050 2016-2023 2016-2030 2016-2050 
0 
1.1  
(0-4.4) 
7.4  
(0- 32.4) 
26.5 
(0- 75.3) 
2.4  
(0-11.4) 
8.6  
(0-25.7) 
27.1  
(0-73) 
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(transport, buildings, industry) indicates that the needs under 2°C and 1.5°C pathways (relative to a 
reference without additional climate policies) would be in the tens of billions dollars per year prior to 
2030 and in the low hundreds of billions per year afterward – or around 10% of the energy supply 
investment estimates provided above.  
Demand for primary energy has been growing at 2.5% per year since 1965, and 1.7% per year since 
2009, suggesting a trend towards energy efficiency (BP, 2019). Much more rapid energy efficiency 
improvements or changes in consumption patterns would, however, be needed to reduce demand 
growth posited in the P1 and P2 pathways. 
 
The success of energy transition depends on specific aspects of energy issues in developing 
countries.  
The first specificity is the need scale up investment to achieve universal access to modern energy by 
2030, as stated in SDG7 on clean and affordable energy. A ESMAP report shows that annual 45 billion 
is needed from 2019 to 2030 mostly for electricity to fulfil the IEA Sustainable Development Scenario 
(SDS). At the moment, the total global investment for energy access is falling short of this number, 
with some countries even reducing their energy access investment (ESMAP, 2020).  
The second come from the divestment estimates from P3 pathways for limiting warming to 1.5°C, 
which show a growing pattern. Based on the model runs assessed in McCollum et al. 2018, the 
projected net divestment in fossil fuel-based energy in developing countries could grow from close to 
$130 billion a year over 2016-23, to just over $200 billion over 2016-2030 and close to $300 billion 
over 2016-2050. They raise particularly important challenges in countries that are dependent on fossil 
fuel export and import, including risks of economic and political instability.  
The third are related to the financial implications of the transition for both households and firms in 
developing countries that must take place in a context of limited financial inclusion in large parts of 
Asia and the Pacific, Africa and some parts of Latin America. Chapters 2 and 3 will examine how to 
help developing countries in redirecting their economies and domestic finance towards climate 
friendly energy investments, including through transborder financial flows. 
Given different trends in demography and urban/spatial dynamics over the next few decades, the 
absolute size of investments in low-emission options in developed countries will be half of those in 
developing countries (CPI, 2019). Even for present NDC pathways (which are projected to lead to 3°C 
of warming by 2100) the investment opportunity in developing countries ranges from close to $350 
billion over 2016-23 to some $500 billion over 2016-50 (McCollum et al., 2018). For the more 
ambitious 2°C pathways, the amount rises to over $750 billion over 2016-50, and to close to $900 
billion to enable a 1.5°C transition. This is about the same order of magnitude of current investment 
in oil and gas exploration. 
1.3.2.2. Land and Ecosystems Transition 
Any attempt to bring Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU) emissions to net zero will be 
closely intertwined with the pursuit of SDGs, notably ending hunger and protecting biodiversity (Roy 
et al., 2018), as well as the employment and livelihoods of almost 30% of the world workforce 
(ILOSTAT, 2019). There is a range of small-scale land-based and terrestrial ecosystem transition 
options to deliver 1.5°C pathways (Rogelj et al., 2018; de Coninck et al., 2018; IPCC 2019a, largely 
related to improved management of agriculture, forests, and soils. However, implemented in existing 
lands they induce competition with other land uses geared to support food security (SDG2), livelihoods 
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and sustainable water-resource management. Risks of trade-offs can be exacerbated by growing 
demand for agricultural and forestry products and rising land needs for bioenergy and CDR. The 
feasibility of some of these options for the land and ecosystem transition are evaluated in table 1.8. 
Table 1.8 Feasibility assessment of mitigation options in land- and ecosystem transitions.  
For more details and the legend, see the caption of Table 1.2, based on de Coninck et al. (2018). 
MITIGATION OPTION EC TEC INST SOC ENV GEO CONTEXT 
Reduced food wastage 
and efficient food 
production 
      
Will depend on the combination of individual and institutional 
behaviour 
Dietary shifts 
      
Depends on individual behaviour, education, cultural factors and 
institutional support 
Sustainable 
intensification of 
agriculture 
      
Depends on development and deployment of new technologies 
Ecosystems restoration 
      
Depends on location and institutional factors 
 
Radical shifts in the demand side, including waste management and decline of overconsumption of 
meat and milk products as today in OECD countries (Paillard et al., 2014) – can alleviate the transition 
risks, both by reducing the pressure on agricultural land and the need for land-based negative 
emissions (van Vuuren et al., 2018; Arneth, 2019; Mbow et al., 2019; IPCC, 2019a). However, 
implementation is challenging and requires a shift in public policies and consumer behaviours. 
Transitions in AFOLU systems are also associated with transition risks for the associated industries. 
Improved management in agricultural systems include increasing the productivity of land used for 
food production and avoiding the emissions that would occur if increased food demands were met 
through expanding agricultural land area. But the conventional intensification of land productivity 
through industrial technologies could both lead to a rebound effect encouraging such expansion of 
agricultural land (Desquilbet et al., 2017) and increases GHGs emissions related to the manufacture, 
distribution and application of industrial inputs. Alternative approaches, based on agroecology are 
increasingly proposed (Wezel et al., 2009; Perfecto I. and Vandermeer J., 2010). But it is still hard to 
represent them in global integrated models due to the multiplicity and complexity of the synergies 
between plant and animal species under and above the ground surface (Dorin and Joly, 2020).  
Reducing conversion of grassland to cropland could also provide significant climate mitigation benefits 
by retaining soil carbon stocks that might otherwise be lost. Integrated water management provides 
moderate benefits for climate mitigation due to interactions with other land management strategies. 
Improved forest management and increasing soil organic matter stocks in mineral soils could also 
potentially yield mitigation benefits globally. One of the most effective and robust options for climate 
change mitigation is reducing deforestation and forest degradation, especially in the tropical regions. 
For instance, in Brazil, Rochedo et al. (2018) estimated that investments for controlling illegal 
deforestation in the Amazon and improving forest restoration between 2010 and 2050 would require 
2-3 times less investments than those required to decarbonise the energy sector. For managed forests, 
the most effective mitigation strategy is through increasing biomass productivity that optimises 
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carbon stocks (in forests and in long-lived products) as well as wood substitution. Soil-based mitigation 
options include increasing soil organic carbon (www.4p1000.org), control of erosion to prevent losses 
of organic carbon and the use of biochar. 
1.3.2.3 Industrial Systems Transition 
The heavy industry sectors of steel, cement, chemicals, aluminium, wood products, non-ferrous 
metals, glass and ceramics, have relatively high GHG emissions per unit of value-added, long facility 
lifespan, and low profit margins. This makes them particularly sensitive to carbon pricing and climate 
policies in general (Dechezleprêtre and Sato, 2018; Sato et al., 2015). The basic materials produced by 
these sectors are essential to the physical functioning of the economy while representing only a small 
part of GDP. Moreover, demand in these sectors is expected to grow in the coming decades (OECD, 
2019). 
Currently, these sectors represent 21.5% of non-land-use anthropogenic CO2 emissions. Their total 
emissions are projected to grow, even if significant efforts towards material efficiency are pursued 
(IEA, 2019). Given their 20-50 year lifespan, without drastic innovation by the early 2030s, these high-
carbon facilities will be locked in past mid-century and their emissions by 2050-70 will have to be 
offset with CDR or air-captured carbon with CCS (Bataille et al., 2018), estimated at $100-300/t CO2 
(de Coninck et al., 2018; Keith et al., 2018). As a result, facilities that cannot be retrofitted for lower or 
near zero emissions and are too expensive to offset, should be prematurely retire with potential 
damages to workforce communities and local supply chains which might block this retirement. 
The technical options to transition these sectors to very low or zero emissions are electrification, 
hydrogen, CO2 capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS) or other technologies (Axelson et al., 2018; 
Material Economics, 2019; Energy Transitions Commission, 2018; Bataille et al., 2018). Based on 
expected prices for low emission electricity, hydrogen and CCUS, these technologies will cost more 
than current production technologies, e.g. 20–40% more for steel, 70–115% more for cement, and 
15–60% for chemicals (Material Economics, 2019). Material efficiency and circularity strategies can 
help reduce the need for more expensive low-emission primary materials through better design for 
longer life, reusability and easier recycling (Allwood and Cullen, 2015). Most of the cost of 
decarbonising these sectors is required at the primary and intermediate producer level, and 
consumers are unlikely to see more than a 0.5-2% increase in the cost of buildings, infrastructure or 
vehicles as a consequence.  
A generalised feasibility assessment can be found in table 1.9, indicating significant gaps in knowledge 
for institutional, socio-cultural and environmental impacts of the mitigation options. This suggests that 
the challenges for financing this transition are potentially greater and depend on policy 
instrumentation.  
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Table 1.9 Feasibility assessment of mitigation options in industrial system transitions. 
For more details and the legend, see the caption of Table 1.6, based on de Coninck et al. (2018). 
MITIGATION OPTION EC TEC INST SOC ENV GEO CONTEXT 
Energy efficiency 
      
Potential and adoption depend on existing efficiency, energy prices and 
interest rates, as well as government incentives 
Bio-based and 
circularity 
      
Faces barriers in terms of pressure on natural resources and 
biodiversity. Product substitution depends on market organization and 
government 
incentivization 
Electrification and 
hydrogen 
      
Depends on availability of large-scale, cheap, emission-free electricity 
(electrification, hydrogen) or CO2 storage nearby (hydrogen). 
Manufacturers’ appetite to embrace disruptive innovations 
Industrial carbon 
dioxide capture, 
utilization and storage 
      
High concentration of CO2 in exhaust gas improve economic and 
technical feasibility of CCUS in industry. CO2 storage or reuse 
possibilities 
 
The key policy challenge in industrial transformation towards climate neutrality is connecting the low 
economic impact on consumers with the high impact on producers. If well planned, and if local 
economics support it, there can be significant synergies between industrial decarbonisation and net-
zero energy systems (Vogl et al., 2018; Bataille, 2020). For instance, industries using hydrogen could 
produce hydrogen when variable electricity generation is high and prices are low, and remove their 
demand when generation is low. If so equipped, they can also send electricity back to the grid when 
variable electricity generation is low using reversible fuel cells or sending surplus hydrogen to 
electricity generation turbines.  
Transitioning heavy industry to very low or zero emissions will require carefully designed and 
negotiated policy packages that include: 1) clear direction, 2) transition plans prepared with the active 
input and acceptance of all stakeholders, 3) accelerated research and development 4) dedicated 
support for demonstration and lead markets (for example, through minimum content regulations or 
green procurement or feed-in-tariffs realised through contracts for difference (Sartor and Bataille, 
2019), 5) carbon pricing with competitiveness protections, 6) infrastructure planning and support for 
electrification, hydrogen and CCUS (United Kingdom Committee on Climate Change (UKCCC), 2019), 
7) supporting institutions and education for, amongst other things, material design and, 8) clear 
regulatory framework and accounting for lifecycle emissions (Wyns et al., 2019; Wesseling et al., 2017; 
Bataille et al., 2018). Along with these, it would require the financial system – both public and private 
– to de-risk the needed investments along the value chain and guarantee their transformation in 
credible assets.  
1.3.2.4. Urban and Infrastructure 
Today, 55% of the global population lives in urban areas, a number projected to reach 68% by 2050 
(UNDESA, 2018). Over the next three decades, nearly 70 million people will move to urban areas every 
year, a majority of whom will live in small- to medium-sized cities in the developing world (Revi et al., 
2014). This trend will imply large investments in urban and infrastructure sectors that are central to 
economic growth and have critical implications for emissions (Bazaz et al., 2018). 
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Urban and infrastructure sectors are highly capital intensive (Global Commission on the Economy and 
Climate, 2014) with investment needs consistently falling, despite discrepancies amongst 
assessments, in a ballpark of a few trillion dollars per year in the next decades, an increasing trend 
compared to current levels (Acclimatise, 2018; Global Infrastructure Hub, 2017; New Climate 
Economy, 2016). 
Cities around the world are actively formulating building codes to improve energy efficiency and 
reduce cooling needs; planning transportation systems to reduce energy consumption; investing in 
green and blue infrastructure such as tree planting, green roofs, rainwater harvesting to reduce urban 
heat islands; regulating construction in coastal zones and other areas subject to flooding (de Coninck 
et al., 2018; Revi et al., 2014; Bazaz et al., 2018). Some of the mitigation options for the urban and 
infrastructure system transition are assessed for their feasibility in Table 1.10, revealing that although 
the investment need is high, many options show high feasibility and only few gaps in literature.  
Table 1.10 Feasibility assessment of mitigation options in urban and infrastructure system 
transitions. 
For more details and the legend, see the caption of Table 1.6, based on de Coninck et al. (2018). 
MITIGATION OPTION EC TEC INST SOC ENV GEO CONTEXT 
Land-use and urban 
planning 
      
Varies with urban fabric, not geography or economy; requires 
capacitated local government and legitimate tenure system 
Electric cars and buses 
      
Varies with degree of government intervention; requires capacity to 
retrofit “fuelling” stations 
Sharing schemes 
      
Historic schemes universal, but new ones depend on ICT status; 
undermined by high crime and low levels of law enforcement 
Public transport 
      
Depends on presence of existing ‘informal’ taxi systems, which may be 
more cost-effective and affordable than capital-intensive new build 
schemes, as well as (local) government capabilities 
Non-motorized 
transport 
      
Viability rests on linkages with public transport, cultural factors, climate 
and geography 
Aviation and shipping 
      
Varies with technology, governance and accountability 
Smart grids 
      
Varies with economic status and presence or quality of existing grid 
Efficient appliances 
      
Adoption varies with economic status and policy 
framework 
Low/zero-energy 
buildings 
      
Depends on size of existing building stock and growth of building stock 
 
The economic and financial conditions of mobilizing investments for the mitigation options in Table 
1.10 differ significantly between building and transportation. 
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In the building sector financing low energy resilient, cool architecture is constrained by the need for 
several small investments with long payback times Ürge-Vorsatz et al. (2018). More critically, short-
term financial ‘low hanging fruits’ can disincentivise longer-term systemic change – e.g. easy 
investments with fast returns (such as boiler replacement) can prevent holistic deeper mitigation 
opportunities (a whole-building retrofit becomes less financially viable after a new boiler is installed). 
Avoiding the lock-in of 40–80% thermal energy use in buildings would require a fundamentally 
different approach to traditional energy efficiency incentives through innovative financing (Ürge-
Vorsatz et al., 2018).  
The dynamics in the transport sector are governed by the complex interplay of diverse factors, 
including energy prices, transportation costs, housing costs, real estate markets, spatial organisation 
of human activities, mobility needs, congestion, modal choices and GHG emissions (Lampin et al., 
2013; Waisman et al., 2013; Allio, 2016; Behrens et al., 2007; Anas and Xu, 1999; Choi and Sjoquist, 
2015). This highlights the risks of self-reinforcing loops and lock-in within the structure of 
transportation systems, the localisation of activities and the demand for mobility, possibly generating 
a bifurcation towards more carbon intensive pathways if consistent policies are not adopted (carbon 
prices, housing prices, infrastructure choices) (Guivarch and Hallegatte, 2011). These risks are far 
higher in developing countries, where pre-Covid estimates were expecting a multiplication of mobility 
needs by a factor of four by 2050, against a factor of two for developed economies (ITF, 2017). Other 
key factors influencing investment needs are the evolution of road construction costs (Rodríguez-
Alloza et al., 2019) and the future occupancy rate of rail networks (the modal shift towards rail is a 
lever for reducing investment only if combined with a higher rate of occupancy).  
Integrating these factors in a global IAM analysis (Fisch-Romito and Guivarch, 2019) shows that the 
cumulative investment needs in the transportation sector (roads, rail and airports) up to 2050 are 
similar in climate policy scenarios for developed economies compared to a reference scenario, but 
that they are significantly lower in developing countries (median values of decrease are -10% for Asia, 
-17% for Latin America and -47% for the Middle East and Africa).  
A large increase of investments in transportation by 2050 is needed in developing countries (Gaya and 
Campos, 2009; OECD, 2017; Jakob et al., 2016). The share of transport investment in countries’ GDP 
would increase from 1%, on average to between 2 and 3% in Asia and Latin America, while remaining 
almost stable in OECD countries. This is a case of infrastructure investment gap that chapter 2 tackles 
in depth. The issue is that the amounts of investment generated by mobility are more sensitive to 
policy integration than for the electricity sector. For example, Rozenberg and Fay (2019) show that, 
under current urbanization trends, transportation investments in developing countries by 2030 may 
increase to up to 3.3% of GDP. But assuming other modes of urban transport, reduction of forced 
mobility in addition to higher electric mobility and higher rail mobility would limit them to around 
1.3% of GDP. We come back to this in chapter 2. 
1.3.2.5. Carbon Dioxide Removal 
Carbon Dioxide Removal is needed in all 1.5°C pathways, but with differences in terms of options and 
the scale of deployment as indicated in the bottom-up SR1.5 assessment for 2050ii. The BECCS 
deployment in P1 to P3 pathways range of up to 5 GtCO2 per year by 2050, while P4 exceeds the 
bottom-up potential by more than a factor of two. 
The CDR potential depends on technological and yield developments, land availability and 
sustainability criteria. Under the assumption that the bulk of removals in the AFOLU category stem 
from afforestation measures, pathways P1 to P3 lie below the best estimate of 2050 bottom-up 
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potential of 3.6 GtCO2 per year. In P3, however, the use of BECCS exceeds the bottom-up potential 
around 2070. 
Box 1.5 | Carbon Dioxide Removal  
All mitigation pathways in the Table 1.2 use CDR to offset residual or hard-to-abate CO2 emissions 
on the way to the net-zero CO2 goal, but the degree to which they can be used varies.  
A distinction can be made between natural CDR options, including planting trees and the restoration 
of ecosystems, and technological CDR options. The pathways in the SR1.5 only consider two CDR 
options: planting biomass to generate bioenergy in combination with CO2 capture and storage 
(BECCS), and afforestation and reforestation (both illustrated in Figure 1.4). However, various other 
CDR options could play a role in the order of a few billions tonnes of CO2 removal per annum by 
2050 (de Coninck et al., 2018). 
Some nature-based options such as applying biochar to soils or enhancing soil carbon sequestration 
can have positive side-effects on soil health or sustainable energy access. The other CDR options 
are still very costly and energy intensive. These include Direct Air CO2 Capture and Storage (DACCS), 
where CO2 is extracted from the air through chemical processes using energy (currently in its 
demonstration phase), and enhanced weathering, a collection of methods to fixate CO2 in 
carbonates in mineral rocks.  
Figure 1.4 Two of several carbon dioxide removal options 
 
. Source: de Coninck et al., 2018. 
 
 
Uncertainties dominate the investment needs estimates of CDR options. The tentative estimates 
rarely consider land or water resource competition, and when they do, potentials are limited 
considerably (Hanssen et al., 2020). Researchers have so far hardly assessed their feasibility, given 
their low technological maturity. Especially for soil carbon sequestration and biochar, enhanced 
weathering, and Direct Air Capture with Carbon Storage (DACCS), information is sparse on their socio-
cultural, institutional and environmental consequences (see table 1.11). 
SCALING UP CLIMATE FINANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF COVID-19 
 30 
As for the potential for CO2 storage, recent literature reviews (Bui et al., 2018; Fuss et al., 2018) show 
that even more conservative estimates of storage potential do not exceed the requirements for CCS 
storage considered in 1.5°C pathways. Even in P4, summing up storage in Table 1.2 up until 2060 would 
require storing less than 350 Gt CO2 based on a conservative 1% of all sedimentary basins (Koide et 
al., 1993) or even higher recent estimates of 3,900 (Dooley, 2013) to 55,000 Gt CO2 (Kearns et al., 
2017). This compares to a needed 750 Gt CO2. However, even if the global storage potential is ample, 
it is not evenly distributed, there could be bottlenecks in individual regions, which would limit the CCS 
potential, and it would require considerable CO2 transport and storage infrastructure investments.  
Table 1.11 Feasibility assessment of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) options.  
For more details and the legend, see the caption of Table 1.6, based on de Coninck et al. (2018). 
MITIGATION OPTION EC TEC INST SOC ENV GEO CONTEXT 
Bioenergy and carbon 
dioxide capture and 
storage 
      
Depends on biomass availability, CO2 storage capacity, legal framework, 
economic status and social acceptance 
Direct air carbon 
dioxide capture and 
storage 
      
Depends on CO2-free energy, CO2 storage capacity, legal framework, 
economic status and social acceptance 
Afforestation and 
reforestation 
      
Depends on location, mode of implementation, and economic and 
institutional factors 
Soil carbon 
sequestration and 
biochar 
      
Depends on location, soil properties, time span 
Enhanced weathering 
      
Depends on CO2-free energy, economic status and social acceptance 
 
These assessments show, however, many CDR options are still at a fairly early stage and that counting 
on multi-gigatonne scale CDR as early as 2040 poses risks that the Paris Agreement temperature limits 
will be out of reach (see table 1.2a). The vast majority of existing CDR literature is focused on early 
stages of the innovation chain and very little is known about how these technologies will eventually 
mature from RandD to deployment; how institutional governance can secure both their public 
acceptance and developing niche markets (Nemet et al., 2018).  
Afforestation or soil carbon sequestration would require far lower investment needs than BECCS at 
present and could benefit from learnings in REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation). However, as land availability decreases, and as permanence becomes an issue because 
of ongoing climate change or anthropogenic disturbances, other – currently still more expensive – 
options could be envisaged e.g. Direct Air Carbon Capture and Storage (DACCS) (Fuss et al., 2018). But 
a large-scale roll out of DACCS would only make climate sense in an different energy system from 
today’s (Creutzig et al., 2019). This is because DACCS captures CO2 from ambient air, which requires a 
lot of energy. BECCS, instead, produces energy. As models are improved to incorporate these 
technologies (Strefler et al., 2018; Realmonte et al., 2019), we will better understand this scaling 
dynamic and resulting financing needs.  
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1.4. The financial system faced with climate change risks  
There is not one unambiguous link between the physical risks induced by climate change and the 
resulting social and economic damages, or between claimed climate stabilisation targets and the 
content of mitigation strategies. Similarly, there is no unambiguous link between overall climate risks 
for societies and for the financial system. However, risk transmission channels can be identified, 
though not yet quantified.  
Figure 1.5 pictures the direct and indirect channels through which transition risks and physical risks 
are transmitted, as well as the feedback loop that could threaten financial stability. Direct transmission 
happens from the economy (fragilization of some business sectors, costs of accelerated capital 
scrapping and reconstruction, increase of commodity prices and forced migration) to the financial 
system. Indirect transmission comprises the impact of overall economic deterioration on the financial 
system. As the financial system, via market losses and credit tightening, can affect the real economy, 
a feedback loop of financial contagion could emerge.  
Figure 1.5 Overview of the potential system dynamics between the economy and the financial 
system (blue boxes) because of physical and transition climate risk drivers. 
 
The dynamics are negotiated through direct transmission channels in the real economy and indirect 
economic deterioration because of economic impacts of the physical impacts. Economic deterioration 
and financial contagion with direct and indirect transmission channels can jointly form a feedback loop 
that could threaten financial stability. Adapted from: NGFS, 2019.  
 
The indirect transmission channel is important, but it is fully dependent of the pre-existing stability of 
the impacted economies and of the efficacy of their policy responses. These are parameters that the 
actors of the financial system cannot control. The financial actors are directly hurt by and have a 
capacity to adapt to the signals transmitted directly. For the physical risk, these signals pass through 
the impairment of: 
- Agriculture assets: increased uncertainty and variability in crop and fisheries yields, 
degradation of water and soil quality and quantity, increased virulence of pests (Taylor, et al., 
2018), more frequent disruptions of distribution and processing from extreme weather 
(Bakker, et al., 2018), logistical constraints that prevent or delay the shipment of crops, seeds, 
and material. 
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- Infrastructure assets (transportation, water, energy, telecommunication, health care 
delivery): when cascading failures resulting from accelerated material degradation of 
concrete, steel, timber, and earthen structures in case of extreme precipitation, extreme 
temperatures, and changes in relative humidity and salinization (Stewart and Deng, 2015; 
Bastidas-Arteaga, 2018). Coastal flooding, inundation from rising sea levels, extreme heat, 
icing, subsidence, and forest fires also challenge nearly every component of transportation 
systems, from bridges and airports to pipelines and ports (Jacobs, et al., 2018) and of energy 
systems (dams, transmission lines, cooling systems in thermoelectricity, pipelines,). These 
risks do not just impact particular sites and locations but also shorten the infrastructure's 
lifecycle and degrade its operational reliability (Maxwell, et al., 2018). Progressively 
degradations in lifecycle performance and degradation in the quality of the logistics can 
compromise their yields and creditworthiness. 
- Real estate and land: when perceptions of increased physical risk in a local housing market 
lead to decreasing prices of homes exposed to sea level rise, flooding, and wildfires. Any drop 
in the values of real estates and land, in turn, threatens the value of mortgages that play a 
critical role in the balance sheets of many financial market participants, including banks that 
hold these mortgages, investors in mortgage-backed securities, and government-backed 
enterprises which guarantee the default risk of the mortgages they securitize (Ouazad and 
Kahn, 2019). 
- Financial institutions: especially insurance companies and smaller regional and local banks, 
are also vulnerable to claims and loan default losses from chronic and acute physical risks.  
Transition risks are different in nature. They come from the interplay between the market and 
technological uncertainty, and the policy uncertainty due to the accelerators and inhibitors on climate 
policies shaped by social perceptions of climate change damages and in reaction to the unmitigated 
economic consequences of climate policies. One important category of these transition risks are 
stranded assets losses incurred by investing in carbon-intensive options whose profitability could be 
wiped out by accelerated climate policies and reputational effects amplified under the pro-divestment 
movement pressure. Stranded capital from fossil fuel assets alone suggests a potential global loss of 
wealth between $1 trillion and $4 trillion (Mercure et al. 2018). The risk extends to demand-side 
sectors, for instance sales of diesel-based cars are expected to shrink within the European market.  
Another category includes the risks taken by investing in alternative low-emission and climate-resilient 
options. The economic viability of these options, usually capital intensive, is very sensitive to 
uncertainties about  
i) the overall business context, 
ii) how specific markets evolve as a result of policy changes (e.g. ban of high emission 
products, carbon tax, regulation of electricity markets, real estate policies), 
iii) shifts in consumer behaviour (e.g., attitudes towards diesel cars and electric cars, air 
travel, plastic products versus natural fibre products, animal protein), 
iv) the cost/efficiency and social acceptance of energy supply options (e.g., wind energy, 
nuclear, CCS (L’Orange-Seigo et al., 2014) and adaptation measures and resilience 
technologies (micro-irrigation, drought-and dryness tolerant biotechnology), 
v) capacity of technological breakthroughs (battery or hydrogen) to survive the valley of 
death of innovation (Grubb et al., 2014); and 
SCALING UP CLIMATE FINANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF COVID-19 
 33 
vi) feedbacks from land-use policies and ecosystems management. 
These uncertainties are all the more critical as the pace and chances of success of every individual 
low-emission option depend on systemic changes in our energy, urban, land-use and industrial 
systems. In turn, these systemic changes require a re-optimization of the upstream industry and 
logistic chains, which adds another layer of uncertainty that might be exacerbated by the adaptation 
measures themselves.  
The overall risks depend upon financial institutions' capacity to absorb the changes in the value of 
assets. These changes affect differently: 
 
- Credit Providing Institutions (banks and other financial actors) that lend to entities weakened by 
climate risks. Credit Providing Institutions are exposed to losses from impaired loans and might 
become less able to provide credit to affected entities. For example, they would stick strictly to 
loans with a maturity of one to three years and refuse to roll over loans if they believe a company 
becomes high risk. 
 
- Institutions holding Climate Impacted Assets that operate along a broad spectrum of investment 
horizons but under prudent management and hold assets that may be affected by climate risk. 
Examples of such assets are commercial mortgage-backed securities pooled together and secured 
by commercial property, such as hotels, office and retail buildings, warehouses, and 
municipalities' bonds. Typically, insurance companies and small regional and local banks are 
vulnerable to claims and loan default losses from chronic and acute physical risks. 
Whether and how climate-related risks could harm these two categories of financial institutions 
depends on three parameters: i) the deployment pace of these risks that result not only from the 
direct impacts on the assets of individual financial institutions but also from the feedback loops 
pictured in Figure 1.5, ii) capacity of the financial institutions to internalize the risks, and iii) the efficacy 
of shock absorbers (Litterman, 2020) (private insurance and reinsurance, government-sponsored 
entities) for assistance to people and businesses during extreme eventsiii.  
A related question is whether, in these conditions, the financial system will evolve in such a way that 
it will help households, small and medium enterprises, farmers, corporations, cities and the public 
sector to launch the four systems transitions needed to avoid the worst of climate change. The 
problem is that physical climate changes are significant but ‘baked in’ for the next few decades and 
accelerate later. Financial players will progressively integrate physical risks under a ‘value at risk’ 
framework, and revise them according to new information, but it is not certain if this integration 
happens fast enough to motivate them to support the four systems transition and maximize the 
chances of realizing a P1 or P2 scenario. Chapter 2 will address this question. 
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Endnotes 
 
i These risks could be exacerbated by societal responses to sector-scale impacts, e.g. in the form of mass migration, food riots, etc., which 
are not captured in the currently assessed pathways. 
 
ii “Bottom-up” refers here to an assessment of deployment of a technology or practice that adds environmental and social side-effects of 
rapid ramp-up to technical, geophysical and economic constraints. Bottom-up assessments therefore arrive at lower estimates of potentials 
than what is seen in most pathways. 
 
iii These shock absorbers have intrinsic limits. On the one hand, experience demonstrates that private insurers often raise premiums in the 
aftermath of major events to ensure that they have sufficient reserves to cover future losses or exclude coverage for too large risks to cover 
even at an acceptable price in the case of flood protection. On the other hand, the existence of public shock absorbers may exacerbate risk 
by creating a moral hazard. For example, subsidizing some properties' insurance premiums can be an incentive to excessive risk-taking in 
areas most exposed to flooding, inundation from sea level rise, and extreme precipitation. 
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Chapter 2: How to be proactive in addressing gaps and capturing opportunities?  
Accelerating climate action requires over the next two decades a massive increase in low-carbon and 
climate-resilient investments. This places a triple responsibility on financial decision-makers, including 
governments and regulators:  
- To maintain the capacity of the financial system to support economic activity, encourage 
entrepreneurship, and safeguard the assets of millions of savers, pensioners, local public institutions, 
and businesses 
- To channel a much larger share of private savings towards sustainable and low carbon options 
- To create a business environment in which climate policies contribute to alleviate today's 
tensions in the world economy (unemployment, poverty, inequality, trade disputes). This is, according 
to the IPCC 1.5° C report, an overarching pre-condition of scaled-up climate action. 
We will see in chapter 3 that this responsibility is even more critical in the post-Covid-19 context. This 
chapter will specify the differences and interplays between climate-related risks for societies and the 
financial system. It will also discuss the stakes for scaling-up climate-friendly investments in the 
context of a structural investment gap for infrastructure, and how climate finance can help bridge this 
gap contributing to more sustainable and equitable development and a safer financial system. 
2.1 Climate-related risks for the financial sector and societies: differences and 
interplays 
Chapters 1 highlighted that the earth system is entering a situation of non-linear consequences and 
'unknowable unknowns' related to global warming (Lenton et al., 2019). For an effective framing of 
policy issues, a distinction must be made between these physical consequences and tipping points for 
the financial system, the world economy, and the human community. 
For example, the 'risks hotspots' for human systems might primarily affect areas with a marginal share 
of the market economy and capital flows. Thus, financial actors might not immediately predict the 
consequences of exacerbating vulnerabilities in these societies and their impact on the world’s 
security (Stern, 2006; Mach et al., 2019). According to the 'rational expectations and efficient markets 
hypothesis' (Fama, 1970, Lucas, 1972) that underpins the current functioning of the global financial 
system, this delay is acceptable because financial actors will readjust their choices and deploy an 
optimal hedging strategy for both the financial system and society when these consequences will fall 
upon them. 
However, this hypothesis might not hold true in relation to climate change. It might lead to a trade-
off between the protection of the financial system and of the collective interest.  
Indeed, learning from experience, financial actors can disengage from assets exposed to physical risks 
as home insurers did for flood and wildfire insurance for example in California (Ouazad and Kahn, 
2019). As regards transition risks, the disengagement will take the form of high coefficients applied on 
infrastructures and investments with a long lifespan. In both cases, the probability of 'extreme but 
plausible' scenarios will be progressively revised upwards in the Value at Risk (VAR) calculations 
reinforcing the disengagement behaviour. 
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The ensuing question is whether the VAR revision based on experience will lead financiers to readjust 
their choices quickly enough to avoid that climate change and climate policies destabilize the financial 
system in the coming decades. There is no need for a catastrophe on a planetary scale in the Weitzman 
sense (2014) for that. In the context of already-stressed balance sheets and high levels of corporate 
and municipal debt, a few destructive events affecting key economic hubs or revisions of technological 
expectations (e.g. negative surprises about low carbon options or a drop in fossil fuel prices) could 
trigger a sudden spike in risk aversion, and it might be difficult to restructure the portfolios in a short 
time”. Time is of the essence. When time runs out, risks can turn into catastrophes. Investors could 
rush out of certain bond funds causing liquidity shortages that could dry up futures markets that are 
already fragile because of higher volatility in certain commodity prices, including oil.  
The financial system might delay the readjustment if it misses the signal of increasingly worrying 
statistics of climate damages is missed during the financial cycles' upward-oriented phases with a 
momentum of cumulating debts and buying permanently revalued assets (Borio, 2014). At the cycle’s 
turnaround, financiers might pay more attention to sources of risks not related to the climate, such as 
high corporate debt and suddenly devaluated assets based on other risk factors, and this would 
destabilize the system. 
This leads to two opposite outcomes.  
In the first scenario, a successful spontaneous adjustment due to new information would keep the 
financial system safe (Keenan and Bradt, 2020; Litterman, 2020), but transfer to taxpayers the onus 
of damage compensation and the funding of adaptation and mitigation investments. The growing 
fiscal pressure on public budgets already put under strain by unfunded pension obligations and rising 
healthcare costs (Gilmore and St. Clair, 2018) might increase the population’s vulnerability and delay 
the scaling-up of climate mitigation activities.  
In the second scenario, the financial system would not readjust on time to new information, 
endangering its own stability (DNB, 2017). In both cases, the 'rational expectations and efficient 
markets’ hypothesis would be invalidated and the financial system would fail to deliver on its triple 
responsibility to address climate change.  
Since the Nineties, the economic literature has highlighted that climate action must be undertaken 
before a fully-fledged assessment of damages associated to climate change becomes available 
because of the inertia of the earth and economic systems. 'Act then learn' is preferable to 'learn then 
act’ (Manne and Richels, 1992; Ha-Duong et al., 1998), and there is no need to wait for a scientific 
consensus about global climate catastrophes (Weitzman, 2011 to justify precautionary action (Pottier 
et al. 2015). This is why the international community adopted the below 2° C warming target. But the 
financial system's spontaneous reaction is closer to the 'learn then act' approach and will likely lead 
to a P3 or P4 mitigation pathway in the absence of policy action and reforms of its internal dynamics. 
What set of public policies, self-adaptation measures, reforms of the financial regulatory framework, 
and international cooperation arrangements can enable the financial system to adopt a pro-active 
attitude towards climate change and support the scaling-up of climate-friendly investments? All these 
tools cannot ignore the general operating principles of the financial system (Malesky, 2017) so climate 
finance will have to be an adaptive market (Hallet al. 2017) embedded in, and contributing to, the 
evolution of these principles. The challenge is to reduce the internal vulnerability of the financial 
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system and its consequences for societies while better aligning with climate priorities and accelerating 
the transition to net zero emission economies. This would reduce societies' intrinsic vulnerabilities 
and allow them to better resist to global warming dynamics already underway. The magnitude of 
damage caused by climate change depends indeed on the seriousness of physical impacts as much as 
on the resilience of impacted societies (Hallegatte et al., 2007) 
2.2. Climate finance, investment gap and capital flows’ geographical 
misalignment  
Circulating figures on the investment requirement for a climate-friendly transition without their 
uncertainty ranges misrepresents the challenges ahead. It would be simple to channel capital flows 
towards projects whose overall volumes, technical content, and returns are easily predictable. The 
financier's mission is precisely to help decision-makers take manageable risks in an uncertain context. 
The reasons for this uncertainty lie in the interplays between a) the baseline economic growth rates, 
b) the link between economic growth and energy demand, c) the evolution of low carbon options’ 
cost efficiency, d) the level of integration between climate policies and other public policies, and their 
efficacy. Every scenario collected in the IPCC report incorporates various hypotheses about these 
parameters, except for policy uncertaintyiv, and the full range of the modelling results helps 
understand the orders of magnitude at play and the determinants of their uncertainty.  
Understanding the challenge of climate finance requires differentiating between global low-carbon 
investment needs, the incremental costs of a less-than-2°C warming target, and the amounts needed 
to bridge the infrastructure investment gap (IMF, 2014). Global low-carbon investment needs are 
estimated between 3.9% and 8.7% of the world’s GDP over the next two decadesv. The incremental 
costs of low-carbon options are less than that and their funding could be achieved without reducing 
global consumption by reallocating 1.4% to 3.9% of global savings (2.4% on average, (see box 4.8 of 
IPCC, 2018) that currently flow towards real estate, land and liquid financial vehiclesvi. More 
challenging is the reduction of the infrastructure investment gap, as repeatedly pointed out in 
specialist literature. According to the Global Infrastructure Outlook, this gap could reach a cumulative 
value of $14.9 trillion worldwide in 2035, meaning a global deficit of 15,9%. Arezki et al., (2017) retain 
the more pessimistic projections of a 32% deficit by the Boston Consulting Group. Rozenberg and Fay 
(2019) find that this investment gap is even higher in low and middle-income countries, especially 
when SDG-related investments are included. Meeting the 2°C target and SDGs 6.1 (drinking water) 
and 6.2 (sanitation and hygiene) would demand to multiply by 1.24 to 2.36 investments in water 
supply and sanitation, flood protection, and irrigation in such countries. 
Fundamentally, the chronic infrastructure investment gap and the geographical misalignment of 
capital flows are symptoms of the 'fault lines' of the current world economy.  
First, the global infrastructure investment gap reflects a misalignment between the geographic 
distribution of savings, capital flows, and infrastructure investment needs. This gap exists at the 
national level due to limited access to capital for key stakeholders of the low carbon transition (local 
authorities, SMEs, and households) (World Bank, 2019b) and to the diverse causes of the efficiency gap, 
for example energy efficiency (Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 2018). It is critical at the international level given 
countries' heterogeneity. Developed countries have aging populations, high savings capacities, 
established social safety nets, and the bulk of their infrastructures in place. Developing countries have 
a significant opportunity to leapfrog to low carbon infrastructure as they still have to build two-thirds 
of their infrastructure capital . But they have young populations, a wide range of savings rates (from 
15% to over 40%) and underdeveloped social safety nets. Even regions with high savings can suffer 
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from deficient energy access and inadequate infrastructure coverage (ADB, 2018). This misalignment is 
compounded by the limited capital flows from high-saving to low-saving regions. The main barriers to 
these capital flows are discussed later in the chapter.  
A second fundamental reason behind the chronic infrastructure gap is the short-term bias of 
economic and financial decisions (Miles, 1993) (Bushee, 2001); (Black and Fraser, 2002). This bias 
results from a 'business environment' in which returns weighted on short-term risk dominate the 
investment horizon of both financial actors and firms working under a 'shareholder value business 
regime' (Roe, 1994; Froud et al., 2000) instead of the 'managerial business regime' that characterized 
the late 20th century (Galbraith 1967). In such an environment, risk-averse financial players tend to 
direct more savings towards liquid financial products and real estate and will avoid confronting the 
risks of early-stage technologies and markets in developing countries. We will examine more in detail 
later why this bias works against infrastructure investments even though they deliver returns between 
4% and 8% (OECD 2017). 
This behaviour results in a gap between the 'propensity to save' and the 'propensity to invest' 
(Summers, 2016) in which some analysts see a driver of an unstable and uncertain growth over the 
past and forthcoming decades, if not of a possible secular stagnation, (Krugman, 2014; Blanchard, 
2019; Summers and Rachel, 2019). This has become a severe threat to the stability of the modern 
financial system (Christopher, 2017; Schwab, 2019 , Arezcki et al., 2019). 
 
2.2.1. The unintended impacts of the response to the subprime crisis 
After the subprime crisis, tight regulations adopted to minimize the vulnerability of the financial and 
monetary systems and the liquidity injections by central banks did not help reduce the infrastructure 
investment gap. They resulted in increased corporate debt worldwide, but not in more long-term 
investments. While syndicated bank loans have traditionally been an important source of funds for 
risky long-term projects, the tighter bank regulations under Basel III, combined with an economic 
context with more uncertainty and flatter yield-curve, have pushed banks to retrench from risky and 
less profitable asset classes (Blended Finance Taskforce, 2018). In this context, they tended to limit 
loan maturity to 5 or 8 years, while infrastructure projects typically require amortization of debt over 
15–20 years (Arezki et al. 2017).  
The private sector's recourse to debt has then largely bypassed the banking system via 'shadow 
banking' actors, with bonds and equity traded through Non-Bank Financial Intermediaries (NBFI) 
(mutual funds, insurance, asset managers, hedge funds, exchange-traded funds) that are not subject 
to the same regulatory regime as banks. The percentage of global financial assets held by the NBFI 
sector grew from 42% in 2008 to 49.5% in 2019 (FSB 2020). Since this sector can provide, through 
green bonds, the easiest vehicle to mobilize savings for low-carbon investments, the question 
(discussed later) is how such vehicles should be built to improve and not undermine the stability of 
the non-bank banking system. 
Between 2008 and 2019, the upward phase in the financial cycle allowed the accumulation of debt 
with cumulated risks concealed in the loaners' asset column preparing a slowdown in economic 
growth at the downturn of the cycle (Borio et al., 2018). The threats materialized in 2019 prospecting 
lower economic growth worldwide even before the Covid-19 crisis. This generated a loss of confidence 
in asset prices and revealed systemic vulnerabilities. A symptom was, in 2019, the negative 10-year to 
3-month US spread (-7.6bps.vii  
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These post-2008 dynamics have had indirect negative consequences for the willingness of the private 
sector to invest in the low carbon transition. In particular: 
• negative yields for long-term sovereign bonds reflect very risk-averse behaviours (preferring 
the certainty of small losses to the expectation of gains that are associated with the risk of large losses) 
that lead to credit rationing for projects (Stiglitz J., Weiss A., 1981) and penalize capital intensive and 
less mature low carbon options; 
• in the investment-grade universe 50% of private companies were rated BBB end of 2019 
compared with 34% in 2000, which inhibits their capacity to invest (CEIC Data stream: 
https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicators); and 
• average sovereign spreads in emerging economies reached 524bps on March 18, 2020 
undermining their refinancing capacity. Besides, an increasing number of developing countries have 
been or are at risk of being downgraded at CCC, thus deprived of access to the capital market if not at 
usurious discount rates. 
2.2.2. The investment gap for adaptation and essential goods and services 
The warmer the planet, the higher the sea-level rise and the more frequent the floods, typhoons, 
hurricanes and heat waves. As a consequence, the investment needs will also increase in new and 
retrofitted resilient infrastructure, flood protections, water management, health systems, climate 
resilient agriculture, nature-based solutions, community-based initiatives, and early warning systems 
(IPCC, 2018).) 
Studies indicate that adaptation investments needs are in the order of $140 to $300 billion per year 
for developing countries over 2016-2030 (UNEP, 2018; IFC, 2016). Only 18-25% of climate finance is 
currently directed to these measures in developing countries with a fragmented support and small 
amounts flowing through UNFCCC channels (Shine and Campillo, 2016).  
The funding of specific adaptation investments is only part of the challenge because, ultimately 
improving societies' adaptive capacities depends on the SDGs' fulfilment (Hallegatte et al., 2015). 
Bridging the investment gap on irrigation, water supply, healthcare, energy access, and quality buildings 
is an essential enabling condition for adapting to climate change.  
Investment at scale in these essential infrastructure and services is however hampered by two intrinsic 
features. First, it is more challenging to capture monetary revenues from beneficiaries of these projects 
as their benefits frequently have a local public good nature and concern activities that often do not 
deliver marketable goods and services. Second, adaptation projects are not easy to standardize, making 
financial, technological, and organizational innovations more difficult than for mitigation activities. 
This is why much of adaptation mobilizes local, regional and national partnerships, including with the 
support of national and sub-national government budgets, supplemented by NGO and private climate 
funds (Nakhooda and Watson, 2016). Adaptation investments and the provision of basic infrastructure 
will likely continue to require public subsidies and development assistance. In 2018, the private sector 
brought only 5.7% of the adaptation projects to the portfolio funded by Multilateral Development 
Banks (MDBs), while the proportion for mitigation projects was 47%. The difficulty to monetize 
adaptation benefits explains why 70% of their funding by the MDBs is operated through loans, 9% 
through grants and only 0.04% through guarantees which cover instead 4.4% of mitigation projects 
(MDB, 2019). 
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2.3. Bridging the investment gap for low-emission, climate-resilient 
infrastructure: market fixing and market shaping 
 
For decades, discussion on how to incentivize the changes needed in investment, production, and 
consumption patterns and induce technological progress that brings down carbon abatement costs 
centred on the relative merits of pricing and non-pricing instruments, and ways of articulating them. 
The prevailing assumption was that, with the proper carbon prices, well-defined standards, and norms 
supported by public funding, private finance would follow automatically. This assumption no longer 
holds given the variety of market failures in the infrastructure investment gap and the geographical 
mismatch of capital flows. 
As the traditional distinction between market-based and command-and-control instruments does not 
capture the diversity of policy packages experimented over the past three decades to accelerate 
climate innovation and investments, we consider here, and interpret more broadly, the distinction 
between two approaches to correct market failures. This distinction has been made by several authors 
(Mazzucato, 2015; Ryan-Collins, 2019). 
 
The market-fixing approach focuses on removing information barriers that hinder investments by 
adding financial disclosure to pricing signals with no specific demand for systemic reforms of the 
capital markets and no fiscal and regulatory policies to guide microeconomic choices. The market-
shaping approach aims to remove investment barriers directly through a mix of self-regulatory 
regulatory, and financial instruments, and direct public investment to improve risk-weighted returns 
of low emission, climate-resilient infrastructure for a given carbon price.  
2.3.1. Market fixing: sending the right signals 
The market fixing approach aims to send the right pricing and risk signals to enable financiers to 
better value assets and reallocate capital accordingly.  
Carbon Pricing, necessity, forms, and limits 
There is a widely shared consensus in economics that, in a frictionless world with perfect capital 
markets and without uncertainty, carbon prices would be sufficient to secure the attractiveness of 
low carbon options for capital markets. In the real world, however, the carbon price signal is swamped 
by the noise of other signals, such as oil prices, interest rates, and currencies exchange rates in 
addition to the business uncertainty (Gross et al. 2010, Roques et al. 2008) 
Carbon prices capable of covering these noises should be set at a higher level than the $40–80/tCO2 
by 2020 and $50–100/tCO2 by 2030 recommended by the high-level commission led by Nicholas Stern 
and Joseph Stiglitz (Stern-Stiglitz 2017). The main reason is that the payback period of low carbon 
options with higher upfront capital expenditure and lower operations and maintenance costs is longer 
and therefore much more sensitive to uncertainty than alternatives with fuel costs dominated 
technologies (Hirth and J.C. Steckel,2016; Hourcade, 2017; Iyer et al. 2015; Schmidt,2014). viii 
The scaling-up and geographical expansion of carbon prices to such levelsix are highly uncertain 
because they have to be embedded into country-specific fiscal and social policies to hedge against the 
regressive impact on welfare, competitiveness, and employment caused by higher energy costs 
propagated throughout the economy (Michaelowa et al., 2018). This impact needs to be offset using 
the proceeds of carbon taxes or auctioned emission allowances to reduce distortive taxation (Goulder, 
1995; Mooij, 2000; Mooij and Bovenberg, 1994; Chiroleu-Assouline and Fodha, 2014) and fund 
compensating measures for the population sections that are most adversely impacted (Combet et al., 
2010; Jaccard, 2012; Klenert et al., 2018). The adverse economic and distributive effects of higher 
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energy prices and the removal of fossil fuel subsidies are more severe for low-income countries, 
countries with a large share of energy-intensive activities, and countries exporting fossil fuels. These 
also have a lower potential to mitigate impacts because of lower wages and lower pre-existing taxes 
(Lefevre et al., 2019) 
The challenge is almost identical in the case of emission trading systems. A frequent misconception is 
to see in this mechanism a way of financing the low carbon transition through the revenues from the 
sale of emission permits. But this is possible only if at least part of the emissions allowances are given 
for free to companies. In this case, finding the rules for the allocation of allowances for a given overall 
carbon constraint is an uncertain exercise. It has to allow all sectors to self-finance their low carbon 
investments or cover the debt service of loans without generating 'carbon rents' that would impose a 
burden on the rest of the economy (Branger and Quirion 2015). The perspective of voluntary carbon 
markets growing more than 15-fold by 2030 to deliver the 1.5°C pathway envisaged by The Taskforce 
on Voluntary Carbon Markets (Task Force on Voluntary Carbon Markets, 2021) might confront the 
same obstacles, including the political pressure for auctioned permits and the difficulty of controlling 
the effects of linking cap and trade systems that are very heterogeneous in scope and underlying 
jurisdiction (Holtsmark and Weitzman, 2020). 
Carbon price signals alone leave financing challenges unresolved because of the constraints on their 
scaling-up and the need to use a significant share of their revenues to mitigate their effects directly 
(recycling option) or indirectly through companion policies that tackle market failures other than 
greenhouse gas emissions and that involve public funding. These failures are related to knowledge 
spill overs, learning and RandD, information, capital markets, labour markets, and unpriced co-
benefits of climate action. This is why a consensus, expressed by the High-Level Commission on Carbon 
Prices (Stern and Stiglitz 2017), is now emerging on the necessity of embedding carbon prices in more 
complex policy packages. 
The Stern-Stiglitz commission also emphasizes the interest of implicit carbon pricing in complementing 
explicit carbon prices. The way to do so is to embed notional prices in financial instruments and public 
incentives that foster low-carbon programmes and projects, such as specific project-based credits and 
'shadow pricing' internal to public enterprises. This link between carbon pricing and financial 
instruments is explored below.  
Climate Risk Disclosure and taxonomies  
Historically, the concerns about the implications of climate change for the financial community arose 
from potential fiduciary obligations of reinsurers and pension funds (Freshfields at al. 2005; Girgis and 
Barker, 2015; Mansley, 1994; Wilder and Curnow, 2012). The focus on liability risks responded to the 
advocacy strategies deployed by the universities’ endowments and mission-based investors such as 
philanthropic and religious organisations to remove the 'social license' from the fossil fuel industry 
and to raise the cost of its access to capital (Ansar, A et al. 2013; Baron and Fischer, 2015). The Carbon 
Tracker Initiative (CTI), a UK think tank, first quantified in 2011 the climate-related risks of stranded 
assets in the fossil fuel industry (CTI, 2016). Since then, other tools have emerged covering other 
sectors and asset classes, such as the 2° Investing Initiative's PACTA.x Such tools demonstrate a rising 
interest in business circles to engage in an 'investor revolution' (Eccles and Klimenko, 2019) with 
climate change incorporated in the Social Responsibility of Enterprises to induce changes in 
companies’ routine decisions, and more attention paid to alternatives with a lesser climate impact. 
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A few asset owners started, for example, to sell their fossil fuel-based assets. Before the recent crash 
of oil prices, the question was whether a divesting movement could be large enough to weigh on share 
prices of oil companies (Denning, 2019). The question is even more difficult if we are to disentangle 
the impact of such movements from other causes of oil price volatility in the Covid-19 contextxi. 
Marc Carney's speech (2015) on the 'tragedy of the horizons’ broadened this perspective, adding the 
'physical risks' and the 'transition risks' to the 'liability risks". This alert from the former Governor of 
the Bank of England had an influence amongst financial actors who generally do not consider the 
future beyond a quarterly horizon 151. It opened a discussion about the unseen build-up of climate 
risks across multiple companies and actors that could threaten the system's stability by suddenly 
writing down significant classes of assets. This discussion led to the creation of a Taskforce on Climate-
related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) under the auspices of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) that 
brings together financial authorities from G20 countries to prevent new financial crises. The voluntary 
nature of the TCFD facilitated its endorsement by governments and regulators, in addition to 
numerous companies and investors. But it allowed for a patchy adoption of its principles. 
The Sustainability Accounting Standard Board, a non-profit organisation, published in 2016 detailed 
technical guidelines (Sustainability Accounting Standards Board, 2016) to better understand the 
probability, magnitude, and timing of climate risks for each industry across the economy in the near 
term and to compare corporate performance among peers. In 2017, the TCFD released a universal 
framework (TCFD, 2017) with a set of quantitative and qualitative criteria to disclose the climate risks 
embedded in portfolios (See box 2.1). 
There are currently five leading voluntary disclosure frameworks, which have recently begun to work 
together towards a joint vision: the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), the Climate Disclosure Standards 
Board (CDSB), the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), the International Integrated Reporting Council 
(IIRC) and the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB). They follow the recommendations of 
the Inter-Agency Task Force on Financing for Development (IATF) , which includes over 60 UN and 
international entities on global mandatory disclosure of climate-related financial risks (UN IATF, 2020). 
BOX 2.1: Examples of climate-related finance initiatives, frameworks, standards and 
methodologies 
Disclosure-oriented platforms, scorecards, and tracking lists. These seek to provide decision-
makers or institutional customers with information about the way specific companies or 
institutions perform in relation to climate change. Examples are the Climate Disclosure Project 
(CDP), the Asset Owners' Disclosure Project and the Global Coal Exit List. 
Financial reporting standards. These seek to include climate and other ESG or non-financial factors 
into accounting standards. Examples are the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB), the 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and Integrated Reporting. Others, such as the Partnership for 
Carbon Accounting Financials include features of both reporting standards and disclosure 
platforms.  
Analytical methodologies and certification schemes. These go a step beyond disclosure-oriented 
platforms by analysing and seeking to incentivise possibilities for the reduction of embodied 
emissions and physical climate risks. Examples come from both NGO and proprietary/commercial 
providers, such as the 2 Degrees Investing Initiative, the Transition Pathways Initiative, the 
Platform for Carbon Accounting of Financials, and many commercial providers.  
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Scenario-related tools. A critical element of the TCFD recommendations, scenario analysis 
attempts to capture future risk. Examples are the Paris Agreement Capital Transition Assessment 
(PACTA), a tool to test entire portfolios against a scenario, and the Inevitable Policy Response, a 
modelled, policy-driven transition scenario with resources to apply it.  
Physical risk analysis tools. These use information from climate models combined with data about 
the location and features of assets and business activities to estimate their vulnerability to climate 
impacts. Examples are the World Resources Institute (WRI)'s Aqueduct tool or 427MT's physical 
risk services.  
The primary outcome expected from climate disclosure approaches is that banks and asset managers 
will correct their short-term bias and launch financial signals to investors by setting the cost of loans 
in an inverse proportion of the projects' carbon content.  
An important macroeconomic side-benefit would be to hedge against abrupt corrections in financial 
markets caused by cumulated mispricing of assets (Plantinga, A; Scholtens, 2016). In late 2017, the 
Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) was launched. It now has 90 members, amongst 
which central banks from many developed and developing countries. Observers include the IMF, the 
World Bank, the Bank for International Settlements, the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, 
and the Green Climate Fund (GCF). Its first report made several recommendations for central banks 
and other policy-makers and established a taxonomy of green, non-green, brown, and non-brown 
products (NGFS 2019) to help direct investments to sustainable options. The European Union recently 
developed a first essay of such a taxonomy (EU, 2020), and some EU companies have just launched 
the first application trials. 
In parallel, stress test methodologies have tried to assess the risk exposure of various asset portfolios 
(Battiston et al., 2017). In 2019, the Bank of England and the Netherlands announced plans to conduct 
climate risk stress tests for banks and insurers. In March 2020, the European Central Bank (ECB) 
announced the preparation of a macro prudential stress test to reveal how climate risks could 
propagate across the financial system and the non-financial economy. 
The concrete outcome of these processes is still uncertain, but they show an increasing demand for 
knowledge tools from high-level decision-makers in an uncertain environment. 
Lessons learned from market fixing experiences 
Experiences of carbon pricing started in the early nineties in Sweden. Twenty-five years later, in 2016, 
explicit carbon prices covered only 15% of global emissions and three-quarters of them were below 
$10 per tCO2 (World Bank, 2016), far lower than $40 to $80 worldwide recommended by the Stern-
Stiglitz report. This has to be compared with the $5.2 trillion (6.5% of the world GDP) dedicated in 
2017 to subsidising fossil fuel consumption (Coady, et al., 2019).  
The scaling-up of carbon prices and the removal of fossil fuels subsidies remain fundamental 
conditions for the low carbon transition, but their pace depends ultimately on each government' 
capacity to incorporate them into a set of public policies (fiscal reforms, regulation of the electricity 
and transport systems, real estate policies, safety nets) that minimize their adverse effects on 
development priorities and, possibly, turn them into a 'double-dividend. The design of these policies 
will always have to consider national and local circumstances. This explains why paragraph 136 of the 
Paris Agreement's decision recognizes the usefulness of a carbon price but states that it "applies to 
non-Party entities and is not binding upon countries that are Parties to the convention." There is, 
therefore, little chance that carbon prices can reach in the coming years the levels required to 
overcome the noise of other market signals.  
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A still underexplored area is the use of notional carbon prices to drive public policies. Such prices have 
been adopted in the UK and France with a 'valeur tutélaire du carbone' (safeguard carbon value) of 
250€/tonne (Quinet, 2019) but with, so far, no observable consequences. 
Climate transparency approaches are too recent to assess their impact. In June 2019, a TCFD survey 
found that most companies do not disclose sufficient information on potential financial impact of 
climate-related issues affecting them (TCFD, 2019). A recent report by the Climate Disclosures 
Standards Board also found that the adoption of the TCFD recommendations continues to be slow and 
that 78% of Europe's largest companies are falling short of reporting environmental and climate-
related risks despite EU guidelines (Climate Disclosures Standards Board, 2020). As for the practical 
consequences of these efforts, an IMF study found that equity valuations across countries did not 
reflect any of the commonly discussed global warming scenarios nor associated projected changes in 
hazard occurrence or physical risk incidence.xii  
The TCFD and taxonomy tools face three main limits: 
- The methodological difficulties associated with calculating aggregated indicators of 
portfolios’ 'greenness'. The quantification of the so-called 'scope 1', 'scope 2' and 'scope 3' of 
emissions to be attributed to each activity as defined by the GHG Protocol launched in 2001 by the 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), and the World Resources Institute 
(WRI) might not be easy to resolvexiii. Another question is about the grades given to emissions from 
energy-intensive industries like cement, steel, and specific chemicals, which have high production-
based emissions but are also absolutely needed to build low carbon climate-resilient infrastructures.  
- Decarbonizing an asset portfolio by divesting coal or other carbon-intensive activities does 
not necessarily lead to investing in the technical options needed for deep decarbonisation 157. One can 
decarbonize a portfolio by investing not in such options but in other non-carbon intensive activities, 
like health, education, or information systems, or assets like real estate that indirectly induce mobility 
needs contributing to higher CO2 emissions. 
- A company that gives up a carbon-intensive project may make way for a competitor less 
sensitive to environmental virtue, which would find support by financial institutions with a looser 
interpretation of climate disclosure. 
Hence, even if public pressure mounts to require financial institutions and industry to disclose their 
climate risks and the emission embodied in their investment, disclosure and transparency alone might 
not effect the redirection of saving quickly enough for a 1.5°C or a 2°C warming transition 
(Christophers, 2017) (Ameli, 2019). Transparency is needed to address behavioural routines, what 
Grubb et al. (2014) call the first domain of action, but it cannot address on its own the market failures 
that interact with the financial system and the structural issues of climate finance, the second and 
third domains of action. 
Thus, price mobilization and financial signals alone might fail to reduce the infrastructure investment 
gap in due time. Their common limit is that the deficit in low carbon investments depends on many 
market failures that improved information alone cannot reduce. Symptomatically, climate-related 
resolutions have proliferated in the past couple of years (Westcott, 2019), while investors use their 
power to appeal to governments directly. An example is the Global Investor Statement to 
Governments on Investor Expectations, a call to governments worldwide to meet the objectives of 
the Paris Agreement endorsed by 420 investors managing over $32 trillion2. Market-shaping 
 
2 The Global Investor Statement to governments on climate change: https://globalinvestorcoalition.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/09/190916-GISGCC-for-UNCAS.pdf  
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approaches aim to respond to this call by addressing directly the market and institutional failures 
that inhibit the efficacy of price and financial signals.  
2.3.2. Market shaping: removing economic and non-economic barriers of climate-friendly 
investments 
From a microeconomic point of view, the infrastructure investment gap looks like an economic 
paradox since, with current low-interest rates, infrastructure investments deliver a real return 
between 4% and 8% (Bhattacharya et al., 2016). With an estimated $14 trillion of negative-yielding 
debt in OECD countries and $26 trillion of low carbon, climate resilient investment opportunities in 
developing countries by 2030, capital in search of higher yields should flow from developed to 
developing countries to address this infrastructure investment gap. This is not happening.  
Finance for projects in non-OECD countries reached $356 billion per year in 2017-2018, or 61% of 
global climate finance. However, 76% of these resources are deployed in the country in which they 
are sourced, revealing a strong preference among investors for home-country investments where risks 
are well understood (CPI, 2020). East Asia and Pacific was the largest regional provider of and 
destination for climate finance, at $238 billion. Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for only 5% of climate 
finance flows in non-OECD countries, at $19 billion (CPI, 2019). The bulk of climate finance in Sub-
Saharan Africa originates from the public sector (MDBs, NDBs, multilateral climate funds).  
Neither financial investors nor project developers try and take advantage of what the IMF's World 
Economic Outlook (Abiad et al. 2014) describes as 'free lunch' opportunities because these 
opportunities face several political and regulatory, macroeconomic and business costs, as well as 
technical barriers. These costs are magnified in developing countries because of the considerable 
differences in their creditworthiness. The spread between the interest rate of a bond issued by the US 
government and the interest rate of loans to a given country comes on top of projects' risk-premium. 
In 2018, it was 1.30% for a five-year project and 2.5% for a ten-year project in BBB-rated countries. At 
the beginning of 2020 it jumped to 6% and 9%, respectively, in B-rated countries. Before the Covid-19 
crisis, more than 60 countries were rated below BBB and had access to capital only at interest rates 
higher than 18% for two-year projects. The impact of this inequality is exacerbated by the fact that 
countries in this class are often those whose creditworthiness might be the most affected by climate 
change damages (Buhr et al., 2018). 
Aligning capital flows and investment needs is not just a matter of North-South aid and foreign 
assistance, of which flows are currently falling. It demands correcting the world economy's structural 
mechanisms behind the well-known Lucas' paradox, 'why doesn't capital flow from rich to poor 
countries' (Lucas, 1990), and the non-negligible share of their savings flowing into the 'safe havens' of 
developed countries (World Bank, 2019b). 
While market-fixing approaches address information barriers for financiers, a second approach 
gradually emerged over the past 30 years to direct private investment towards low emissions climate-
resilient development pathways addressing a range of other barriers. This approach couples climate 
finance channels with tools designed to develop the demand for ‘green’ products, promote low-
carbon technical innovation and remove the political and regulatory barriers that hinder demand and 
supply of climate-resilient investments. In essence, market-shaping approaches embed pricing signal 
into broader policy packages. 
This section highlights climate-friendly investment barriers and describes how the market-shaping 
approach removes these barriers through policy and financial de-risking. 
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Barriers and risks time profiles 
At the microeconomic level, the persistent infrastructure investment gap is caused by several risks 
that deter entrepreneurs and financiers from exposing their resources. The OECD (2016b suggests to 
cluster these risks into three main categories and to follow them along the four phases of the project 
development cycle (table 2.1). 
Political and regulatory risks arise from governmental actions, including changes in policies or 
regulations that adversely impact infrastructure investments. For example, complex, inconsistent, or 
opaque licensing procedures lead to transaction delays and costs. Similarly, changes in tariff 
regulations or off-taking contract renegotiation can affect the profitability of investments.  
Macroeconomic and business risks arise from the possibility that the industry and/or the economic 
environment are subject to change. These include macroeconomic variables like inflation and 
exchange rate fluctuations, as well as shifts in consumers' demand, access to finance, and liquidity 
constraints.  
Technical risks are determined by the skills of operators and managers, and related to the features of 
the project (e.g. its complexity, construction, and technology). These risks can also arise from the lack 
of supporting physical infrastructure (e.g. cranes or roads to unload and transport heavy equipment).  
Table 2.1: Main risks by project development phase (OECD, 2016b) 
 
All the four phases (development, construction, operation, and termination), including their specific 
risks, will count in the investment calculus of both entrepreneurs and financiers. The development 
phase is critical because, at this stage, entrepreneurs are particularly exposed as they engage personal 
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equity and take the risks of sunk costs. They will therefore expect higher returns before investing their 
time and personal resources in an infrastructure project. Similarly, finance providers will demand a 
higher margin and offer less attractive terms to protect themselves from these higher risks.  
This translates into higher interest rates (debt) and required returns (equity), shorter loan tenors and 
a larger share of costlier equity in capital structure, affecting the attractiveness of the investment. The 
additional financing costs are even higher in less developed countries in which infrastructure projects 
would not reach investment grade (Blended Finance Taskforce, 2018).  
These barriers appear to restrict even further climate-friendly investments, as suggested by the 
limited private funds leveraged by public money for such projects, the low share of carbon saving 
potentials tapped by dedicated policies such as energy renovation programmes (Ürge-Vorsatz et al. 
2018), and a demand for climate finance lower than the volume of economically viable projects (de 
Gouvello and Zelenko, 2010; Timilsina et al., 2010). 
Part of the risk is primarily transactional. Risks come from the uncertain results of environmental 
reviews, surprises in the costs, and delays incurred in the pre-construction phase (permitting process 
longer than expected, difficulties raising the pre-funding and identifying credible financial partners, 
risks of cancellation of permits, and renegotiation of the initial contract). These factors combined with 
those of cost overruns for less mature technical options generate up-front risks that deter many 
initiatives. They are very high for sub-critical project sizes, fragmentation of financing windows, limited 
familiarity with particular geographies, uncertain governance landscape, and weak project preparation. 
These parameters can be found in almost all economies but are decisive in developing countries  
A direct consequence is the limited supply of high-quality, transparent low-carbon climate-resilient 
investment projects despite the unmet demand for new infrastructures. Hence, although the issuance 
of green bond reached a record high of $225 billion in 2019, it was far below the potential of low 
carbon investments. This chicken and egg problem explains the paradox of complaints from 
entrepreneurs about difficult access to capital on the one hand, and from financiers about a deficit of 
bankable project proposals on the other. Any green market will require addressing the barriers to both 
the demand and the supply of climate-friendly investments to be successful (Mazzucato, 2015). 
Environmental public support instruments to create demand and supply for climate-friendly 
investments 
The need to address market and investment barriers to low carbon options has inspired the 
development of a wide array of public measures modelled around the energy efficiency policies 
conducted since the Seventies. According to the IEA’s Policies and Measures Database, over 5,500 
climate policies and instruments are currently used globally today.xiv Table 2.2 shows the main types 
of instruments.  
The first four columns list environmental policy instruments that create a business context conducive 
to the demand for low carbon investments and the supply of low carbon projects. They include 
information, regulatory, economic, and institutional measures that create a demand for green, 
climate-resilient goods and services by reducing market uncertainty. They also encourage climate-
friendly investments by reducing their transaction costs.  
In contrast, financial de-risking instruments do not seek to change the overall business context but 
tackle projects’ risks by transferring part of them to public actors. They blend public and private 
resources, often to encourage market-creating projects that will establish a proof of concept 
(innovation to market) or commercial track record (market deployment) for new climate solutions.  
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Table 2.2: Environmental Public Support Instruments 
 
The mobilization of these two classes of instruments to address the infrastructure microeconomic 
paradox remains a complex exercise because it requires to find the right balance between three 
parameters: a) the social acceptability of end-use services' delivery prices, b) the coverage of costs 
to develop the systems, and c) the risk-weighted profitability for the private investors. 
Environmental policy de-risking: a matter of stability and policy integration 
The core objective of environmental policy instruments is to create a business context conducive to 
markets for low carbon goods, services, and technologies that will attract investors. Their de-risking 
dimension stems from their adequacy to the pursued objectives and their stability.  
Historically, technical standards and norms have played a dominant role. Their first important field of 
application has been end-use equipment energy efficiency (e.g., miles/gallon or level of CO2 emission 
per km). xv They also included building codes, retrofitting standards, and, more recently, shares of 
renewable energies in the electricity supply, materials recycling rates, and norms for construction 
materials. 
These tools have been questioned repeatedly in economic literature since the early nineties (Pearce; 
1991; Barde, 1994) because they result from negotiation processes necessarily influenced by lobbying 
interest. Therefore they cannot equate the marginal greenhouse gas emissions abatement costs 
throughout the economy and minimize the social costs of meeting a given environmental target. 
Another criticism is that they do not deliver the promised emissions reductions because of the 
‘rebound effect’, which means that in the absence of carbon prices, efficiency gains lead to cheaper 
end-use services and higher consumption of these services (Sorrell,2009; Dimitropoulos et al. 2018). 
This typically occurs when more efficient heating systems allow for higher thermal comfort or when 
an annual CO2 emission target for the entire fleet sold by vehicle manufacturers leads to increasingly 
efficient cars but does not limit the driven distance.  
However, they continue to be extensively employed because they reduce uncertainty for industry and 
accelerate learning by doing processes (Kahouli-Brahmi, 2009). They are also the only way to 
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coordinate the emergence of competence networks fast enough to avoid technological lock-ins. For 
example, building codes are needed to avoid the lock-in of rapidly urbanizing countries to poorly 
performing buildings that remain in use for the next 50–100 years (Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 2014). 
Technical standards and norms are increasingly supplemented by a large set of financial incentives: 
RandD funding (battery and hydrogen technologies), public procurement of zero-emission vehicles, 
feed-in tariffs based on the quantity of renewable energy produced, energy savings (Bertoldi et al., 
2013; García-Álvarez et al., 2017; Pablo-Romero et al., 2017; Ritzenhofen and Spinler, 2016), feebates 
and 'bonus-malus’ schemes that foster the penetration of low-emission options (Butler and Neuhoff, 
2008), rebates on value-added tax (VAT) and trading schemes with Energy Savings Obligations (Haoqi 
et al., 2017) for energy retailers or Green Certificates for renewable energy portfolio standards (Upton 
and Snyder, 2017). 
On the supply-side, environmental policies are the first part of general legal and institutional reforms 
that ensure an appropriate supply of skilled labour, secure a social license to operate, and reduce 
complex, inconsistent, or opaque permitting procedures.  
Although some of these instruments have a neutral impact on public budgets by incentivizing low-
emission products and penalizing high-emission ones (de Haan et al., 2009), most of them come at a 
cost to industry, consumers, or the taxpayer.  
The limit of these instruments lies in the fact that the tighter the public funding constraints, the lower 
is the political credibility of their maintenance over time. Combined with the difficulty of controlling 
opportunistic behaviours in subsidies, this can lead public budget officers working under tight 
constraints and competing demands to lower the support to these measures or making their 
administration particularly complex. 
Financial de-risking and blended finance 
Financial instruments include direct public investment and public co-investment to de-risk private 
investment. De-risking instruments include concessional finance (grant, concessional debts), loan 
guarantees, deferred or income-contingent repayment, political risk insurance (PRI) and public 
equity co-investments. They are blended with private resources to reduce the high perceived and 
real risks faced by private investors in early-stage climate solutions and markets.  
Blended finance is a structuring approach that allows organizations with different objectives to 
invest alongside each other while achieving their own objectives. The main forms of blended finance 
include provision of: (i) concessional capital (below-market terms finance) to lower the overall cost 
of capital to private investors; (ii) credit enhancement through guarantees or insurance to provide 
an additional layer of protection to private investors; and (iii) grant-funded technical assistance 
facilities that can be utilized for biding and project development phases. 
One lesson from the agency theory (Holmstrom 1979; Mirrless 2011) is that the optimal contract 
between a Principal pursuing a collective goal and an Agent involves a trade-off between risk sharing 
and incentives. If public budgets are the risk carriers in the last resort, one challenge is how they can 
play this role in a context where their position is fragile because of competing demands and they must 
maximize the efficacy of every currency spent. 
Table 2.3 shows the main types of financial de-risking instruments as a function of the type of risks 
they tackle. The key information is that the public guarantees are neutral vis-à-vis the type of risk, 
including the 'macro' country risks (currency risks, political risks). This broad coverage is the reason 
why public guarantees have been increasingly proposed to cut the risk-premium of low carbon 
investments (de Gouvello and Zelenko, 2010; Studart and Gallagher, 2015; Emin et al., 2014) (Lee et 
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al., 2018; Schiff and Dithrich, 2017). The World Bank initiated a Partial Guarantee Scheme (Launay, 
2016), and the Blended Finance Task Force called recently for the scaling up of these instruments. 
Table 2.3 | Financial instruments and risks (adapted from BFTF (2018)) 
 
 M
AC
RO 
CREDIT / COMMERCIAL TECHNICAL FINANCE INFRA 
SPECIFIC 
 
countr
y risk 
Currency 
ris
k 
Credit  
worthiness 
risk 
Liquidity 
risk 
Demand 
risk 
Construc
tion risk 
Operation 
risk 
Access to 
capital 
Lack of 
pipeline 
Off-take 
risks 
O
f
f
-
t
a
k
e 
s
k 
1. Public 
Guarantees 
         
1b Guarantees 
         
 
2. Insurance 
         
 
3. Hedging 
         
4. Junior/ 
subordinated 
capital 
         
5. 
Contractual 
mechanism 
         
 
6. Grants 
         
 
Insurances also de-risk these phases of the project life cycle. For example, were insurances for an 
infrastructure project in Africa, unlisted in the Solvency II framework, be backed on AAA guarantees, 
the corresponding reserve requirement would be reduced by 30% (Déau and Touati, 2017). However, 
the limit of insurances is that they entitle the issuer to review claims concerning events. They thus 
must be combined with guarantees that cover lenders or investors against payment defaults.  
Contractual arrangements like power purchase agreements (PPA) are powerful instruments to reduce 
market risks through a guaranteed price and a guaranteed access to the grid. They can also provide 
favourable tariffs to increase return on investments. However, they do not tackle directly macro and 
credit-worthiness risks. Moreover, the credibility of a price premium on sales might be undermined 
by the policy uncertainty about the ability to maintain it under strongly pressured public budgets. 
Private actors and government officials may not have equally good information when prices for feed-
in tariff programmes are initially set so they may turn out to be too high. This can erode support for 
the programme and lead to unnecessary public costs. 
The same pressure on public budget will be a constraint for sovereign concessional finance. The 
capacity of public institutions to provide concessional finance will depend on the fiscal situation of 
originating and receiving governments. Highly indebted governments might not be able to contract 
additional sovereign debt. Grant resources are by nature limited and cannot be deployed at scale to 
finance capital-intensive infrastructure work. 
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Experiences and limits of financial de-risking and blended finance 
Between 2012 and 2018, $205.1 billion were mobilized from the private sector by official development 
finance interventions. The data show an upward trend over the period, with a significant acceleration 
between 2017 and 2018. Overall, guarantees catalysed the most of private finance (39% of the total), 
followed by direct investment in companies (DICs) and syndicated loans, accounting for 18% of the 
total each (OECD, 2020). 
While private finance was almost evenly distributed across the other regions, 96.3% of private finance 
mobilized through blended finance flows to countries with a credit rating that most low-income 
countries do not have. It primarily benefits high and middle-income countries and catalyses investment 
mostly in mature technologies such as on-grid renewable energy (ODI, 2019). 
Only 5.3% went to LDCs and other LICs. The role of guarantees was particularly important in these 
countries, as they mobilised 62% and 46% of the resources in 2015/16 and 2017/18 respectively. Direct 
equity investment followed, mobilizing 14% and 24% of the resources in 2015/16 and 2017/18 
respectively (ODI, 2019). However, blended finance has usually taken the form of relatively safe senior 
debt rather than guarantees and equity. 
In terms of thematic distribution, 55.5% of the amounts targeted energy and financial sectors, and only 
4% critical climate adaptation priorities such as agriculture and forestry (3.3%) and general 
environment protection (0.7%). In terms of market creation, blended finance leveraged so far limited 
private funds for low carbon investments - less than 1:2 compared to a range between 1:3 and 1:15 
for traditional public finance (BFTF, 2018; Ward et al., 2009). 
The geographic and thematic concentration of blended finance as well as overall low leverage are 
significant obstacles to tapping into the vast private savings pool to reduce the infrastructure 
investment gap in emerging economies. On average, every $1 of MDB and DFI resources invested 
leveraged just $0.37 of private finance in LICs because of a poor investment climate (ODI, 2019). This 
observation calls for further efforts to tailor such instruments to low-income countries and the specifics 
of their climate management, as well as to better meet private investors' risk requirements. It will 
demand greater use of higher impact instruments such as guarantees and equity, particularly for 
market creating investments in adaptation and nature-based solutions in nascent markets. It also 
shows the need to combine project-level financial de-risking instruments with market-level policy 
instruments to enhance the investment climate and improve the catalyst role of public resources.  
One symptom of this limited use of high leverage instruments such a guarantees and equity in blended 
finance is to gap between the potential of green bonds, estimated to €29.4 trillion over 2030 (Bolton 
et al., 2020) and the $1 trillion only issued the ten years since their launch (Climate Bonds Initiative, 
2020). Only 50% of them are backed on sovereign and sub-sovereign guarantees.xvi As a result, the 
market for green bonds remains largely concentrated in developed and emerging markets, with the 
USA, China and France accounting for 44% of global issuance in 2019, and the increase in issuance in 
2019 driven largely by Europe (CPI 2020). Chapter 3 will examine how to unlock such markets in 
developing countries, so that they contribute to reduce the geographical mismatch of capital flows. 
2.3.3. Complementarity between market fixing and market shaping 
In theory, market-fixing approaches can be embedded within broader market-shaping efforts (placing 
key market-fixing policies within measures directed at the demand side – see top line of table 2.2.) In 
practice, market-fixing and market-shaping approaches tend to emphasize different sub-sets of public 
instruments. Market fixing relies on price signals to create a demand for low-carbon low-climate-risk 
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goods and services and shift financial flows towards climate-friendly investments. Market shaping 
intervenes at the level of sector policies and endeavours to create a demand and directly de-risk the 
supply of climate-friendly investments to crowd-in private finance. However, the above discussion 
shows that these two approaches are mutually supportive and should be deployed in tandem. The 
combination of the two sets of instruments helps overcome the constraints inherent to each approach 
and increase the overall efficiency and effectiveness of public policies and finance to accelerate the 
transition to net zero climate-resilient economies.  
The four graphs below (figure 2.1) sketch the cumulated net cash flows over time of an archetypal 
conventional, carbon-intensive project C and a 'green' low carbon project G. The modelled policy 
impacts are magnified in the many low-income countries, which face high financing costs, and for 
early-stage technologies.  
In the North-West panel, the red and green curves show the net cash flow trajectories of projects C 
and G that make G economically non-attractive. Its higher net operating margins (lower purchase of 
fossil fuels) do not compensate for its higher capital intensity, particularly in developing countries with 
limited access to long-term and affordable finance. This is even more the case if, during the projects' 
bidding, development, and construction phases, a slippage in administrative and construction costs or 
a site delay causes the cumulative cash flows to pass the red and green dotted lines. The risk of 
slippage is comparatively higher for novel green technologies and practices. If the project initiator 
selects C, it will earn a lower Net Present Value, but the extra costs will not threaten the project 
viability. If it selects G, it might be trapped in the dotted green line and touch the 'danger line' D 
beyond which it will lose bankers' and shareholders’ confidence when asking for additional support. 
It will then stop the project and lose its down payment with a potential higher penalty related to the 
drop of the enterprise value if not bankruptcy. A simple calculation of the expected yielded cash at 
the projects’ end year (50/50% probability in the panel) will lead the investor to prefer C to G. 
In the North-East panel, pricing and financial signals are used to tilt the balance in favour of G. A 
carbon tax penalizes the conventional project C and shifts its cumulated cash-flows down from the 
red curves while a lower interest rate for G reduces its debt service and moves its cumulated cash 
upward. This is the aim of Climate Disclosure, which prices the value of loans as an inverse function of 
their carbon footprint. 
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Figure 2.1 
This is an illustration of the green infrastructure microeconomic paradox. Even though the net 
present value of G becomes higher than that of C thanks to the two market-fixing tools, project 
initiators might refrain from selecting G because of the up-front risks of extra costs. The relative 
advantage given by price and financial signals to project G comes too late and will not prevent the 
project initiator from touching the danger line D. The average value of the end year yielded cash of G 
increases but stays below that of C.  
In the South-West panel, the market-shaping tools come into play. This panel shows their impact 
pushing down the danger line from D to D' through risk-sharing between project initiators, private 
finance and governments, such as public pre-funding to cover project development and bidding costs. 
It demonstrates the complementarity of market-fixing and market-shaping. Indeed, unleashing 
project initiatives that would have been deterred up-front, the de-risking devices reinforce the 
efficacy of the price and the financial signal. Project G will benefit from the bonified interest rates 
and reach cumulated cash (g’) in the ‘extra cost’ case higher than this (c’) of project C. It will no longer 
be blocked at a shallow level in the North-East panel. As a result, its average end year cumulated cash 
will be higher than that of the conventional option. 
The South-East panel sketches how the consideration of physical risks of climate change (extreme 
weather events affecting operations and supply chains, etc.) and transition risks (early retirement of 
carbon intensive infrastructures, products, services, etc.) reinforces the economic superiority of G if 
C is affected directly or indirectly through a reputational effect. The curves here are purely illustrative 
but show an interesting case, as the consideration of physical and transition risks is not enough to 
establish superiority in the absence of up-front de-risking. The average end year cumulated cash of 
the conventional option with and without over-costs does not differ much from the ‘green’ option in 
the North-East panel. In runaway climate scenarios, these risks will lead to C crossing the danger line.  
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2.3.4. Paving the way for climate-friendly structural changes of the financial and monetary system 
Arguably, the learning process triggered by a synergy between market shaping and market fixing tools 
to unlock climate friendly projects might not go very far without fundamental financial and monetary 
reforms (Campiglio, 2016; Schoenmaker and Tilburg, 2016; Svartzman and al, 2019, Bolton et al 
2020)). The International Monetary Fund started to mainstream climate change into reflections about 
such reforms (Krogstrup , and Oman, 2019). 
The cornerstone of such systemic reforms is that Central Banks recognize the climate remediation 
assets as collateral of debts. This recognition cannot be disconnected from the basic rules for the 
issuance of money and international payment currencies, which explains the suggestions for a new 
Bretton-Woods (Sirkis et al., 2015; M Stua, 2017). Many capital market-shaping proposals are made 
in this direction. They go beyond making compulsory the disclosure of climate-related information or 
taxonomies (EU, 2020) and require changes of macroprudential regulatory rules. One of them is to 
change the Basel III guidelines on liquidity that encourage debt issuance to any activity regardless of 
its emitting content but discourage investing in long-term assets even with negative long-term interest 
rates of AAA countries (Campiglio et al., 2018; Dikau and Volz, 2018). Others suggest imposing new 
prudential standards on banks and non-bank banksxvii (D'Orazio and Popoyan, 2019; Ryan-Collins, 
2019). For example, the differentiation of minimum of reserves held by Central Banks and mandatory 
climate risk indicators included in the EandS assessment of the borrowers would push Central Banks 
to re-purchase in a preferential manner debt based on climate-friendly asset classes (Honohan, 2019; 
Schoenmaker and Tilburg, 2016). 
All these proposals give Central Banks and the IMF a more 'activist' role (Volz, 2017) to support the 
'greening' of the economy and play a 'developmental role through their regulatory oversight over 
money and credit. One difficulty is that this role can be perceived as violating the principle of the 
neutrality of monetary policies concerning microeconomic decisions (Weidmann, 2020). and extend 
the Central Bank's mandates beyond their traditional core responsibility of safeguarding overall 
macroeconomic and financial stability (Dikau and Volz, 2018; McKibbin et al., 2017; UNEP-Inquiry, 
2018)). Such debates engage long-standing traditions about the banking system's independence from 
political influences that differ between OECD and developing countries and even within the OECD 
countriesxviii. The time needed to reach a robust consensus amongst these traditions and overcome 
the geopolitical obstacles to significant monetary reforms makes them incompatible with climate 
action's urgency. 
This does not mean that these reforms are not needed. This means that they are not a precondition 
for climate action, and one question to be explored further is to what extent launching a circle of trust 
to scale-up climate-friendly investments can pave the way for structural reforms of the financial 
systems claimed for reasons other than climate risks. This might be the case because an immediate 
scaling-up of low carbon investment with a high credibility level could lead without political 
interferences, to a recognition of the underlying assets by Central Banks in their interbank payments. 
The conditions for this emergence are discussed in 3.2. They include multilateral sovereign guarantees 
and projects assessed by standard rules including a common notional value of avoided carbon 
emissions that Stiglitz and Stern (2018) recommend in the absence of high enough explicit carbon 
prices. The emergence of assets recognized in such a setting might address the concerns of high-level 
policy-makers about the risks of political arbitrariness of the management of Central Banks, which are 
crucial to reject the perspective of a move in Central Banks and the IMF mandates.  
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The rationale for exploring this perspective is that contrary to the rational anticipation and efficient 
market hypothesis this system is vulnerable due to the absence of a mechanism that automatically 
returns capital markets to equilibrium. The works on the link between financial intermediation, credit 
policies, financial cycles, and economic growth show that market finance amplifies economic 
fluctuations. Unlike business cycles where an excess or deficit of demand over production capacity 
triggers rebalancing mechanisms, the momentum of the financial cycles is driven by debt to buy assets 
that permanently reappreciate until the cycle's turnaround provokes their sudden devaluation when 
confidence vanishes. 
Ultimately, scaling-up climate-friendly investments and new asset classes recognized in the interbank 
payments would constitute a step towards a carbon-based reserve currency, which comes back to 
Keynes' position about common money for international trade based on an indicator of 'real wealth.' 
(Jaeger et al., 2013, Hourcade et al., 2012). 
Conclusion:  
Understanding the basic principles of complementarity between up-front de-risking instruments, 
carbon prices, and lower interest rates for low-emissions options helps identify how to implement 
them over time given the political economy constraints on each of them. The end objective is to allow 
the deployment of innovative business models (Déau and Touati, 2017) that bring together public 
agencies and firms, local authorities, private corporates, professional cooperatives, and institutional 
financiers in order to both reduce legal, engineering, and overhead costs of projects and commoditize 
markets of low carbon options from an investor point of view. 
The strategic role of up-front de-risking of low-emissions projects is to unlock many low carbon 
projects under current economic conditions, lower the carbon prices needed to tilt the economic 
balance in their favour and give the necessary time to set up enabling conditions of the deployment 
of market fixing tools over time. This is true for fiscal reforms capable to offset the adverse effects of 
higher energy prices, agreements on common assessment principles to ease voluntary international 
carbon trading xix , and the upgrading of the scope, credibility, and effectiveness of climate financial 
disclosure. 
The scaling-up of climate finance could ultimately contribute to the emergence of a more robust 
financial system by hedging against the systemic risks of climate change and partially offsetting one 
of its endogenous sources of destabilization thanks to the reduction of ‘the gulf between what markets 
value and what people value’. (Carney M. 2020). 
 
Endnotes
 
iv This caveat from the IPCC AR4 about cost assessments: “most models use a global least cost approach to mitigation portfolios and with 
universal emissions trading, assuming transparent markets, no transaction costs, and thus perfect implementation of mitigation measures 
throughout the 21st century.’ (AR4 WGIII SPM Box 3). Scenarios thus minimize transition costs and assume the best available options are 
adopted by all economic agents in all countries. They provide useful benchmarks but political uncertainty matters when designing efficient 
financial arrangements. 
v These estimates aggregate energy sector information from box 4.8 of the IPCC 1°5 C report (IPCC, 2018) with results of Fisch-Romito & 
Guivarch (2019) on transportation infrastructure and of the OECD (2017) on other sectors.  
 
vi On the basis of global private capital stock estimates in 2017 ($100 trillions in bonds, $60 trillions on equity and $226 trillions in banks 
loans, and assuming that half of investment are funded by public capital, Dasgupta et al. (2019) show that redirecting between 0,8% and 
3% of the private capital’s yearly revenues would be needed to fund the incremental costs. This wide range encompasses the range of 
investments needs and a pessimistic 3% to an optimistic 5% average returns of capital. This does not mean that it is an easy task since 
innovative financial channels and products have to be set up, but that there is no apparent global constraint for such a shift in financial 
portfolios. However, these assessments imply the emergence of new assets classes to compensate for the stranded assets due to early 
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retirement of capital stock and divestment from the fossil-fuel industry, which could amount to 32% of the carbon-intensive assets 
(Mercure 2018) in the case of a speedy transition. 
 
vii https://tradingeconomics.com/country-list/r beasating 
viii These studies, although conducted with different methodologies and for different contexts, deliver convergent messages. Schmidt 
(2014) finds that a risk premium that doubles the financial costs increases the life-cycle costs of electricity from renewable energies by 
31% to 46%, while the costs of electricity from coal and gaz increase by 17% and 7% (they even decrease by 3% for diesel). As for switching 
carbon price, it triples for wind and biogas, more than double for small hydro and increases by 70% for photovoltaïc. Hourcade et al. 2017, 
for a similar risk coefficient, find that the switching carbon price almost doubles for coal plus CSS in the EU and hydro projects in Brazil. 
Hirth and Steckel (2016) find that the switching carbon price securing a 25% share of renewable energy in the electricity sector in Germany 
increases by 80% when a higher risk perception leads a weighted average capital cost of low carbon options to increase from 7.5% to 12%. 
 
ix The minimum and maximum marginal costs of carbon reported in the AR6 report range between $70 and 160 for 2030 worldwide for a 
2°C target and the summary for policy-makers of the IPCC 1.5° C report states that the carbon prices for a 1°5 C target should be set at a 
level three to four times higher than those needed for a 2°C target. These ranges might be optimistic in case of policies only focused on 
carbon price because they assume transparent markets and perfect mitigation of least cost measures (AR4 WGIII SPM Box 3). Moreover, 
they do not represent the compensations needed to equate the marginal welfare costs across countries and assume implicitly that their 
implementation would be costless.  
 
x The scientific robustness of these tools deserves scrutiny. Comparing the amounts of fossil fuels in a baseline scenario with those in a 2°C 
or 1.5° C target to assess stranded assets twenty years ahead comes to assume a benevolent dictator imposing a low emission path on one 
hand and investors ignoring its existence and never changing their decision pattern despite the costly experience of trajectory corrections 
on the other. 
 
xi For example, BNP Paribas Asset Management is divesting from thermal coal across all its actively managed funds. Source: 
https://institutional.bnpparibas-am.com/divesting-coal-new-policy/. Danish pension fund MP Pension sold off shares in 10 major oil 
companies in part because returns were considered poor and were expected to continue to deteriorate. The Norwegian Government 
Pension Fund Global is divesting from some oil companies to manage its climate-related risks deriving from exposure to the sector: 
https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/the-report-on-energy-stocks-in-the-government-pension-fund-global/id2662171/  
 
As for oil companies, the difficulty to disentangle the causes of the share price changes is illustrated by the fact that the shares of Exxon 
Mobil plumetted from 69.89$ on 12/27/2019 to 32.74 on 03/20/2020, rose to 53.08 on 06/05/2020, fell again to 32.78 on 06/11/2020 and 
was 61,93 on 03/03/2021. The share price of Total followed a similar trend: 50.38 on 01/03/2020, 25 on 03/20/2020, 38.34 on 06/05/2020, 
25.82 on 10/30/2020 and 42.19 on 03/12/2021. 
xii https://blogs.imf.org/2020/05/29/equity-investors-must-pay-more-attention-to-climate-cical-risk  
 
xiii Scope 1 registers Direct Emissions under the control of the activity (fuel combustion on-site, fleet vehicles); Scope 2 encompasses indirect 
emissions (e.g., from purchased electricity) and Scope 3 all Indirect emissions from sources that the activity does not control but incorporate 
(through the purchase of non-energy inputs) or induce and that is usually the most significant share of the carbon footprint. Beyond data 
uncertainty, which will be hopefully reduced over time, the difficulties come from two interrelated problems. The first is the ‘attribution’ 
given the complexity of the global value chains (Antras P. & al. 2017, De Loecker & al. (2016) Goldberg P. K .et al (1997); World Bank, 2020a). 
This complexity makes it difficult to track value-added chains in a consistent way with capital flows, the circulation of physical products and 
their energy content. Overcoming the risks of double-counting and controversial attribution with an acceptable level of approximation is 
possible for correcting the countries' emission considering the emissions content of their imports and exports. It grows rapidly at the higher 
level of granularity needed to track the carbon content of capital flows. The second difficulty is that any work on the alignment of portfolios 
towards climate targets, or any stress test, demands a set of baseline and climate constrained trajectories. One alternative option has been 
explored by the French Energy Agency (Ademe). This combines a top-down approach with an attribution per type of activity (Ademe 2014) 
but has not been replicated so far.  
 
xiv https://www.iea.org/policies 
xv In this domain, the existing diversity of command and control tools can be grouped in: 
-  end-use standards for domestic appliances, lighting, electric motors, water heaters, and air-conditioners) in OECD countries and, 
more recently, in developing countries (Brown et al., 2017; Scott et al., 2015). Mandatory efficiency labels often complement them to attract 
consumers' attention and stimulate the manufacture of more efficient products.  
- efficiency standards (e.g. miles/gallon or level of CO2 emission per km) in the transport sector for light and heavy-duty vehicles. 
In the EU (Ajanovic and Haas, 2017) and the US (Sen et al., 2017), vehicle manufacturers must meet an annual CO2 emission target for the 
entire fleet they sell.. 
- regularly revised building codes (Evans et al., 2017) to increase their efficiency per unit of floor space. These codes are essential 
to avoid the lock-in of rapidly urbanizing countries to poorly performing buildings that remain in use for the next 50–100 years (Ürge-Vorsatz 
et al., 2014) and in OECD countries to incentivize the retrofit of existing buildings. In the context of a 1.5°C warming a new focus is placed 
on public and private coordination to better integrate building policies with the promotion of low-emission transportation modes (Bertoldi, 
2017). 
-  
xvi https://nordsip.com/2020/07/14/green-bond-issuance-to-recover-in-second-half-of-2020/ 
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xvii These regulations can include leverage limits, liquidity requirements, contingent capital requirements, risk committees) on non-bank 
banks, on the asset purchases of central banks injecting liquidity to maintain the cash position of firm’s in adverse conditions, on securities 
issuers, on commodities and derivatives markets and Financial Market Utilities (regulation of market participants and swap dealers). 
 
xviii The first attempts to incorporate climate issues in macroprudential policies at a national level were conducted by central banks of a few 
developing countries: Green Credit Allocation in Bank Bangladesh and India (RBI) 220, differential reserve by Banque du Liban (2010) to 
allocate more credit into renewable energy and energy efficiency 243; the process of Capital Adequacy Assessment, which originates from 
Pillar 2 of the Basel II accords and requires commercial banks to take the exposure to environmental damages and risks into account (Banco 
Central do Brasil, 2017); the Green Finance Task Force initiated by the People’s Republic of China in cooperation with UNEP Inquiry with the 
aim of promoting green bonds (PBOC and UNEP Inquiry 2015). 
 
xixInitiated by the UN Special Envoy for Climate Action and Finance, Mark Carney, the Task Force on Scaling Voluntary Carbon Markets 
released 20 recommendations. They include a) “Core Carbon Principles” (CCPs) and a taxonomy of attributes to ensure high integrity and 
market liquidity b) core carbon reference contracts that can be traded on exchanges to concentrate liquidity and unlock its associated 
benefits c) market infrastructure to ensure resilient, flexible markets that handle large-scale trade volumes transparently d) Improving the 
integrity of carbon markets through strong guidelines and frameworks and e) supporting a clear demand signal to drive the development of 
liquid markets and scaled-up supply 
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Chapter 3: Scaling up climate finance in the context of Covid-19  
The main message from chapter 2 is that climate finance can help bridge the infrastructure investment 
gap with low-emission climate-resilient options that fulfil the objectives of the Paris Agreements and 
sustainable development goals. This can be achieved by embedding carbon pricing and disclosure 
mechanisms within a market transformation approach that removes barriers on the demand and 
supply of low-emission climate-resilient investments. This also help build a safer financial system. 
The Covid-19 crisis has brought the world to a crossroad in the fight against climate change. On the 
one hand, advanced economies are undertaking expansionary fiscal measures. Depending on the 
content of their recovery packages, the large amount of liquidity injected into economies in the 
forthcoming years will either entrench our dependence on fossil fuels and put the achievement of the 
Paris Agreement out of reach; or create the momentum to shift towards net zero-carbon, climate-
resilient and inclusive development for all. Developing countries on the other hand – already the most 
vulnerable to climate change – are suffering from increasingly restricted monetary and fiscal space, 
which seriously undermines their capacity to finance mitigation and adaption measures (Bayat-
Renoux et al., 2020). 
The Covid-19 crisis places two responsibilities on policy and financial decision-makers, which are in 
line with those identified in Chapter 2: narrowing the investment gap by greening economic stimulus 
measures worldwide, and facilitating access of developing countries to long-term and affordable 
finance to implement recovery packages without increasing their debt burden. 
This chapter discusses the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on climate action and highlights why 
climate investments can promote a robust and fair recovery from the crisis. It also recommends four 
concrete actions that enable developing countries to scale up climate finance in order to promote a 
climate-resilient recovery and realize their climate ambitions. 
 
3.1. Covid-19: The world at a crossroad for economic and climate security 
3.1.1. The impact of Covid-19 - A shock quantitatively and structurally different from the subprime 
crisis 
Responses to the Covid-19 pandemic have pushed the global economy into the deepest recession 
since the Second World War. An estimated 81% of the global workforce has been affected by 
lockdown measures worldwide, leading to unprecedented job losses and furloughs (ILO, 2020). The 
World Economic Outlook (April 2021) estimated a 3.5% contraction in global growth in 2020, which is 
far higher than the 0.1% recorded after the 2008 financial crisis.xx Non-conventional monetary policies 
allowed the world GDP to almost immediately return to its pre-crisis level in 2009, even though the 
average growth rate for over a decade remained 0.5% lower than before the crisis. However, the IMF 
predicts in the context of the Covid-19 crisis that the GDP of advanced economies' will be 6.1% lower 
than it would have been otherwise in 2021 (IMF 2020. The last assessment by the World Bank (2021) 
confirms this trend with a 5% reduction, even considering some regains with the success of vaccination 
campaigns. 
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The Covid-19 pandemic has been particularly devastating for developing countries. During the 
subprime crisis, emerging and developing economies continued growing at a rate of 2.8% in 2008 
(World Bank, 2020a), whereas their GDP in 2020 contracted by 2.6% and 5% respectively, China 
excluded (World Bank 2021). In addition to the humanitarian consequences of the pandemic, these 
countries experienced sharp drops in commodity export prices, including oil prices, a collapse in 
tourism revenues, reduced exports to developed economies, and supply chain blockages . This led to 
an increase from 135 million in 2010 to 272 million of the number of people facing food insecurity 
(WFP, 2020), a significant transfer of the employed population into ‘inactivity’ (ILO, 2020), xxi and 500 
million additional people falling below the poverty line. This increase, the first in thirty years, was 
particularly acute in Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) (UNU 
WIDER, 2020). 
The Covid-19 crisis and the consequent dramatic drop in economic activity have led to an 8% reduction 
of greenhouse gas emissions (2.6 GtCO2) from the energy sector in 2020 (IEA, 2020), which is more in 
absolute terms than in any other year on record (Boden et al., 2017, Le Quéré et al., 2018).xxii A global 
adaptive multiregional input-output model at constant GDP shows scenarios with lockdown and fiscal 
counter-measures that would lower global emissions by 3.9% to 5.6% in five years (2020 to 2024) 
compared to a no-pandemic baseline (Shan et al. 2020). However, these scenarios come with high 
economic and social costs and are not compatible with sustainable development and poverty 
alleviation. Without government action, once lockdowns end emissions will rebound to an extent that 
depends on the speed of economic recovery and the nature of recovery spending (Hepburn et al. 
2020).  
3.1.2. Covid-19 fiscal recovery: a green, climate resilient stimulus also accelerates global growth  
In order to stimulate the economy and mitigate the impact of Covid-19, governments are undertaking 
large-scale expansionary fiscal measures. The fifty largest economies in the world have announced 
$14.6 trillion in fiscal spending in 2020, of which $1.9 trillion for long-term economic recovery (UNEP, 
2021). There is a disparity between announced spending by advanced economies (22.5% of their 
combined GDP), and that of emerging markets and developing countries (10.6%), a 17 times greater 
amount on a per capital basis (UNEP, 2021). One of the key reasons for this disparity is the difference 
in the cost of additional debt. For most high-income countries, the cost of additional debt is close to 
0% per annum. For developing countries, with low credit ratings, interest rates are significantly higher, 
increasing the cost of any new debt thus burdening and stretching fiscal budgets. Developing countries 
will build in the next two decades infrastructures that will influence their development path over the 
century (Hourcade and Shukla, 2013). The question is therefore whether the Covid-19 crisis will 
deprive them of the capacity to bridge their infrastructure investment gap taking away options 
compatible with a low carbon path that are generally more capital intensive. 
Before the last proposals of the Biden administration, Mc Kibbin and Vines (2020) estimated that on 
top of the $9 trillion of recovery packages already spent or promised by advanced countries, the 
optimal response to the Covid-19 crisis would be nearly $2 trillion in countries that have not been able 
to put such rescue packages in place. But the content of these packages is not discussed and the 
question is whether green recovery plans will have a knock-on effect at least as strong as ‘colourless’ 
ones. 
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Governments’ reflex might otherwise be to resort to a mix of quantitative easing monetary policies 
and recovery packages that will stay ‘colourless’ until the return to a growth rate that is deemed 
satisfactory (Hepburn et al., 2020). Chapter 2 has shown that the response to the subprime crises, 
combined with stricter regulatory interventions on the banking system, penalized risk-taking and long-
term investments, including low carbon investments. The impact might be worse with oil prices at 
historically low levels, creating a temptation to slow down the behavioural and structural changes 
required by the low carbon transition. 
Conventional economic discussions focus on whether the crowding out effect of ‘green stimuli’ on 
other sectors and consumption will be compensated by their spill-over effects. This framing is relevant 
if the economy is on a balanced growth pathway where there is no idle capacity, production factors 
are fully employed, and inter-temporal financial intermediation is frictionless. In this case, the 
"economic (Keynesian) multipliers are near zero. In contrast, during deep crises, economic multipliers 
of stimulus packages can be high (Hepburn et al., 2020) since capital is idle, consumers underspend, 
and labour skills are underutilised. Fiscal injections can then generate multipliers as high as 1.5 to 2 
(Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012) or even as high as 2.5 (Blanchard and Leigh, 2013). They can 
consist of a mix of investment funding and cash transfers to the most fragile households (Gechert and 
Rannenberg, 2018). 
Together with the public budget constraints and difficult access of some countries to international 
currencies, there are six reasons why the post-Covid-19 recovery packages might have smaller 
multipliers than the post-2008 packages:  
• the economic shock of the current crisis is bigger, and the uncertainty about its near future 
is deeper, leading to more precautionary behaviours 
• the record levels of the global stock of non-financial corporate debt ($13.5tn at the end of 
2019) is higher than during the global financial crisis (OECD, 2020) 
• the lower quality of public and private debt threatens the stability of the banking system and 
of non-bank banks 
• household demand is held back by restrictions on spending possibilities of upper middle 
classes (for example air travelxxiii), job losses, furloughs (OECD, 2020) and precautionary 
behaviours 
• the global health scare halts sentiments with savers and investors giving priority to safe rents 
over risk-taking investments in productive activities. The evolution of this sentiment will be 
determined by the speed at which vaccination campaigns will reduce the pandemic effects 
and prevent new outbreaks. 
Can climate-oriented packages overcome part of these obstacles and have a stronger and more 
certain knock-on effect? The IMF (2020) suggests that a global 'green stimulus' of 0.8% of GDP in 
additional fiscal spending annually between 2020 and 2030 would accelerate the emissions reduction 
path and boost global recovery by about 0.6% of GDP per year in the forthcoming years. 
The reason why 'green stimuli' have potentially a strong knock-on effect is that the infrastructure 
sector represents a dominant share of the world’s gross capital formation (Leduc and Wilson, 2012) 
and involves principally domestic industrial demandxxiv. The IMF has long advocated for an 
infrastructure push (Abiad et al. 2014), and recent studies confirmed the positive impact of 
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transportation infrastructure investments after the 2008-2009 recession (Donaldson et al., 2016; 
Donaldson, 2018).  
However, the strength of the green spending multiplier, compared with that of colourless recovery 
packages depends on its funding modalities (tax, foreign debt, domestic borrowing) (Batini et al., 
2021), the overall policy environment (fiscal reforms, sectoral policies) and the synergies with other 
priorities, including health, poverty alleviation and securityxxv. It will therefore differ across countries. 
3.1.3. Covid-19 stimulus measures are not green enough yet  
Examining the fiscal stimuli of 41 countries, Shan et al. (2020) have shown that carbon-intensive 
packages would increase global five-year emissions (2020 to 2024) by 16.4% (23.2 Gt) while the 
‘greenest’ one could reduce them by 4.7% (6.6 Gt) (2020). Foster et al. (2020) show that a ‘colourless’ 
recovery would put the world on an emissions pathway that would pass the 1.5°C threshold within a 
decade and the 2°C limit soon after 2050, whereas the world has a 50% chance to stay below the 2°C 
warming target with a moderate green stimulus and below 1.5°C with a solid green stimulus.xxvi The 
distance between these trajectories would not be a problem if moving from one to another were 
possible without high economic costs. But because of the long lifespan of energy, transport, and 
building infrastructures, an abrupt change of course would be very expensive, which justifies early 
climate action (Grubb et al., 1995; Ha-Duong et al., 1998). 
The UN Environment Programme (2021) finds that, in the 50 largest economies, only 18% of recovery 
spending and only 2.5% of total spending will enhance sustainability. In 2020, G20 countries spent 
$208.73 billion supporting fossil fuel energy, compared with at least $143.02 billion supporting clean 
energy.xxvii Considering the relative size and green characteristics of recovery spending, Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, France, Norway and Poland were global leaders. Spain and South Korea also 
introduced comprehensive green packages. The South Korean ‘Green New Deal’ announced in July 
2020 demonstrated a commitment to sustainable recovery. But Hepburn et al. (2020) estimate that 
only 4% of the G20 rescue measures are ‘green’ and have the potential to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions in the long run, 4% are ‘brown’ and are likely to increase net greenhouse gas emissions 
beyond the base case, and 92% are colourless, maintaining the status quo . In March 2021, the US 
President signed into law $1.9trillion Covid-19 relief package. 
3.1.4. Widening Geographical mismatch of capital flows and increasing developing countries debt 
burdens  
Since early 2020, governments and Central Banks have adopted monetary and fiscal policies that 
involved an unprecedented level of private and public debt outside war times in all countries (365% 
of GDP according to Tiftik , and Mahmood (2020) towards the end of 2020). More than two-thirds of 
the debt is in private hands, and a failure in economic recovery could lead to dramatic declines in 
equity valuations and asset values that would severely hit corporate balance sheets.  
Efforts to revive economies and mitigate the impact of Covid-19 led to a sharp increase in debt, by 
19.3% in developed countries, 23.6% in emerging economies, and 14.6% in low-income countries.xxviii 
A basic economic principle is that new public debt, subject to efficient use of the received funds, is not 
a problem for a country if a) it can be repaid by the tax revenues of the additional economic growth 
generated by the investments it finances; b) creditors recycle interest revenue in the economy, which 
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is partly a function of the share of the debt held by nationals; c) the new liability is balanced by assets 
of credible value in public balance sheets; and d) there is no difficulty to access international 
currencies to pay imports and debt services to foreign entities.  
Because they meet these four conditions and some have the privilege of a currency recognized as a 
reserve, developed countries have a debt/GDP ratio twice as high in percentage points as that of 
emerging and middle-income countries, and 2.5 times higher than that of low-income countries. 
Public debt management is easier for them than for developing countries that do not have the same 
latitude to adopt a counter-cyclical package stimulating demand. The Covid-19 context has reinforced 
this constraint in developing countries for three reasons: 
• Drop of domestic public revenue: the plunge in economic activity has significantly reduced 
their tax revenues and already limited domestic public resources. Trade declined by 13-32% 
(WTO, 2020) and international tourist arrivals fell by 60-80%in 2020xxix. Plummeting commodity 
prices disproportionately affect countries that rely more strongly on natural resource revenues. 
Taken together, fiscal balances in developing countries are expected to turn sharply negative 
to -9.1% and -5.7% of GDP in middle-income and low-income countries respectively (UN, 2020). 
For sub-Saharan Africa, estimates suggest that government revenue could deteriorate by 12 to 
16% compared to a non-Covid-19 baseline scenario (World Bank, 2020a). At the same time, the 
Covid-19 shock necessitates large public spending on health, social protection and economic 
relief, as well as longer-term investments to maintain the recovery. The simultaneous 
divergence in available funds and the increase in spending needs amplifies the ‘scissor effect’ 
of sustainable development finance identified by the OECD (2021), which means that public 
debt in developing countries is likely to increase further and sizeably. 
• Decline in foreign currencies inflows from exports and external private finance: the 
deterioration of exports, the fall of international tourism and of commodity revenues in 2020 
created a dangerous 'currency scarcity' in many countries. Simultaneously, private finance 
inflows were expected to decrease by $700 billion in ODA-eligible countries and remittances 
dropped by 20% compared to 2019 levels. During the two first months of the crisis, an exodus 
of capital towards countries perceived as more secure ($100 billion according to the IMF) 
represented the largest capital outflow in history. While debt flows to emerging markets 
recovered in April and May 2020, outflows of equity have continued. Overall portfolio and 
investment flows are not expected to recover quickly as the Covid-19 pandemic is still 
ongoing, which could result in a second wave of outflows, according to the Institute of 
International Finance (IIF, 2020). Foreign direct investment (FDI) to developing countries also 
slowed down in 2020, with an estimated 35% drop, particularly in terms of equity (World 
Bank, 2020b). This will most likely be compounded by a lower equity to debt leveraging ratios 
for infrastructure in the coming years. Infrastructure projects often have higher levels of 
leverage than non-infrastructure investments, given lower cash flow volatility. Debt 
instruments have historically comprised 70-90% of the total capitalization of infrastructure 
projects in developing countries (OECD, 2016b) whereas in high-income nations there are 
examples of private debt financing 100% of infrastructure projects. The increased risk 
perception could lead financiers to require higher equity investment to mitigate lending risks 
in a deteriorating macro-economic environment.  
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• Solvency and liquidity crisis for SMEs: SMEs account for over 60% of GDP and over 70% of 
total employment in low-income countries when considering the informal sector.xxx The 
economic lockdowns caused by containment measures have reduced demand for their 
products and disrupted supply chains. Given their limited resources, SMEs can survive shocks 
over very restricted periodsxxxi and they are more exposed to corporate insolvency than larger 
firms. According to a survey by the International Trade Center (ITC 2020) in 132 countries, 
one-fifth of SMEs are at risk of shutting down permanently within three months.xxxii The SMEs 
sector collapse would reverse years of efforts to strengthen developing countries’ capacity to 
invest in climate action. 
Even though the G20 has suspended official bilateral debt payments from the poorest countries, 
freeing up about $5 billion for 42 low-income states in 2020, poor macroeconomic conditions, 
including currency devaluations and increased perceived country risk, led to downgrades in sovereign 
credit ratings, increasing the interest rate spread and cost of public borrowing. In 2018, the spread 
was 1.3% for a five-year project and 2.5% for a ten-year project in BBB rated countries and up to 6% 
and 9% respectively in B rated countries. At the low end of the creditworthiness ranking, more than 
60 countries were rated below BBB and, before the Covid-19 crisis, had access to capital only at 
spreads higher than 18% for projects longer than two years (Buhr et al. 2018). The list of countries in 
debt distress has grown since then, and outright defaults have already begun (Bulow et al. 2021) with 
substantial downgrades in sovereign credit rating.xxxiii The proportion of poorest countries (assessed 
using the Low-Income Country Debt Sustainability Framework) in or at high risk of debt distress has 
climbed to 55% in January 2021, from 50% in 2019 and 26% in 2013.xxxiv These countries have neither 
deep domestic financial markets nor excess savings. The conditions are such that some financially 
strapped countries are now hesitant to accept debt standstills for fear of jeopardizing their credit 
ratings, creating issues long into the future. Notably, FDI greenfield investment, which is more 
important in developing economies than mergers and acquisitions, declined significantly over the first 
two months of 2020, and the announced inflows for such investments for 2021 are 60%, 51%, and 
38% lower than in 2019 in Africa, Latin America and Asia respectively.xxxv There will not be a sustainable 
debt if such trends continue. 
Developing countries will thus not be able to mount counter-cyclical climate investment paths since 
past experiences show that rising domestic taxes to balance public budgets slows down recovery and 
increases capital outflows. After the subprime crisis, macroeconomic policies did not prevent the GDP 
growth rates of Latin America and Low-Income Countries from falling from 3% per year and 6% per 
year respectively between 1997 and 2007 to 2.05% and 3.92% between 2009 and 2019. The situation 
might be worse in the post-Covid context because developing countries might also receive less help 
from the MDBs than after the subprime crisis. The World Bank, the African Development Bank (AfDB), 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)increased their 
total lending by $46.4 and 42.9 billion in 2009 and 2010 (compared with 2008) against $18.2 billion 
and $20.1 billion only in 2020 and 2021 (compared with 2019) (UN IATF 2021). Actually within this 
total, LDCs received a higher support than after 2008. This is the case for the World Bank’s IDA 
commitments (an increase of 40% in 2020 against 26% in 2009), for the AfDB’s concessional window 
which is expected to reach its $3.0 billion target, and for the ADB due to significant lending room 
gained from the merger of its concessional and non-concessional windows in 2017. But financial 
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capacity constraints are limiting MDB countercyclical support for middle-income countries. The World 
Bank’s International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) loan commitments for middle-
income countries are estimated to have increased by only 36% in 2020, compared to a 145% increase 
during its response in 2009. Similarly, AfDB lending through its non-concessional window is hampered 
by financial constraints and expected to fall compared to 2019. The situation is similar for IADB, whose 
2020 response is also lower than its response to the global financial crisis (UN IATF, 2021)  
If these pessimistic prospects materialise for a significant number of developing and emerging 
economies, OECD countries will fail to recover full employment even using robust rescue and recovery 
packages. In the absence of a dynamic demand from developing countries (55% of the world markets, 
China excluded), these packages might deepen the gap between the propensity to save and the 
propensity to invest worldwide. The combination of yields falling because of expansionary monetary 
policies, an impressive increase of households saving ratesxxxvi, and persistent risk-averse corporate 
saving trends (Demary et al., 2021) are indeed the key ingredients of a ‘saving glut’ whereby the high-
income people refrain from financing productive investments (Mian et al., 2020; Chen et al. 2017). 
Lowering the risk-perception of such investments is a matter of domestic public policies but will not 
be achieved without a conducive international context. 
Unconventional monetary policies (debt cancellation, debt swaps, issuance of new special drawing 
rights (SDRs), Gallagher et al., 2020) are currently envisaged to avoid economic collapse in many 
countries. They are discussed but the major difficulty to be solved is the cascading effect they will have 
on the world economy and the financial system. Large-scale economic stimulus packages from OECD 
countries pump trillions of dollars into the global financial system and lead to a series of asset price 
bubbles that could burst soon and undermine financial stability if the liquidity is not invested 
productively. The way out is to direct part of the additional debt where the greatest needs are, 
including low-carbon investments (Bulow et al. 2021). 
Chapter 2 has shown that well-designed climate investments can create this redirection by lowering 
the investment risks coefficient in developing countries. Such risks currently prevent the flow of 
capital to solve the geographical mismatch and restricts access to the largest greenhouse gas 
emissions abatement opportunities and corresponding markets. The challenge is then to convince the 
climate agnostic decision-maker that these basic principles can be enforced and will ensure that any 
new payment facility will use money efficiently to create jobs and economic wealth in the short-term. 
The following section examines this challenge. 
 
3.2. Immediate actions for a climate resilient Covid-19 recovery in developing 
countries 
The economic and financial impacts of Covid-19 have exacerbated the four pre-existing challenges 
facing developing countries to scale up climate action. In order to address these challenges, 
developing countries will need to ensure that climate action and economic recovery are mutually 
supportive, scale up investment without increasing their debt burden, attract large scale private 
financial flows in a context of perceived higher investment risk, and secure access to long-term 
affordable finance at a time of rising capital costs. 
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This can be achieved through a set of four complementary actions: (i) integrating policies on climate 
action, sustainable development and Covid-19 stimulus measures to minimize incremental investment 
requirements and optimize development co-benefits; (ii) alleviating developing countries’ debt 
burden to create fiscal space to finance their green, climate-resilient recovery plans; (iii) leveraging 
sovereign and multi-country guarantee funds to reduce investment risk and catalyse private finance; 
and (iv) increasing developing countries’ access to the green bond market.  
3.2.1. Policy: Integrating climate, sustainable development and Covid-19 stimulus measures  
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) are at the heart of the Paris Agreement and countries’ 
commitment to transform their development trajectories. Countries are currently in the process of 
submitting updated and more ambitious NDCs. This process will culminate at the 26th session of the 
Conference of the Parties (COP 26) to the UNFCCC in November 2021 in Glasgow. This section discusses 
how the next generation of NDCs can promote integrated policy planning and support the development 
of investment plans that identify the right sources of finance and the opportunities to combine and 
sequence different sources of finance.  
Leveraging NDCs to promote integrated policy planning between climate action, sustainable 
development and Covid-19 recovery measures 
One pervading message throughout this report is the importance of integration between sectoral 
policies, adaptation measures, mitigation action, and Covid-19 recovery stimulus (Fankhauser and 
McDermott, 2014; Morita and Matsumoto, 2015; Adenle et al., 2017; Sovacool et al., 2015, 2017; Peake 
and Ekins, 2017). 
An illustration of the gains deriving from policy integration is given for a 2°C scenario that also meets 
the targets of SDGs 6.1 (drinking water) and 6.2 (sanitation and hygiene). They find that the total annual 
infrastructure investment of low and middle-income countries in energy, transportation, water supply, 
sanitation, flood protection, and irrigation should amount to $2.7 trillion/year over the next 15 years, 
under current decision-making practices and fragmented policies, against $1.5 trillion/year only in case 
of policy coordination. For the sole investments that are critical for adaptation (water supply, 
sanitation, flood protection, and irrigation) the reduction would be from $0.66 trillion/year to 0.35 
trillion/year.  
Similarly, integrating macroeconomic policies, debt management and sectoral ‘green’ packages will 
maximize the knock-on effect of recovery strategies and their development side-benefits. For example, 
investment in energy efficient buildings can generate large employment opportunities, reduce energy 
poverty and increase resilience to extreme weather events. Investments in climate resilient agriculture 
and water management will preserve livelihoods and foster ecosystem restoration while investment in 
shovel-ready low emission, resilient infrastructure will protect people, jobs and assets. 
However, at the domestic level, policy making is typically split across different government ministries, 
e.g. ministries of environment are responsible for developing and updating NDCs, ministries of planning 
are responsible for national SDG plans, and ministries of finance for economic stimulus packages and 
creditworthiness concerns. Experience from the first NDCs has shown that they were often siloed in 
environment ministries with weak alignment with national, sectoral and sub-national development 
planning (Riva M. et al. 2020).  
Translating NDCs into investment plans 
NDCs and national SDG plans are often designed as policy signals for national priorities, rather than 
portfolios of bankable investment projects. Few countries have completed their NDC financing plan 
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(Cooke et al. 2018) due to the lack of clarity on what these plans should look like and a poor 
understanding about the financing mechanisms available for NDC implementation. As a result, 
priorities expressed in NDCs are too numerous and/or too abstract to guide investments grade project 
development at the national/sub-national levels. This is a major obstacle to attracting the right mix of 
finance and using scarce public resources to catalyse private funds for climate investments with high 
socio-economic co-benefits. 
In addition, the domestic financing landscape is complex and fragmented. Institutional partners, 
including international development agencies and banks tend to have their own country strategies and 
programming documents to identify investment priorities and different focal points in line ministries. 
Similar challenges also emerge at the sub-national level, where there is often no structured 
engagement or coordination mechanisms dedicated to municipalities for climate investment decisions. 
There is a need to translate integrated NDCs into investment plans that: 
• align, combine and sequence multiple sources of international and domestic finance from the 
public and private sectors;  
• enable countries to take a more integrated value-chain investment approach, notably by 
acquiring the technical capacity needed to address policy and regulatory gaps in order to 
improve the bankability of the NDC project pipeline; and 
• identify financial mechanisms and investment patterns that will not increase sovereign debt, 
but catalyse private funds and increase access to long-term affordable finance.  
This need is amplified in order to green Covid-19 recovery efforts.  
Developing NDC investment plans can take place as part of countries’ efforts to update their NDCs or 
increase their access to climate finance. Box 3.1 highlights the Government of St. Lucia’s efforts to 
develop and implement an NDC Financing Strategy to realize its climate and sustainable development 
ambitions without increasing its debt burden.  
Translating NDCs into investment plans can also take place as part of a country’s broader effort to 
finance its national sustainable development strategies. In line with the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, 
countries are beginning to design integrated national financing frameworks (INFFs). INFFs set out the 
national financial landscape and coordinate efforts to mobilise and align a wide range of financing 
sources with the country’s sustainable development priorities (UN IATF, 2019). 
Consistent with the INFF process, such policy integration and the development of NDC investment plans 
can be achieved through high level inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms, that also bring together 
institutional partners and financiers. Such mechanisms would create opportunities to jointly identify 
climate friendly investment priorities, map different sources of finance and strengthen synergies 
between public domestic resources, public international finance, including through direct budgetary 
support (DBS), and private finance. Identifying priority investments should also reflect the impact of 
non-action and how climate change may affect countries’ macro-economic stability and development 
objectives. Priority investments could be duly costed and translated into a pipeline of bankable 
projects. Contributions from public resources (domestic and international through DBS) can then be 
integrated in annual budgets via Medium-Term Expenditure Frameworks (MTEFs), and Public 
Investment Programming (PIP), which create regular timeframes to embed climate investments as part 
of national domestic spending plans and processes. This in turn would enable institutional partners and 
private sources of finance to align their investments with national climate friendly investment priorities. 
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Within this context, , a key responsibility of the international community is to reduce the 
fragmentation of the current climate finance (Watson and Schalatek, 2020) and enable synergies 
between different sources of finance.  
Box 3.1: Saint Lucia mobilizes international climate finance and private investment for low-
carbon developmentxxxvii 
Saint Lucia, like all Small Island Developing States, is deeply affected by the impacts of climate 
change. The Government is committed to global efforts to reduce greenhouse gases and has 
pledged in its NDC to reduce the country’s emissions by 23% by 2030. The achievement of Saint 
Lucia’s NDC targets is conditional upon external financing. While international climate finance and 
ODA offer some relief to Saint Lucia’s growing debt-to-GDP ratio, the decreasing level of 
international aid undermines the long-term sustainability of this approach. Saint Lucia faces a 
number of barriers, including limited fiscal space and limited access to long-term, affordable finance 
due to high interest rates – averaging 7.7% in 2019 - and collateral requirements. Enterprises also 
lack capacity and a track record in climate mitigation projects.  
In order to address these barriers, the Government is striving to increase access to climate finance 
and develop new and innovative mechanisms to de-risk mitigation projects and attract private 
sector investments. The Government’s strategy sets out a target of $218 million in mitigation 
investments provided by the private sector by 2030, 90% of the total. In order to achieve this target, 
the Government has embarked on the development of an NDC Financing Strategy which proposes 
specific actions aimed at increasing and accelerating private sector participation, particularly for 
the development of commercial mitigation projects. The strategy includes: 
• Accessing the green bond market by exploring their issuance and advancing go-to-market 
and pre-issuance activities, including the development of a Green Bond Roadmap and 
Green Bond Framework.  
• Developing and implementing a ‘debt for climate swap strategy and roadmap’ by 
assessing Saint Lucia’s public finance policy and external debt to assess readiness for a swap 
transaction, supporting engagement with priority creditors, identifying eligible projects, 
and developing an appropriate governance, monitoring and reporting mechanism.  
• Greening Saint Lucia’s financial sector by strengthening the capacity of local financial 
institutions to understand environmental and social risks and benefits, integrate 
environmental and social standards into processes and procedures, and develop green 
credit instruments.  
• Increasing the Government’s capacity to implement public-private partnership projects 
by developing a web-based step-by-step public-private-partnership (PPP) toolkit to be used 
by public officials for assessing projects against screening criteria such as environmental 
and social impact, scale, risk transfer, financial viability and market appetite.  
• Developing a concept for high-quality green and affordable housing for submission to the 
Green Climate Fund to address the need of a housing stock that is resilient to extreme 
climate events and accessible.  
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3.2.2. Alleviating developing countries’ debt burden to create fiscal space for a green, climate-
resilient recovery 
The sharp increase in developing countries’ debt level due to the Covid-19 crisis creates a vicious cycle, 
whereby these countries have almost no fiscal space to spend on the economic recovery and climate 
action. The situation is especially critical for 55% of the poorest countries which were in or at high risk 
of debt distress in January 2021. For example, Fiji, a small island developing state that is highly 
vulnerable to climate change, has reduced government allocations to climate related projects by 32% 
in 2020.xxxviii 
Several multilateral actions are being taken to support developing countries coping with the economic 
crisis and create more fiscal space. The G20 has suspended – not cancelled – official bilateral debt 
payments for 42 low-income countries, corresponding to approximately $5 billion. MDBs collectively 
announced over $200 billion of support to developing countries (UN IATF, 2021). The IMF will present 
by June 2021 a formal proposal to the Executive Board on a new Special Drawing Rights (SDR) 
allocation of $650 billion to help meet the global long-term need to supplement reserves and boost 
liquidity (IMF 2021). However, a similar initiative taken by the G20 in 2009 for an amount of $250 
billion was blocked by the lack of easy country allocation rules and by the fear that greater payment 
facilities would lead to a lax selection of projects and generate windfall profits. These obstacles might 
still prevail today. 
Even bolder action i is ‘debt-for-climate swaps’, a partial cancellation of debt by the creditor 
government transforming the remaining part into local currency and directing it to investment in 
climate action. The level of debt reduction could be a function of a country’s overall climate 
vulnerability. Many forms of debt swap for development and environment have emerged since the 
1980s. They have proven to alleviate the fiscal pressure of debt repayment, improve macroeconomic 
stability, generate long-term, stable streams of revenue for environmental projects, and help build 
capacity in managing public environmental expenditure. However, such swaps have to date resulted in 
relatively small amounts of debt relief, limiting their impact on the overall debt burden. Their use has 
been limited for two reasons. First, they are complex to design and tend to require long legal 
negotiations and technical assistance to support reviews of countries’ policies and legislative 
frameworks, and formulations of contractual agreements between debtor and creditor countries. Early 
debt-for-environment swaps were negotiated by environmental NGOs, which did not always have the 
resources to implement large-scale programmes. Second, experience has also shown that such swaps 
require a pipeline of high-quality bankable climate investments which can be capitalized in the form of 
credible assets and supported with transparent and credible domestic spending. 
Both ‘debt-for-climate swaps’ and the issuance of new SDRs, or any form of unconventional debt relief, 
will be scaled-up and generate development and climate benefits if they credibly target bridging the 
countries’ infrastructure gap. Low-carbon climate-resilient options are interesting in terms of credibility 
as they can link the impact of mitigation and adaptation action to clear metrics (e.g. avoided emissions 
and number of people benefiting from increased resilience), designed using transparent assessment 
methods suggested below.xxxix. 
These unconventional debt management instruments (debt-climate swap, debt suspension or 
cancellation, SDRs) respond to the specifics of the post-Covid-19 context and are additional, not 
alternative to the commitment of developed countries to mobilize $100 billion in climate finance per 
year by 2020 for developing states. Reaching the $ 100 billion commitment is critical to finance essential 
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non-market services as well as the deployment of environmental policy instruments to create a 
conducive business context to catalyze low carbon, climate resilient private investment. 
These commitments, formalized at the 16th Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC in 2010, are 
central to the climate accords but have not been fulfilled so far even though they have been on an 
upward trajectory before 2020xl. They are also pivotal to restore a circle of trust and creating an 
enabling environment by de-risking market-creating investments in early-stage climate-friendly 
options (see Chapter 2). Connecting the $100 billion target with access to new debt facilities and debt 
reliefs programmes would be an extremely powerful way to foster a green and inclusive economic 
recovery from the Covid-19 crisis both in developing countries and developed countries. However, 
according to a recent assessment by an independent group of experts, it is unlikely that the 2020 $100 
billion target is reached, despite the year-on-year progress between 2015 and 2018 (Bhattacharya, A; 
Calland, R. et al. 2020). A concerted increase of the effort is therefore needed to bolster climate 
finance in 2021. The question is how to shape this concerted action at a short notice. 
3.2.3. Sovereign, sub-sovereign, and multi-sovereign guarantee funds to reduce perceived investment 
risk 
Chapter 2 has explained why sovereign and sub-sovereign (local governments) guarantees are 
increasingly recognised as one of the major blended finance mechanisms to overcome the barriers 
hindering climate-friendly investments. They reduce up-front risks, provide a broad risk coverage, a 
lower cost for public budgets of donor countries and a high leverage ratio of public to private capital 
(BFTF, 2018). Chapter 2 also explained why there is a ‘glass ceiling’ limiting their scale-up by MDBs 
(Gropp et al., 2013; Lee et al., 2018; Schiff and Dithrich, 2017). 
Sovereign guarantees might circumvent this obstacle but their use in finance related to overseas aid 
suffers from a mix of historic finance agencies’ inertia, perceived loss of control over the use of funds 
(compared to direct project-based financing), and politics around fiscal accountability at home. To 
address these challenges, many proposals have emerged for multilateral guarantee funds: Green 
Infrastructure Funds (de Gouvello and Zelenko, 2010; Studart and Gallagher, 2015), Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (Enhanced Green MIGA) (Déau and Touati, 2017), guarantee funds to 
bridge the infrastructure investment gap (Arezki et al., 2017), and multi-sovereign 
guarantee mechanisms (Dasgupta et al.,  2019). 
These proposals have in common the search of a credibility-enhancing effect provided by multilateral 
arrangements on capital markets for both the donor and the host country. Such an effect would 
overcome the lack of familiarity by public administrations with guarantees outside major projects and 
programmes. On the one hand, unlike multi-year budgetary commitments, pre-commitments within 
multi-sovereign guarantee architectures do not depend on annual legislative approvals, which can be 
problematic given taxpayers' fiscal conservatism (Peltzmann, 1992). On the other hand, they would 
support a learning process about agreed-upon assessment and monitoring methods to strengthen, at 
low transaction costs, the environmental and economic credibility of green investments and financial 
products. It could also accelerate the demand for science-based assessment tools. 
In addition, a primary factor enhancing the credibility of multi-sovereign guarantees is the ability of the 
system to deliver immediately tangible reciprocal gains, thus securing its continuation over time despite 
competing demands for public support in all countries. The leverage effect of the Junker Plan in Europe, 
for example, has been estimated at 1 to 15. Even if such a ratio is not systematically reached, multi-
sovereign guarantees are still efficient in mobilizing domestic and international resources from financial 
institutions, asset managers and institutional investors at a low cost and with longer maturities.  
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Guarantor countries can compensate the public cost of their commitments with the fiscal revenues of 
induced exports. Only a percentage of the guarantees has to be set aside as potential loss given the 
default risks, and it can be easily balanced by the positive impact of investments on tax revenues 
through exports. This depends on the country's foreign trade multiplier, i.e., the increase of a country's 
national income generated by a unit increase of its exports. USAID's extensive experience on a global 
guarantee fund for SMEs (known to be generally risky) over 1999-2017 shows a default rate as low as 
2.4% (USAID, 2017). As to the host countries, they would benefit from new capital inflows and the grant 
equivalents of reduced debt service which might potentially go far beyond $100 billion per year 
(Hourcade et al., 2021). 
The overall economic efficiency of the system would be higher with guarantees calibrated on an agreed 
notional value of the avoided ton of emission (Stiglitz et al., 2017). This value would express the "social, 
economic, and environmental value of mitigation actions [and] their co-benefits" (Article 108 of the 
Paris Agreement decision). It could be part of the assessment process discussed below, which is critical 
for the credibility of any climate-friendly financial architecture. 
Multi-sovereign guarantees, where developed countries rated AAA-AA join forces to provide an AAA-
AA backing to developing countries, thus provide a number of advantages. These include:  
• Expanding developing countries' access to capital markets at a lower cost and longer 
maturities thanks to the reduction of creditworthiness risks, especially for small states.xli This 
also avoids the Basel III’s liquidity impediment and the EU's Solvency II directive on liquidity 
(Blended Finance Taskforce 2018). 
• Accelerating the recognition of climate assets suitable for institutional investors seeking 
'safe investments havens’, thanks to the reputational effect of a selection of projects with 
multilateral backing and transparent assessment methods. 
• Strengthening climate disclosure through high grades in the environmental notation of these 
climate assets. This would minimize the risks associated with the 'greening' of the portfolios 
by divesting from carbon-intensive activities for investing in 'carbon neutral' activities and not 
in more risky low carbon infrastructures. 
• Increasing the effectiveness of carbon pricing with more mitigation activities unlocked by a 
given price level, a stronger employment impact and higher funding facilities to help industries 
adapt. This would not remove the need of fiscal measures to accompany the increase of 
carbon prices, but it would make them lighter because they would have to offset the adverse 
effects of lower prices for the same emission objective. 
• Freeing up grant capacities for SDGs and adaptation by crowding in private investments for 
mitigation. For non-marketable activities, grants are the key instrument to develop policy and 
capacity and establish a conducive investment environment that deals with risks.  
Figure 3.1 below provides an overview of a theory of change of a possible multi-sovereign guarantee 
fund.  
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Figure 3.1 
3.2.4. Increasing developing countries access to the green bond market  
De-risking low carbon and climate resilient investments is a necessary but not sufficient condition to 
reduce the mismatch between where the savings are and where they should be directed to for a 
‘green’ recovery. Due to their cash profiles and long-life span, infrastructure investments tend indeed 
to require financial backing for around 15-20 years, whereas (see chapter 2) the tighter regulations 
that have followed the subprime crisis have reduced the long-term risk appetite of banks and 
institutional investors. These regulations resulted instead in preferences for shorter loan maturities (5 
to 8 years) and more secure assets. In 2015, only 5% of assets held by pension funds and public reserve 
funds were backed on infrastructures (OECD 2017). Covid-19 has compounded this risk aversion. 
It is also necessary to transform climate-friendly infrastructures into recognised asset classes to 
remove this barrier. Climate resilient infrastructure as an asset class is needed to back the issuance of 
green bonds that can mobilize institutional finance at scale, respond to the needs of many actors in 
the low carbon transition, and preserve the stability of the financial system (see box 3.2). The potential 
of green bonds is estimated at €29.4 trillion over 2030 (Bolton et al., 2020) and has the potential to 
create new public-private partnerships and increase developing countries’ access to long-term 
affordable debt. However, as noted in chapter 2 in the assessment of blended finance to date, the 
development of green bonds is far below this potential (only $1 trillion in the ten years since their 
launch and $258 billion in 2019, Climate Bonds Initiative, 2020). They represent about 5% of total 
bonds issued globally and they fell by 11% in 2020 in the aftermath of the pandemic. At the same time, 
governments and development banks globally have been actively issuing bonds to provide immediate 
relief amid the devastating impacts of Covid-19. In the first seven months of 2020 sustainable bonds 
issuance surpassed $270 billion, up by 5% from 2019. This includes the issuance of ‘pandemic bonds’ 
largely driven by China (CPI, 2021) but no significant increase of ‘green’ bonds. 
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Several initiatives are ongoing to broaden developing countries’ access to the green bond market (see 
box 3.3 for the example of Jamaica). This requires creating (i) credible and standardized assessments 
and valuation methods to select, monitor and report on high-quality bankable climate projects; and 
(ii) developing capacity to design, float and implement green bonds. Details across these two elements 
are discussed below. 
Project assessment and valuation methods  
A pipeline of high-quality, bankable climate projects is a pre-condition for a strong bond market. On 
the part of institutional and impact investors, concerns around climate impact and possible 
‘greenwashing’ as well as the risk of default can prove a major obstacle to the scaling-up of green 
bonds. From the perspective of public budgets, additional challenges for using public resources to de-
risk climate friendly investments are alignment with country priorities and additionality- i.e. the risk 
that it will generate windfall profits to investors for projects that would have been undertaken 
anyway.  
One way to address these concerns and to best reconcile the interests of investors, entrepreneurs, 
taxpayers and rate payers is to link de-risking mechanisms with transparent and rigorous project 
selection methods. Such methods can assess country ownership, climate impact, additionality and 
sustainability and hedge against arbitrary project selection or 'hold-up' problems in PPPs structures 
(Dewatripon and Legros, 2005; Bolton et al. 2020). The challenge is to set up these hedges without 
increasing the transaction costs of the project at the preparation stage, which would deter 
entrepreneurs' engagement. This strict selection will indeed be a de facto or implicit certification of 
Box 3.2: The importance of new climate resilient asset classes to preserve the stability of the 
financial system 
In addition to its potential to unleash public-private partnerships and increase access to long-term 
affordable debt finance in developing countries, the creation of new asset classes for climate-
resilient infrastructure is essential for: 
• Project developers because the recoverable assets enter the calculation of the project's NPV 
(Net Present Value) and can serve as loan collateral.  
• Economic actors whose capital value could also collapse. These are not only the firms engaged 
in fossil fuel extraction, fossil fuel-based power and heat production, but households whose 
floor space is reduced by insulation works, the transport sector, energy-intensive 
manufacturing, food production, animal husbandry, and forestry. 
• Actors of the financial system (pension funds, insurance companies and asset managers) 
whose ability to meet their obligations might be impaired. They would consequently reduce 
their services (e.g. risk coverage by insurances) with detrimental effects for both mitigation 
and adaptation activities. 
• Countries and regions highly dependent on fossil fuels, whose development capacity will be 
undermined by significant losses due to stranded assets. Their engagement in the low carbon 
transition depends on access to climate remediation assets to finance the industrial 
conversion. 
• Host countries of any loan or bond as any new debt will be first registered as a liability on their 
public accounts posing creditworthiness risks. These risks can be offset if new and credible 
asset classes that can registered on the asset columns emerge.  
• Regulators as financial products across asset classes backed by certified projects would increase 
liquidity and reinforce the efficacy of climate disclosure and taxonomy approaches.  
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bonds. While the challenges are not identical for adaptation and mitigation projects, progress is 
required for both. 
There are several ongoing efforts in this regard. The Climate Bonds Initiative published a Climate Bond 
Standard and Certification Scheme to offer guarantees that funded projects fulfilling environmental 
objectives; and the International Market Association proposed sustainability bonds guidelines to 
incorporate non-climate related benefits of the projects’ portfolio (ICMA 2018). However, in 2019 the 
issuance of green bonds certified through these standards accounted for only 17% of the green bonds 
volume, which is insufficient in relation to needs. UNDP recently released impacts standards for bond 
issuers to optimize their contribution to sustainable development (UNDP, 2021). 
Several proposals also aim to build on experience of environmental funds such as GEF, CDM, GCF, and 
others to develop specific additionality methodologies for green bonds and guarantees. For example, 
in a context of imperfect knowledge of projects’ performance and costs of proving additionality 
(Shishlov and Bellassen, 2012; Bellassen, 2015), it is possible to create statistically significant 
additionality through standardized assessment methodologies.  
Some contributions suggest that agreed upon assessment methods can be standardised for mitigation 
projects thanks to the existence of a common metric - avoided ton of emission. Peer-reviewed 
modelled and non-modelled scientific information could help determine upper and lower bounds of 
avoided carbon emissions associated with a given type of project in a given country and/or region for 
various growth scenarios (Dasgupta et al. 2019). It would then be possible in a multilateral setting to 
launch pilot programs to test methods to (i) evaluate the avoided tons of emissions (in quantity and 
value) by type of project, sector and geography balancing rigour and cost of the assessment, and 
including uncertainty coefficients (Hourcade et al., 2012);xlii and (ii) value the avoided emissions based 
on an agreed value per ton xliii and secure the economic efficiency of the world portfolio of low carbon 
projects through the notional prices recommended by (Stern and Stiglitz, 2017) in the absence of an 
explicit and high enough carbon price. Such methods could then be used by third party expertise 
(Blended Finance Taskforce, 2018; Lee et al., 2018; Schiff and Dithrich, 2017) to guarantee the 
credibility of the bundling of project and of the bonds they back. 
For adaptation, new valuation methodologies are required to better assess the benefits of climate 
resilient infrastructure projects and transform them into a new class of assets. Such mechanisms will 
enable investment decision-making to balance off risks associated with higher upfront costs of climate 
resilient infrastructure with their lower OandM costs and lower climate physical and transition risks. 
This could lead to labelling investments as climate-resilient assets, highlighting their sustainable 
development benefits, including improved health, food security and job creation, all of which are 
critical to the COVID-19 response.  
To develop valuations and labelling of climate-resilient infrastructure in developing countries, the 
Coalition for Climate Resilient Investments (CCRI) is piloting methodologies for their structuring and 
financing. With the Jamaican government (see box 3.3), CCRI is developing an assessment tool to 
enable investment prioritisation based on the exposure of selected infrastructure networks to physical 
climate risks, the economic and social value at risk due to such exposure, and the potential capacity of 
nature-based solutions (NBS) to partially replace hard infrastructures. 
This tool, the first of its kind, will integrate climate risk analytics in programmatic infrastructure 
decision-making enhancing cost-benefit analyses at macro-economic and asset levels. Such analysis 
should in turn support and incentivise the development of project pipelines for resilient infrastructure 
and a more efficient allocation of public and private capital for their realisation. The CRRI will also 
analyse cash flows of selected projects to understand the quantitative changes climate risks brings to 
their budgets and codify the results. 
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Generalising the use of this tool will speed up the emergence of an evidence-based benchmark for 
discussion on standardization, even for projects whose assessment necessitates metrics more complex 
than the tons of avoided emissions. This would make it possible to structure financial instruments that 
realistically embrace resilience to climate change throughout the infrastructure project pipeline, which 
in turn will enable its development, financing and securitization.  
Capacity development to design, float and implement green bonds in developing countries 
Investment in domestic capacity to design, issue and report on bonds aligned with the unique 
requirements of developing countries will be required to fully leverage the potential of green bonds to 
finance the transition to net zero climate resilient development in developing countries. For example, 
a strong technical capacity and standardized technical aggregation methods are needed to unlock small 
projects. A microgrid in a remote African village costs a few hundreds of thousands of dollars, 
equipping a large condominium with electricity distribution infrastructures ten thousand only. Such 
projects are barely significant for institutional investors and cannot respond to asset managers' calls 
for investments over $ 100 million in diversified asset pools. Devices facilitating their bundling, 
securitization, and repackaging in standardized liquid financial products can overcome this obstacle 
(Andersson, Bolton, and Samama, 2016; Arezki et al., 2016; Blended Finance Taskforce, 2018).  
Issuing green bonds requires a regulated capital market to be in place and considerations related to 
liquidity apply. The bond issuer also needs to meet certain criteria for listing financial products. While 
there is no specific legal requirement for issuing green bonds, existing international standards such as 
the Green Bond Principles or Climate Bond Standards can be recognized/adopted by national financial 
authorities, issuers and certifying bodies.  
Financial and non-financial corporate issuers have been the biggest source of green bonds in every 
quarter since Q3 2018. However, government backed entities experienced 35% growth in Q3 2020, 
compared to Q3 2019 (CBI, 2020). Publicly owned financial institutions with specific development or 
policy mandates – National Development Banks (NDBs) - have a critical demand creating countercyclical 
role to play in reviving economies in ways that are consistent with the Paris Agreement and SDGs. NDBs 
together with regional development banks (which together are referred to as public development 
banks, PDBs) represent about 10% of global investment, disbursing more than USD 2 trillion annually.  
There are almost 260 PDBs in developing countries, representing USD 5 trillion in assets. PDBs have the 
capacity of extending more than USD 400 billion in climate finance per year, and doubling their 
investment capacity or leverage effect would be enough to bridge the infrastructure investment gap. 
However, only 58 NDBs in developing countries are accessing international capital markets to capitalize 
their operations. Issuing green bonds could be a game changer for NDBs and international efforts to 
scale up climate action. 
To realize their full potential, NDBs need a clear ‘green’ mandate by policy makers and strong 
governance to become first tier financial institutions. They also require the skills, tools, and track 
record to assess the specific risks associated with investments in new climate technologies and identify 
the most appropriate financial structures. Finally, international public finance institutions will be key 
to support in accessing international climate finance and capital markets so that they have adequate 
capitalization to operate at the required scale and take on early investment risk. 
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Box 3.3: Facilitating an enabling environment for a Caribbean Green Bond listing on the Jamaica 
Stock Exchangexliv 
Jamaica, a small island developing state, is highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, 
including droughts, increased intensity of extreme weather events, and higher temperatures. As an 
upper middle-income country, Jamaica also faces several economic challenges, including low 
growth, high public debt, and high energy costs. The Government is implementing an ambitious 
reform programme to stabilize the economy, reduce debt and fuel growth. The Government is also 
committed to accelerating climate investment from the private sector to implement its NDC 
ambitions.  
Based on recommendations from a regional private sector study, the Government is taking action 
to increase its access to the green bond market in order to finance new and innovative business 
opportunities, and attract local and international institutional investors to support climate 
resilience and low carbon development. 
The Government aims to create an enabling environment for a Caribbean green bond listing on the 
Jamaica Stock Exchange, which will enable it to float through a dedicated green bond facility. 
Specifically, it is:  
• Assessing the current structure of the debt capital market for bonds and the suitability for 
green bond growth;  
• Developing appropriate policies and guidelines based on international standards and Green 
Bond Principles; and  
• Strengthening the capacity of key market players from across the region.  
Once the green bond facility has been established, the country envisions the aggregation of project 
assets (from public and/or private sources) and their refinancing through proceeds of green bonds 
to accelerate the implementation of its NDC.  
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Conclusions 
A key conclusion of this study is that meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement in a way that is 
consistent with the Cancun’s mandate of an equitable access to development (COP26) depends on 
our capacity to use climate action to reduce today’s economic and social tensions. We can do so by 
bridging the structural investment gap worldwide (energy, transport, building, water systems) with 
low carbon and climate resilient options. 
The quantitative evidence is that funding an ambitious low carbon transition is possible by redirecting 
a significant part of private capital towards climate-friendly infrastructures through reducing the 
mismatch between where the private savings are and where the bulk of infrastructure investment 
needs, and opportunities lie, i.e. in developing countries. This is in line with the common but 
differentiated responsibilities principle of the UNFCCC (1992). 
In the absence of policy interventions, the financial system will not be able to redirect private capital 
on the needed scale. It might also integrate too slowly climate-related risks in the ‘value at risks’ 
calculations that guide the permanent restructuring of asset portfolios. Even if this integration is 
accelerated by the deployment of climate disclosure and transparency methods, the portfolios’ 
decarbonisation could occur by investing in emission intensive activities but not in low carbon 
infrastructures. This would take the planet towards climate scenarios (P3 and P4) whereby limiting 
global warming to 1.5°C or 2°C would totally depend upon the mobilization of large amounts of carbon 
capture and storage although the technical feasibility of this technology and its consistency with the 
SGDs are still uncertain. 
The policy interventions needed to increase the economic viability and bankability of climate-friendly 
options must maximize the complementarity of a) market fixing instruments (carbon pricing, climate 
disclosure and transparency rules) that incite the financial sector to offer affordable financial terms to 
such investments, and b) market-shaping approaches (information, regulatory, economic, and 
institutional measures) that reduce uncertainty on the demand for green, climate-resilient goods and 
services and de-risk such investments. To scale up climate action, this complementarity should be 
backed by risk-sharing devices, amongst which public guarantees that transfer to public actors part 
of the upfront risks currently deterring investment initiatives on projects that could otherwise be 
economically viable.  
A second key conclusion is that postponing such measures can be detrimental to climate action. In the 
post-Covid-19 context, those measures inevitably imply support from public budgets subject to 
competing priorities and unprecedented debt levels. The report brings together the latest economic 
expertise, which emphasize the following aspects. 
There is an important asymmetry between most OECD countries, which can roll out ambitious 
recovery packages contracting debt at almost zero interest rates, and developing countries facing the 
downgrading of their credit ratings and difficult access to international currencies. A weak recovery of 
countries representing 55% of the world’s markets (China excluded) could undermine the efficacy of 
the unprecedented injection of liquidity in developed countries. 
Bridging the infrastructure investment gap would be a blueprint for a fast and robust global 
recovery thanks to the strong knock-on effect on infrastructure investments, notably the unlocking 
of two-thirds of the world’s infrastructures market currently ‘frozen’ in developing economies. The 
public policy devices mobilized to redirect savings towards low-carbon options have the advantage, 
compared to untargeted recovery measures, to ensure the efficiency of every unit of public money 
spent. 
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Four interrelated actions that can be taken almost immediately. 
• Integrating policies on climate action, sustainable development and Covid-19 stimulus, 
which requires that governments transform their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) into 
credible investment plans. Integrated national financing frameworks (INFFs) in line with the Addis 
Ababa Action Agenda Policy are necessary to meet the overall investment needs for a low carbon 
transition. This includes a mapping of financial flows which will enable countries to navigate complex 
financing landscapes and identify, combine and sequence the right sources of finance. The 
international community can help build an environment conducive to the translation of NDCs into 
investment plans as part of a country’s effort to finance its sustainable development strategies, 
including by reducing the fragmentation of international climate finance. 
• Alleviating developing countries’ debt burden to create the fiscal space for a green recovery. 
Unconventional policies imposed in the context of the pandemic, such as emissions debts swaps, debt 
cancellation or the issuance of new SDRs, might not be scaled-up at the required level in the absence 
of mechanisms to ensure that they are targeted to activities with a strong short-term recovery 
potential that will allow to easily repay the debt, and that deliver a strong contribution to the 
decarbonation of the world’s economy and the fulfillment of the SDGs. 
• Setting up multi-sovereign guarantee funds to de-risk low carbon investments in developing 
countries. This is possible thanks to AAA guarantees and enhanced credibility coming from the high 
leverage of public funds on private capital, and the delivery of immediately tangible reciprocal gains. 
For guarantor countries the fiscal revenues of induced exports will quickly overcompensate the public 
cost of their commitments, and host countries will benefit from new capital inflows and the grants 
equivalent of reduced debt, which might potentially go far beyond $100 billion per year. A second 
credibility-enhancing factor of the multi-sovereign guarantees is to facilitate the establishment of 
third party assessment procedures backed on agreed-upon methods that include both the 
quantification of avoided emissions and the valuation of these emissions by a notional price of carbon 
to calibrate the amount of the guarantees. This is critical for the emergence of new asset classes and 
the development of credible bonds markets to hedge against arbitrary project selections and windfall 
profits for projects that would have been undertaken anyway. 
• Developing credible green bond markets and facilitating developing countries accessing 
them It is critical to facilitate the bundling, securitization, and repackaging of climate friendly projects 
into standardised liquid financial products that could support the NDCs investment plans. On that 
basis, the key to success is enhancing domestic capacity to design bonds. Together with MDBs and the 
Green Climate Fund, NDBs could be the key players to realize this potential with some dedicated 
support to enable them to become first tier financial institutions and obtain a clear ‘green’ mandate. 
The emergence of credible and standardised projects’ assessment methods is also a precondition to 
dispel the suspicion of greenwashing, a key reason why over the past ten years the issuance of green 
bonds has been far below the theoretical potential in OEDC countries.  
These four immediate actions could have a structural positive impact on the future climate policy 
architecture. They could a) facilitate the deployment of carbon pricing since de-risking mechanisms 
will increase the volume of low-carbon investments at a given carbon price; b) magnify the impact of 
financial transparency and disclosure though the emergence of investments and asset classes of 
higher credibility; c) reduce the fragmentation of climate and development finance and d) enhance 
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the capacity of MDBs and overseas assistance to support non marketable services. These are very 
important to boost the adaptive capacity of societies by crowding in private capital to fund mitigation 
activities. 
To realize this potential, it is necessary and possible to launch a self-reinforcing circle of trust 
worldwide between project initiators, who take the risk of allocating private equity to climate-friendly 
investments; institutional investors, who co-invest and can redirect the pool of private savings; the 
banking system, which sends signals through interest rates and loan maturity; and governments which 
can increase the bankability of climate-friendly investments through a wide range of public policies. 
 
 
 
End note
 
xx This shock is even higher than the 3.6% GDP fall of the Great Recession in 1932. 
xxiThe category of inactivity is distinct from the category of unemployment. It includes peope who no longer search for a 
formal job. This group increased by 6.3% in Latin America, 3.3% in Africa and 3.1% in East Asia. 
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/--dcomm/documents/briefingnote/wcms_767028.pdf 
xxii An interesting comparison is that annual CO2 emissions fell by an average of 4% during the Second World War (1939–
45), 3% during the 1991–92 recession, 1% during the 1980–81 energy crisis, and 1% during the 2009 Global Financial Crisis 
(Boden et al., 2017). The decline in 2020 is significant relative to major historical wars and epidemics (Pongratz et al., 
2021). 
xxiii Air travel is a good indicator of these restrictions. After a 60% drop in air travel in 2020 
(https://www.icao.int/Newsroom/Pages/FR/2020-passenger-totals-drop-60-percent-as-COVID19-assault-on-international-
mobility-continues.aspx), the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation, Eurocontrol forecasts that the flight 
numbers will return to the 2019 level only between 2023 and 2024, with worldwide vaccination in 2021, and will stay 8% 
below that level if global vaccination is achieved in 2022 only: https://www.eurocontrol.int/covid19. 
xxiv Some studies conducted with models representing a world economy on a balanced growth pathway present the modest 
incremental investment cost of climate policies as an argument in favour of green packages (Andrijevic, et al. 2020). This 
argument, grounded on the moderate incremental investment costs of climate friendly options ignores the macroeconomic 
knock-on potential of reducing infrastructure investment in the context of an economic slump which is of the utmost interest 
for policy-making. At the macroeconomic level, because of their incremental investment costs, low carbon options will have 
a higher knock-on effect than conventional infrastructure if they are funded through higher taxes or higher debt but will 
reduce the volume of infrastructures that can be built within a given investment budget. The assessment by Batini N. et al 
(2021) of a green spending multiplier about twice as high as that of conventional spending is very recent and requires further 
examination, but it points out a real potential. Whether the benefits of the additional short-term knock-on effect will 
outweigh the drawbacks of higher investment costs over the medium and long term will depend on the capacity of innovative 
climate finance architectures in order to reduce the infrastructure investment gap faster than it could have been done in the 
present context. 
xxv The concerned sectors are critical for social inclusion. Building efficiency spending for renovations and retrofits, including 
improved insulation, heating, and domestic energy storage systems, can rapidly generate extensive employment 
opportunities, reduce the poor's energy vulnerability, and increase resilience to extreme weather events. Similarly, 
investments in water management ecosystems’ resilience and regeneration, including restoration of carbon-rich habitats 
and climate-friendly agriculture, will preserve livelihoods, while investment in shovel-ready low emission, resilient 
infrastructure will protect people, jobs, and assets. 
xxvi This study does not describe the impact of the general equilibrium effect of such pathways on growth and population 
welfare through, for example, very high carbon prices. It describes the main elements of the behavioural and technical 
changes to be induced and its key message is that the degree of 'greenness' of the recovery packages makes a difference of 
0.3°C in 2050’s average world temperature. 
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xxvii https://www.energypolicytracker.org/region/g20/ 
xxviii https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/G_XWDG_G01_GDP_PT@FM/ADVEC/FM_EMG/FM_LIDC 
xxix https://www.unwto.org/international-tourism-and-covid-19 
xxx https://bassiounigroup.com/smes-driving-growth-in-developing-countries/ 
xxxi Most small businesses in the United States are operating with fewer than 15 days in buffer cash and even healthy SMEs 
have less than two-month cash reserve. Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2020). 
xxxii. A 2020 study by the London School of Economics found even more pessimistic results for financially fragile countries 
(Gambia, Greece, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nicaragua, and Zambia), with four out of five firms at risk of falling into insolvency 
(https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/2020/09/08/firms-in-emerging-markets-fall-to-covid-19/. 
 
xxxiii The observed trends suggest an increasing discrepancy amongst the developing countries with a return to positive yields 
curves of markets assets in East Asia, https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt2103.htm 
 
xxxiv World Bank LIC DSF database. 
xxxv Investment trends monitor : https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/diaeiainf2021d1_en.pdf 
xxxvi This increase of savings rates results from the fact that the high and upper-middle income households could not access 
certain forms of leisure consumption (restaurants, travels, cultural events) and that the middle class adopted precautionary 
savings behaviors. Although data are not consolidated, they show a clear trend. The European Union statistical office 
Eurostat has shown (own calculations) that the average increase of saving was about 7% over the three first trimesters of 
2020 in the EU, representing a 56% increase by comparison with the previous year 
(https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/fr/web/products-eurostat-news/-/ddn-20210202-1). In the US, after a peak of +24% in April 
2021, the average savings increase was 10% between April and December (still 12% in January 2021) representing a 130% 
increase compared to 2019https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/personal-savings 
xxxvii Government of Saint Lucia; Global Green Growth Institute (2021). Readiness and Preparatory support proposal - 
Mobilizing international climate finance and private investment for low-carbon development in Saint Lucia. 
xxxviii https://www.wri/org/profile/michael-westphal 
xxxix In the context of Covid-19, Westphal and Liu (2020) have argued for a climate-health debt swap programme which would 
include measures to foster resilience in the climate and health systems and spending that achieves health benefits by 
reducing air pollution from the burning of fossil fuels. Currently about 4.2 million people die prematurely due to ambient air 
pollution. Simultaneously addressing climate and health needs is consistent with many countries’ NDCs. Westphal and Liu 
also recommend using climate change trust funds to increase accountability. In the Time of COVID-19, China Could Be Pivotal 
in Swapping Debt for Climate and Health Action by Michael I. Westphal and Shuang Liu, November 04, 2020 
xl Climate finance counting towards the $100 billion had been on an upward trajectory, but falls short of the $100 billion 
per year by 2020 target. Based on the most recent OECD assessment, total climate finance counting towards the $100 
billion reached $78.9 billion in 2018 compared to $71.2 billion in 2017. Although the Biennial Assessment of the UNFCCC 
will only be released in 2021, it will likely reflect similar trends given the commonality of the underlying data 
xli Any loan or bond will be first recorded as an additional national debt. The question is whether credit rating agencies will 
judge this debt justified by expected fiscal revenues of induced growth and the built infrastructure's value as collateral thanks 
to the recognition of new asset classes by capital markets. This is of importance for small and less developed economies with 
greater reliance on imported techniques and technical and organizational assistance. The creditworthiness risks come indeed 
less from the absolute level of a public deficit than from the share of debts held by foreigners, from the total public and 
private debt of the country and the capacity of this country to get foreign currencies for its external payments. 
xlii A few initiatives are being launched to test innovative standardised assessment approaches within infrastructure 
platforms: the Global Innovation Lab for Climate Finance (https://www.climatefinancelab.org/), the Fast Infra framework of 
the World Bank (https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/FAST-Infra-Conference-
Presentation-Slides-Nov-2020.pdf and Terrawatt J.-P. Pham-Ba, A. Legrain (2020), “Well bellow 2cts”, Terrawatt Initiative, 
https://terrawatt.org). 
xliii A Third Party Expertise could select a value within these bounds and assign to it an uncertainty coefficient in function of 
the projects’ specifics (Hourcade et al., 2012). Public guarantees could be calibrated on a notional value per ton of avoided 
emissions, retained within the corridors of marginal abatement costs trajectories considering the scenarios reviewed by the 
IPCC, interpreted as the value that the international community attaches to a given climate target (Espagne, & Perrissin-
Fabert, 2017a, Sirkis et al 2015). One can even envisage to incorporate sustainable development co-benefits via an agreed 
'social value of mitigation activities' (SVMA) per ton of avoided emissions (Hourcade, Shukla, & Cassen, 2015) (Shukla et al. 
2015), as recommended by Article 108 of the decision of the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015). Waisman & al (2019) provides 
such a value for India for a climate mitigation strategy aligned with sustainable development outcomes like air pollution 
reduction, energy security, and mobility. A still underworked area is fixing such notional prices for elements other than 
avoided carbon, which are critical for sustainable development (water, forest, air quality, land, and climate resilience). 
xliv Jamaica Ministry of Economic Growth and Job Creation (2019) Readiness proposal to the GCF Facilitating an enabling 
environment for a Caribbean Green Bond Listing on the Jamaica Stock Exchange. 
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